Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

GLASGOW CORPORATION CONSOLIDATION (WATER, TRANSPORT AND MARKETS) ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL

Read the Third time and passed.

Oral Answers to Questions — BOARD OF TRADE

Bulgaria

Commander Courtney: asked the President of the Board of Trade what is the current rate of British exports to Bulgaria; and whether he is satisfied that the present British commercial representation in Sofia is adequate in respect of the potentialities of Anglo-Bulgarian trade.

The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Douglas Jay): Our exports this year are running at an annual rate of £2·7 million. Commercial representation is kept under regular review by my Department and the Foreign Office. As the Plowden Committee pointed out, the lack of an adequate reserve of manpower has led to overstrain, which is reflected in the staffing of Foreign Office posts. Within this limitation the staff at the embassy at Sofia are deployed with commercial work foremost in mind.

Commander Courtney: Does the right hon. Gentleman think that this is really a good return for the £75,000 which the British Embassy in Sofia costs the British taxpayer each year, and will he confirm that commercial representation is confined to half of one individual who doubles up as the consul? Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether he thinks that there is proper, genuine, per-

sonal contact between the members of this embassy and the Bulgarian people, and does he not think that this disproportion between trade and diplomacy is very marked?

Mr. Jay: I understand that the ambassador and his second in command spend much of their time on commercial work. I am glad to see that our exports to Bulgaria have been rising over the last three years, but I fully agree with the hon. and gallant Gentleman that this is an extremely and increasingly important function for our diplomatic posts abroad.

Mr. du Cann: Having, like my hon. and gallant Friend, recently visited this country and other East European countries, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is aware that I fully support what my hon. and gallant Friend has said? Does he not agree that the prospects of increasing trade are very great indeed, particularly in the context of liberalisation, and will he make an urgent point of consulting his right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary in order to ensure that this matter is given urgent attention? It really is needed.

Mr. Jay: Although Bulgaria is one of the few countries which I have not visited in the last few months, I will take note with sympathy of what the right hon. Gentleman says.

U.S.S.R.

Commander Courtney: asked the President of the Board of Trade what is the estimated proportion of the current imbalance of trade between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics represented by the earnings of Soviet-controlled banking, insurance and shipping organisations in London; and what steps he is taking to achieve reciprocity by requesting the Soviet authorities to permit corresponding British organisations to operate within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. Jay: With the exception of the relatively small freight and insurance elements in the figure for imports, the Soviet Union's invisible earnings are not included in the statistics of visible trade between the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. and cannot, therefore, be regarded as forming part of the visible


trade unbalance. I shall continue to impress upon the Soviet authorities the advantages to both countries of their agreeing to allow British concerns involved in Anglo-Soviet trade and services to establish themselves in the Soviet Union.

Commander Courtney: Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm, however, that there is an imbalance in invisible earnings and that this is aggravated by the fact that the Soviet Union's inflexible policy is to buy f.o.b. and to sell c.i.f., and, for example, does he look forward to the day when, perhaps, Barclay's D.C.O. or the Chartered Bank will be able to offer loans to the Soviet local authorities as is done by the Moscow Narodny Bank in this country?

Mr. Jay: I quite agree that there is what I prefer to describe as an unbalance, but I can assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman that I did impress these points not merely on the Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade in Moscow in early November but also on Mr. Kosygin, the Prime Minister.

Mr. du Cann: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the facts are that the Soviet Union buys from us about half as much as it sells to us? Is he further aware that my right hon. Friend obtained a specific undertaking in writing from Mr. Patolichev that everything possible would be done to right this imbalance? While paying tribute to the right hon. Gentleman for the action that he has taken, may I ask him to press on with it in order to rectify what is a serious imbalance of trade? Has the right hon. Gentleman observed the comments in the newspapers that the Japanese are getting better trade advantages than we are, and will he take up this and similar points with the Soviet authorities?

Mr. Jay: I am, of course, aware of the undertakings given by the Soviet authorities to Her Majesty's previous Government, and I did not omit to point this out to the Soviet Government in Moscow. They gave me assurances that they would honour these agreements, and I am confident that they will be carried out.

Patents (Monopoly Rights)

Mr. Shepherd: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will introduce amending legislation so as to allow the

Monopolies Commission to inquire into complaints of excessive prices charged by those operating patents in the United Kingdom.

The Minister of State, Board of Trade (Mr. George Darling): No, Sir. There is no need for amending legislation. There are already provisions in the Patents Act designed to remedy abuse of monopoly rights, and under existing monopolies legislation, the Monopolies Commission could investigate complaints of this sort, where they were relevant to an inquiry which the Board of Trade had asked it to make.

Mr. Shepherd: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that these inquiries have not, in fact, been made? In view of the increasing extent to which synthentic materials are being used, will he see that attention is drawn to the excessive prices now being charged by some manufacturers?

Mr. Darling: If the hon. Gentleman will give me details of any cases which he has in mind, we shall look into them.

Sale of Goods Act

Mr. Shepherd: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will seek to amend the Sale of Goods Act to ensure that cash buyers are afforded as much protection as those buying on hire purchase terms.

Mr. Darling: My right hon. Friend will bear the hon. Member's suggestion in mind when he is considering the Molony Committee's recommendations for the amendment of the Sale of Goods Act.

Mr. Shepherd: Is it not anomalous that a man who buys a car on hire purchase and does not pay all the money down has a built-in measure of protection and, therefore, more security than a man who pays cash and has very little recourse as a result?

Mr. Darling: The hon. Gentleman will recall that this matter was raised when we discussed the Hire Purchase Act. It is an anomaly which must be corrected, and we think that the best way to deal with it will be when we come to amend the Sale of Goods Act.

Mr. Heath: May we have an assurance that the Government will press ahead


with the programme which we had already laid down for implementing the rest of the Molony Report?

Mr. Darling: Yes; that statement has already been made, as the right hon. Gentleman knows.

Industrial Development Certificates, Birmingham Area

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his instructions on industrial development certificates in the Birmingham area provide for exceptional treatment for firms compulsorily displaced by redevelopment schemes and whose operations are closely linked with other industries in the same area.

Mr. Jay: We shall continue to give special consideration to the circumstances of these firms.

Industrial Site, Airdrie

Mr. Dempsey: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will take steps to induce new industries to develop a suitable site at Carlisle Road, Airdrie; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Jay: The Board of Trade Office for Scotland brings the site at Carlisle Road, Airdrie to the notice of firms for which it may be suitable, and will continue to do so. The benefits available under the Local Employment Act would apply to industrial developments there.

Mr. Dempsey: We are extremely grateful for the excellent efforts of the Scottish Controller and his staff but, so far, they have not been successful. Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that in this locality we have the highest unemployment complement of the whole of Lanarkshire, and will he try to take some extraordinary and special measures to steer industries to this site?

Mr. Jay: I fully sympathise with my hon. Friend. As he knows, we are proposing three new advance factories within quite a short distance of this area, and a new estate at Bellshill is shortly to be developed. We shall continue to pursue the effort which he has in mind.

Mr. Brewis: Will the right hon. Gentleman keep in mind the need of areas outside the central belt of Scotland

as well when announcing advance factories?

Mr. Jay: Yes, in accordance with their needs.

Petroleum Industry (Monopolies Commission's Report)

Dr. Bennett: asked the President of the Board of Trade (1) when he expects to receive the Report of the Monopolies Commission on the monopolistic practices in the petroleum industry;
(2) if he is aware that the petrol companies are seeking to tie filling stations more firmly to a monopolistic dealing in their products alone, although such practices are at present before the Monopolies Commission; and if he will take steps to meet the intensification of such practices at this time.

Mr. Darling: I understand that the Monopolies Commission hopes to present its report in the early part of next year. I do not know of any general movement by the petrol companies of the kind described by the hon. Member, but I suggest that he should let the Commission have without any delay any information which he has on that matter.

Dr. Bennett: As at least two of the big petrol distributors are tightening their grip on the stations for their own limited range of products, may we hope that action can still be taken, and does not this rather amount to a contempt of the Monopolies Commission?

Mr. Darling: I do not know about contempt of the Monopolies Commission. A reference to the Monopolies Commission does not operate as any sort of stop order. The firms concerned are free to maintain or to change any trading practices which they may have, but, of course, the Monopolies Commission must take note of any changes in trading practices which occur during the course of its inquiries. I understand that it has done this. If the hon. Gentleman has any further information which he thinks that the Monopolies Commission should have, I would remind him that the report is nearly ready.

Mr. Francis Noel-Baker: Can my hon. Friend give us an assurance that the


Monopolies Commission will look at the advertising by the petrol companies to see whether it is in the interest of the consumer and the general public and is not a factor in increasing monopolistic tendencies among distributors as well as costing the public money?

Mr. Darling: Without looking it up, I am not sure whether this would appropriately come within the Monopolies Commission's terms of reference in this matter, but I imagine that, if the Commission thought that there was anything in it, it would look at the question and refer to it in its report.

Mr. Shepherd: Is it not a fact that, if the Monopolies Commission decided that this was a regrettable practice, there is no authority to stop it? When is the promised legislation to deal with this situation to be brought in?

Mr. Darling: As soon as possible.

Immature Whisky (Exports)

Mr. Stodart: asked the President of the Board of Trade if, in view of the increased number of proof gallons of immature whisky which were exported from this country in 1963, he will take steps to prevent whisky, which cannot for good reasons be legally sold in this country, from being sent to markets abroad.

Mr. Jay: No, Sir. Most of the immature whisky exported from this country goes to Sweden, where it is matured locally.

Mr. Stodart: Is the President of the Board of Trade aware that, quite apart from exports to Sweden, exports of immature whisky to countries such as the United States, the Netherlands and West Germany have been increasing steadily and substantially during the past three years? Does he know that in West Germany there is a brand the label of which bears the caption,
Glen Rankin—Whisky specially blended for Members of the British House of Commons in the Carlton Club"?
In view of what, I am sure, is the right hon. Gentleman's appreciation of a splendid beverage and of a very precious export, will he take steps to see that the value of this export is not diminished by immature products?

Mr. Jay: I am advised that exports of Scotch whisky are going from strength to strength. Eighty per cent. of the immature whisky goes to Sweden, where there is a State monopoly, which might or might not be supported in the Carlton Club. The essential point is that we should try, as we do, to persuade other countries to restrain their nationals from selling whisky under the label of "Scotch whisky" if it is, in fact, produced elsewhere. Even if we were to ban all exports of immature whisky, without such regulations it would still be possible in these countries to sell immature whisky from other sources as Scotch whisky.

Mr. Stodart: In view of what I am sorry to regard as an unsatisfactory reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.

European Free Trade Association

Mr. Webster: asked the President of the Board of Trade how often the permanent body of the European Free Trade Association, set up to watch the operation of the import surcharge and the Government's efforts to abolish it, is to meet.

Mr. Ridley: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will give details of the measures for European Free Trade Association surveillance of the economy of the United Kingdom, to which Her Majesty's Government agreed at the recent meeting of the Council.

Mr. Jay: At their recent meeting, Ministers decided to set up a permanent Economic Committee of senior officials from capitals in order to consult on all aspects of all Member States' economic and financial policies and not merely those of the United Kingdom. The Working Party preparing a report for the next Ministerial meeting on the United Kingdom's economic measures is a temporary body.

Mr. Webster: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, despite what several of his right hon. Friends have said, a number of us on this side defended, for technical reasons, what was done in the 15 per cent. surcharge at the meeting of E.F.T.A. Parliamentarians, but that what


was very much deplored at Strasbourg this time was that there was no Minister there and no Minister offered by the British Government? Does he realise that it was repugnant to us when the Economic Committee had to insist on a Minister being sent out, and will he ensure that there is better co-operation and consultation in the future?

Mr. Jay: I do not think that Ministers have a monopoly of wisdom. I assure hon. Members that at the Ministerial Council at Geneva there were, appropriately, two Ministers present.

Mr. R. W. Elliott: When the right hon. Gentleman arrives in north-east England—I am delighted to know that he is going there later today—will he make urgent inquiry into the possibility of Engineering Production Ltd. of Clevedon, which has a factory at Prudhoe, Northumberland, losing a valuable contract with the Volvo Co., of Sweden, as a direct consequence of the surcharge?

Mr. Jay: I am going to the North-East later tonight. I have looked into this matter and I will continue to do so when I reach the North-East.

Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, in very difficult circumstances immediately after the election, several hon. Members on this side of the House did their best to defend the Government in this difficult situation? Will he also note that the E.F.T.A. Parliamentarians, apart from ourselves, expected that the imports surcharge would be taken off in a matter of months—by spring or the early summer at the latest?

Mr. Jay: I fully accept the phrase "in a matter of months", but I do not accept the gloss the hon. Gentleman has put on it.

Sir C. Osborne: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will have placed in the Library of the House a copy of all the speeches made recently by the United Kingdom delegation at the meeting of European Free Trade Association ministers.

Mr. Jay: I would refer the hon. Member to the Answer given by my hon. Friend the Minister of State on 15th December to the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings).

Sir C. Osborne: Those Answers were quite unsatisfactory. As the right hon. Gentleman's right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary is being blamed, probably unjustly, for starting a run on sterling because of his alleged alarmist reports to E.F.T.A. Ministers, in justice to his right hon. Friend will the right hon. Gentleman let us see what he did say? If the Foreign Secretary made those alarmist reports, he is a very bad servant of the Crown, and if he did not, it is not right that he should be blamed for them. What is the right hon. Gentleman afraid of?

Mr. Jay: I myself made about a hundred speeches on that night, and I think that the hon. Gentleman would spend most of his Christmas Recess reading them if they were to be published. The fact is that these discussions were confidential, but I am happy to say that they achieved the desired result, which was that other members of E.F.T.A. decided against any form of retaliation against British exports, which is what we sought.

Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I and other hon. Members are surprised that he has not expressed gratitude to hon. Members on this side of the House for what they did at the meeting of E.F.T.A. Parliamentarians? Is he also aware that when I said earlier that it was the other Parliamentarians who expected that these surcharges would be taken off in a matter of months, I meant that they specifically said that they expected that they would be taken off by the summer?

Mr. Jay: I am very glad to express gratitude to the hon. Gentleman. Gratitude has been defined as lively anticipation of favours to come.

Mr. Burden: Surely it is in the interests of the Government to publish these transcripts, as the resentment against Government action is only now beginning to arise in E.F.T.A. countries with the end of the backlog of orders and as they await new orders. The resentment is now being felt among ordinary people. If the Government could say that the Governments of those countries sympathise with their action, would not that be helpful?

Mr. Jay: As the hon. Gentleman knows, our action in this respect was publicly praised immediately afterwards


by the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling). If the hon. Gentleman does not know that, he had better read HANSARD. There is an obligation on members of E.F.T.A. not to break confidence about these discussions afterwards, and that obligation we propose to observe.

Sir C. Osborne: On a point of order. In view of the very unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I shall seek your permission, Mr. Speaker, to raise the matter on the Adjournment at some time.

Company (Sales Methods)

Mr. Dodds: asked the President of the Board of Trade (1) what study he has made of the information supplied to him by the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford concerning a company with a head office in London and branches in many parts of the country; and if he will hold an inquiry into its activities:
(2) what representations he has received regarding the contracts supplied for signature to prospective customers of a company of whom details have been sent to him by the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford; and if he will introduce legislation to control the types of contracts which the public may be asked to sign.

Mr. Hamling: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware of the concern arising from the methods employed by a company, details of which have been forwarded to him by the hon. Member for Woolwich, West; if he will cause an inquiry to be held; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Carter-Jones: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware of the concern arising from the practices employed by a company with branches in many parts of this country, details of which have been supplied by the hon. Member for Eccles; and what action he proposes to take to protect the public from exploitation.

Mr. Iremonger: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will institute an inquiry into the sales promotion practices of the organisation with a branch in Ilford, details of which have been sent to him by the hon. Member for Ilford, North.

Mr. Robert Edwards: asked the President of the Board of Trade if, following consideration of the details sent to him by the hon. Member for Bilston, he will set up an inquiry into the activities of the company concerned; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Jackson: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will institute an inquiry into the sales promotion practices of the organisation with a branch in Leeds, details of which have been sent to him by the hon. Member for Brighouse and Spenborough.

Mr. Varley: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will institute an inquiry into the sales promotion practices of the organisation with a branch in Sheffield, details of which have been sent to him by the hon. Member for Chesterfield.

Mr. Cooper: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will inquire into the activities of the organisation with a branch in Ilford, details of which have been sent to him by the hon. Member for Ilford, South.

Mr. Rhodes: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will institute an inquiry into the sales promotion activities of the organisation with a branch in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, details of which have been sent to him by the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

Mr. Alfred Morris: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will set up an inquiry into the sales promotion practices of the organisation with a branch in Manchester, details of which have been sent to him by the hon. Member for Manchester, Wythenshawe.

Mr. Weatherill: asked the President of the Board of Trade what action he will take to ensure that the public are protected from the type of sales technique practised by an organisation with a branch in Croydon, details of which have been sent to him by the hon. Member for Croydon, North-East.

Mr. Hopkins: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will institute an inquiry into the sales promotion practices of the organisation with a branch in Bristol, details of which have been sent to him by the hon. Member for Bristol, North-East.

Mr. Alison: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will institute an inquiry into the sales promotion practices of the organisation with a head office in London and branches in many parts of the country, including the West Riding of Yorkshire, details of which have been sent to him by the hon. Member for Barkston Ash.

Mr. Ogden: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will institute an inquiry into the sales promotion practices of an organisation with a branch in Liverpool, details of which have been sent to him by the hon. Member for West Derby, Liverpool.

Mr. Darling: With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will answer Question No. 16 and Questions Nos. 17, 21, 22, 24, 30, 31, 39, 53, 55, 61, 63, 66, 67 and 68 together.

Mr. Lipton: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. It may be an oversight, but I note that Question No. 59 was not included in that list, although it mentions the same company to which the other Questions refer.

Mr. Darling: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. It was not an over sight. Question No. 59, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton), is in slightly different terms from the others and if we arrive at it today he will get a separate Answer all to himself.

Mr. Francis Noel-Baker: On a point or order, Mr. Speaker. Is my Question No. 26 in the same category as Question No. 59?

Mr. Darling: Yes.
My right hon. Friend has received a great deal of information relating to this company, including a large number of complaints from all over the country about the sales methods which it employs.
There is very little which I, or anyone, can do to stop people signing contracts without reading them, and my right hon. Friend has at present no evidence before him to justify ordering an investigation under the Companies Act.
However, I deplore the fact that any company should have so conducted its business as to attract this volume of complaint, and my right hon. Friend is

considering whether further legislation is necessary and practicable.

Mr. Dodds: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. Is not he aware that Universal Health Studios was introduced into this country by two Americans, husband and wife, and is as crooked and callous as human beings can devise? Is not he also aware of the flood of complaints which come from many branches, from Bournemouth to Glasgow, and show an amazing trail of misery caused to many people who have experienced what is the modern version of the press gang to sign contracts they have never been able to read? Will he bear that in mind?
With regard to my second Question, will my hon. Friend also bear in mind that this diabolical technique is contained in the standard sales procedure sent to every branch? Is he further aware that the number of what this company claims to be salons for the "figure beautiful" is to be increased by another 85 in various towns and that they should really be called "salons of shame"? Will the Board of Trade act quickly in this matter?

Mr. Darling: I am well aware of the practices of this company. There is a branch of it in my constituency and I have had constituency complaints as well. The general question of the sales techniques of this company is one of the factors in the situation which my right hon. Friend is looking at to see whether legislation is required.

Mr. Hamling: Will my hon. Friend tell us how many complaints have been received? Will he consider consulting the Ministry of Health on the health aspects of these malpractices?

Mr. Darling: It is very difficult to assess the total number of complaints because they have gone to so many different organisations. Citizens' advice bureaux throughout the country have had a very large number—running, I believe, into hundreds. Some complaints have been sent to the Consumer Council and some direct to the Board of Trade, while others have come to us through representations by hon. Members. I cannot, therefore, give a total figure, but it is very large. We will certainly consider my hon. Friend's suggestion that we should consult the Ministry of Health about the health aspects.

Mr. Iremonger: With reference to the Universal Health Studio in Ilford, will the hon. Gentleman have an investigation put in train by the police into the extremely unscrupulous methods used on prospective clients of this organisation?

Mr. Darling: If the hon. Gentleman has any evidence which suggests that kind of malpractice, I think that it is up to the customers concerned or to him to draw this information to the attention of the police.

Mr. Rhodes: Is my hon. Friend aware that a branch of this organisation has been established in the City of Newcastle? Is he aware that the people of Newcastle wish to be protected, as far as can be effectively done by his Department, from the deplorable high pressure sales techniques of this organisation? Is he further aware that the instruction given by the head office of the organisation to its local managers says that they must sit in the office and continue to wear people down and hammer at them and hammer at them until they finally give in and join the club. Is this not a highly deplorable practice? Will he consider, as a matter of urgency, doing something to stop it?

Mr. Darling: This is one of the aspects which we have a great deal of information about and are inquiring into.

Mr. Robert Edwards: If my hon. Friend is unable or unwilling to conduct an inquiry into these malpractices, I wonder if he will have another look at the Fair Trade Practices Bill which he helped me to draft and which was calculated to halt the rising tide of misleading advertising? Would not a Bill of this nature deal precisely with the problem we are discussing?

Mr. Darling: Yes. I said that we were looking into the question of legislation.

Mr. Shepherd: Will not the statutory delay under the new Hire Purchase Act cover contracts applied by this organisation? If it does not, is there any possibility of its doing so?

Mr. Darling: That is a possibility we are looking at but it is difficult to apply where cash goes over the counter.

Mr. Hopkins: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that his reply is somewhat disappointing? This is a very serious matter. Legislation would inevitably take some time. Is there nothing he can do in the intervening period to put a stop to this ridiculous practice?

Mr. Darling: I agree with the hon. Gentleman. The trouble is that there is no legislation at the moment which gives us power to deal with this case.

Mr. Ogden: Will my hon. Friend have another look at the complaints I have passed to him about this organisation? Is he aware that, where matters have been pressed to a court case and where the defendant has stood out as long as he could, he has at least gained the support of the court and something has been done? Will my hon. Friend consult the Attorney-General on this point?

Mr. Darling: Yes. We are taking legal advice on all these points.

Mr. Heath: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this really is not good enough? There has been a storm of protest from hon. Members to the Board of Trade. That has been evident today. Indeed, I myself have passed on complaints in the last few weeks. For the hon. Gentleman now to say that the Board of Trade is still considering this is not satisfactory. Could he at least achieve the maximum amount of publicity for the way in which these people behave? Will he refer it to the Consumer Council in order to get the Council publicly to condemn the firm and make these practices as widely known as possible?

Mr. Darling: If we had had the legislation which should have been passed long ago dealing with the Merchandise Marks Acts we should have been in a better position. We are handicapped as a result of the inactivity of the last Administration.
I welcome the publicity—I hope everyone will—which this exchange of Question and Answer in the House will give to this matter. The Consumer Council is considering it and the right hon. Gentleman is merely anticipating action that is to be taken on the question of publicity. I certainly hope that this Question and Answer period will not end the opportunities for publicity in this House.

Mr. Francis Noel-Baker: asked the President of the Board of Trade what steps he will take to control the misleading advertisements of a company, details of which have been sent to him by hon. Members and by the Advertising Inquiry Council.

Mr. Darling: My right hon. Friend at present has no power to control advertisements of services. I understand that certain of this company's advertising material has been considered by the Advertising Standards Authority and related bodies in the advertising industry, and modifications have been agreed between them. If my hon. Friend will refer any specific complaint to the appropriate bodies in the advertising industry, I am sure that it will consider it.

Mr. Noel-Baker: My hon. Friend will be aware that many of us do not consider that bodies set up by the advertising agents themselves are the appropriate bodies. Ought there not to be some independent referee? Have not grossly misleading advertisements about these health clubs appeared in reputable newspapers and periodicals for a very long time, and were not they stopped only when my hon. Friend threatened to raise the matter in the House? Are not the present arrangements inadequate? Should not my hon. Friend talk to the Press Council and the proprietors of the newspapers and periodicals concerned to try to improve on the present practice?

Mr. Darling: The problem is that we shall have no control over advertisements of services until the new merchandise marks legislation appears on the Statute Book. I think that my hon. Friend knows that the advertising industry has accepted the challenge to make voluntary control of advertising standards really effective.

Mr. Noel-Baker: indicated dissent.

Mr. Darling: I think that we should give the industry the opportunity to decide where action can be taken in this respect. I agree with my hon. Friend and I shall support him in any representations which he makes to the advertising industry.

Mr. Heath: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the previous Government implemented much of the legislation recommended by the Molony Committee, culminating in the Hire Purchase Act

of the last Session? If he concludes that he can take action only through a merchandise marks Bill, will he give an undertaking to introduce such a Bill in the immediate future?

Mr. Darling: We shall introduce the Bill as soon as it is ready to be introduced.

Mr. Noel-Baker: On a point of order. With regret, in view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I give notice that I will raise this matter on the Adjournment.

Shipbuilding (Research and Development)

Mr. Buchan: asked the President of the Board of Trade what steps he is considering towards improving research and development facilities within the shipbuilding industry.

The Minister of State, Board of Trade (Mr. Roy Mason): This is one of the matters that I shall be examining in my survey of the problems of the industry, and which the committee of inquiry will be expected to consider.

Mr. Buchan: Will the committee take into account the dangerously small amount of money devoted to shipbuilding research as compared with other industries and the fact that an undue proportion is spent on steam turbine research instead of other forms of propulsion, for instance, diesel? Will it also investigate the consequences of the fact that Japan produces about six times as many naval graduate architects as we do?

Mr. Mason: I am obliged to my hon. Friend for his comments. Perhaps the committee will also look at the subject of research into diesel engine manufacture and the use of turbines.

Television Films

Mr. Hugh Jenkins: asked the President of the Board of Trade what decision has been reached by the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development on removing restrictions on the import, export and distribution of films intended exclusively for showing on television and if he will give an assurance that such decision will not affect the proportions of television programmes, transmitted in this country, which are of British origin and performance.

Mr. Jay: The Organisation recently decided to add to its Liberalisation Code an obligation on member countries to grant any authorisations required for the export, import, distribution and commercial use of television films. Our arrangements do not involve the issue of authorisations for these purposes and I am therefore happy to give my hon. Friend the assurance he seeks.

Mr. Jenkins: Is my right hon. Friend aware that that assurance will be received with great satisfaction by all concerned with the industry and by viewers, who have thus been spared a flood of foreign material which they can well do without?

Children's Sweets (Pictures)

Mr. Dempsey: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will introduce legislation to prevent the practice by which sweets and material likely to be bought by children are sold containing pictures of an improper character, examples of which have been sent to him by the hon. Member for Coatbridge and Airdrie.

Mr. Darling: No, Sir.

Mr. Dempsey: Is my hon. Friend aware that that is a most unsatisfactory reply? Does he not realise that in Britain today, apart from an economic challenge, we are facing a moral challenge? Is it not morally wrong that commercial enterprise should stoop to the level of including disgusting photographs of semi-naked ladies in kiddies' 2d. packets of bubble gum? Do hon. Members appreciate that schoolboys and girls of the tender age of 7, 8, 9 and 10 are buying this type of material? Will my hon. Friend act to stamp it out immediately?

Mr. Darling: The distributors of the product which my hon. Friend mentions have already told the Board of Trade that they have withdrawn the pictures he is complaining about—for commercial reasons. In any case, the distribution of obscene material is already prohibited by law, but I doubt very much whether the pictures of which he complains would be considered obscene by any court.

Mr. Stodart: Would not the Minister agree that it is likely that the children who have seen these postcards, as I have,

would be much less likely to be upset than was the hon. Gentleman by a young lady at London Airport?

Office Building (Control)

Mr. Kitson: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware of the need to clarify the position as regards ancillary office development within the Greater London area; and when he will make a further statement on this subject.

Mr. Jay: I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the Answer which I gave to my hon. Friend, the Member for Wrexham (Mr. J. Idwal Jones) on 20th November.

Mr. Kitson: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that these statements have not clarified the position and that the London County Council is not giving planning permission to any factory development within its area which has ancillary office space in excess of 2,500 sq. ft.? Is this a satisfactory situation and do the Government wish it to continue?

Mr. Jay: We hope to publish the Bill shortly and that should clarify the situation.

Mr. Dudley Smith: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that while office limitation is to be welcomed, there are many worth-while cases for exemption which are now holding fire? Will he please hurry the legislation for exemption permits?

Mr. Jay: I agree, and we are doing so.

Industrial Development, Scotland

Mr. Brewis: asked the President of the Board of Trade how many applications for assistance under the Local Employment Acts by firms wishing to set up business or expand in Scotland were pending at 15th October, 1964; and what is the average time taken to reach a decision.

Mr. Jay: Figures are not readily available for 15th October. At 31st October the Board of Trade had under consideration 1,207 applications for building and plant and machinery grants for projects in Scotland, of which 758 had already been given preliminary approval in principle, in addition to 108 applications for general purpose loans and grants. The time taken to reach a final decision varies


from three weeks to a year or more depending on the extent of the investigation required and the promptness with which applicants supply the necessary information. We are taking all steps within our power to reduce the delay.

Mr. Brewis: These figures are satisfactory, but has the right hon. Gentleman any proposals for quickening up the procedure, which often takes a very long time?

Mr. Jay: We have asked all those concerned to speed it up to the greatest possible extent within their power. But a good many of these delays are due to the failure of applicants to supply the proper information more quickly. I hope that everybody will co-operate in speeding up the whole exercise.

Mr. Heath: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Mr. Hector Hughes. [Interruption.]

Mr. Heath: I rose to put a supplementary question, Mr. Speaker. There has been only one supplementary question on this Question.

Mr. Speaker: I am sorry. I saw the hon. and learned Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes) first and called him. I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman in a moment.

Mr. Hector Hughes: Can my right hon. Friend say how many of these applications were in respect of setting up industries in north-east Scotland, what was the nature of the industries and how many of them were granted?

Mr. Jay: Not without notice, but certainly a number were for north-east Scotland.

Mr. Shinwell: On a point of order. Can you, Mr. Speaker, say whether Privy Councillors have any special privileges in this House?

Mr. Speaker: Not, I think, at Question Time.

Mr. Heath: May I explain that I rose to my feet just now because I thought that you, Mr. Speaker, were about to call the next Question.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say how many jobs will be involved in the number of applications about which he has spoken?

Mr. Jay: Not without notice. However, owing to the expectations aroused by this Government, there has been a great increase lately in applications for these facilities.

Cotton and Man-made Fibre Fabrics

Mr. Mapp: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will state for the third quarter of 1964 the home production, imports and exports of cotton and man-made fibre fabrics; and if he will make a statement on his long-term plans for dealing with the state of the industry in relation to the burden of imports.

Mr. Jay: The figures are as follows: home production, 361 million linear yards: imports and exports, 218 and 76 million square yards respectively. In answer to the second part of the Question, I would refer my hon. Friend to the Answer I gave to the hon. Member for Heywood and Royton (Mr. Barnett) on 10th December.

Mr. Mapp: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the bad imports position was growing worse during the summer and that it has been partly saved by the emergency measures which were taken recently? However, will he say whether he will endeavour to liberalise the 1962 Agreement from G.A.T.T.? Also, is he in a position to say when he may initiate plans finally to identify the place of the textile industry in the national economy?

Mr. Jay: I have discussed this matter with the Cotton Board. We hope to agree on proposals both with the Board and with our partners in the Commonwealth in the first half of next year.

Sir Knox Cunningham: Would it not help the man-made fibre industry if the 15 per cent. import surcharge were taken off its raw material?

Mr. Jay: As the hon. and learned Member knows, that will be done as soon as the situation of this country permits.

Film Industry

Mr. Ensor: asked the President of the Board of Trade (1) what reply he has given to the Cinematograph Exhibitors' Association's suggestion that the review of legislation affecting the film industry should be deferred until the views


of the Monopolies Commission and the results of the pay-television experiments are available;
(2) what review he is making of legislation affecting the film industry, which is due to expire in 1967.

Mr. Darling: My right hon. Friend is consulting the Cinematograph Films Council on the timing and content of the new films legislation. He has meanwhile asked the Council to take note of the letter from the Cinematograph Exhibitor's Association, to which my hon. Friend refers, and he has informed the Association accordingly.

Spain and Portugal

Mr. Marten: asked the President of the Board of Trade what steps he is taking to increase trade with Spain and Portugal.

Mr. Jay: The full range of our export promotion services is available for these markets.

Mr. Marten: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that reply. Can he say what extra steps he is taking to increase exports to this very important market and to South Africa? Will he give an assurance that no political mumbo-jumbo will stand in his way in trying to increase exports to these countries?

Mr. Jay: We shall attempt to increase exports to these countries, and to many others, in the year which lies ahead. We shall be making many proposals to this end.

Mr. du Cann: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind the simple point that the wisest course is to maximise the export effort in respect of those countries, such as Spain, which pay?

Mr. Jeger: Will my right hon. Friend endeavour to increase exports from Gibraltar to Spain and make that a condition of Anglo-Spanish trade?

Mr. Jay: I will not disregard the point which my hon. Friend raises.

PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT DE GAULLE

Mr. Gresham Cooke: asked the Prime Minister when he expects to visit Paris for discussions with the President of France.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): Our two Governments are in consultation about a date.

Mr. Gresham Cooke: Would the Prime Minister bear in mind that it is very urgent for him to see General de Gaulle to heal the breaches over the Concord project and the imports surcharge? Will he also remember the awful warning that the last Head of State called Wilson to go to Paris was President Wilson and that things did not come out too well after that?

The Prime Minister: Yes,Sir—very funny. I am well aware of the need to do everything we can to improve relations with France. But I thought that the worst moment of our relations with France was in the speeches of the then Prime Minister, and in the speech, which we all understood, of the then Lord Privy Seal, when they said what they thought about the end of the Common Market negotiations. I hope that we shall not get back to anything like that.

Mr. Jeger: If my right hon. Friend is going to Paris, will he make sure that he is paired?

Sir A. V. Harvey: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that the best way to improve relations with France, or with any other country, is by trade, and that the sooner the Concord project can be cleared up to the satisfaction of both sides the better it will be for Britain and for France?

The Prime Minister: Discussions are going on with the French Government about that. I find it a little difficult to reconcile the conflicting views of Opposition Members on this. In the case of the surcharge, they complain that we have done this without consultation. In the case of Concord, they complain that we asked for a review before coming to a decision.

DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Sir G. de Freitas: asked the Prime Minister whether, in order to emphasise the importance of the trade promotional work of the external services, he will consider designating the new combined service Her Majesty's Diplomatic and


Commercial Service instead of Her Majesty's Diplomatic Service, as is proposed.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. The title "Her Majesty's Diplomatic Service" was chosen after careful thought by the Plowden Committee. It has the merit of being brief and convenient. The title suggested by my hon. Friend might imply that commercial work is not an integral part of our diplomacy.

Sir G. de Freitas: Is my right hon. Friend aware that although experienced representatives of large firms like I.C.I. and Barclays D.C.O. know how to interpret "diplomatic", many small business firms and their representatives abroad do not realise the expert advice available to them in high commissions and embassies abroad? Would not emphasis on the word "commercial" encourage these representatives to make greater use of the facilities available to them?

The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend has practical experience of the valuable work of what has hitherto been called the Trade Commission Service. From my experience some years ago and again on my recent visit to Canada when I met the trade commissioner there, I very much agree that there is not enough response by a large number of British industrialists to the services provided or even, as in one case about which I heard, pressure from the Trade Commission Service to tender for a valuable order and not a single tender could be obtained from any British firm.

Mr. Grimond: Is the Prime Minister aware that, while this particular proposal may not appeal to him, there is a widespread desire that our Diplomatic Service should play a more active part in the promotion of exports and that various schemes to promote them have been put forward on both sides of the House? Will he consider making a statement on the Government's intentions in this matter in due course?

The Prime Minister: We intend to make a statement about further ways in which we can help the export trade. including the point raised by the right hon. Gentleman. I think that the decision of the late Government, following the Plowden Committee's Report, continues a trend which has been going on over suc-

cessive Governments. Under both Labour and Conservative Governments, we have seen some of our senior trade people rise to the rank of ambassador and be fully integrated with the Diplomatic Service, as it then was. This is formalising an informal arrangement which existed before.

Sir C. Mott-Radclyffe: While the importance of the commercial side of the Diplomatic Service was rightly stressed by the Plowden Committee, none the less fundamentally it is the policies of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the Board of Trade which, broadly speaking, make or mar the task of any exporter.

The Prime Minister: I think that their services are obviously extremely important, but so is the response of British firms to the markets which are available to us and the services of the Trade Commission Service in bringing these openings to their attention. It is not purely the case that my right hon. Friends can help in this matter, but some right hon. Gentlemen opposite might stop hindering.

STRIKES (ELECTION PERIOD)

Mr. Channon: asked the Prime Minister if he has now received the report from the Minister of Labour on strikes during the election period; and if he will publish it.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: asked the Prime Minister, in the light of the information made available in the Minister of Labour's inquiry, if he will now arrange for an independent inquiry into the Hardy Spicer dispute during the General Election, and undertake to publish the report.

The Prime Minister: I would refer the hon. and right hon. Members to the Answer I gave to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Willesden, West (Mr. Pavitt) on 3rd December.

Mr. Channon: Surely the Prime Minister, with his encyclopaedic memory, will recall column 1082 of HANSARD for 24th November, in which he promised that he would make a statement in the House. May I ask why he has not seen fit to honour that undertaking?

The Prime Minister: There was a Question down to me for Oral Answer. I answered it. As it was not reached, it was printed.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: Will not the Prime Minister frankly admit that he made a reckless political intervention in a purely industrial dispute? Was not this a foretaste of acting first and thinking afterwards which has been the hallmark of the Government and which has effectively destroyed industrial confidence?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. I stand by what I said in the House earlier on this matter. When we got, in this election as in previous ones, strikes threatening to paralyse the whole of the motor car industry, when there was reason to suspect that there had been political motivation in the earlier ones—[Interruption.]—it was right on this occasion to say that the matter would be inquired into. Within 24 hours of my making that statement, other statements were made on television which showed us the real reason why these industrial difficulties arose. That has been confirmed by my right hon. Friend.

Mr. Godber: Surely the Prime Minister is not attempting to continue this quite—[Interruption.] Is it not a fact that the Prime Minister's intervention exacerbated the situation of the strikes and that it was the direct cause of the other statements, and that where he made things vastly worse it was my job to settle the strike, which I did? Is the right hon. Gentleman still saying that he was honouring the undertaking which he made to the House when he said that he would make a statement when, in fact, he arranged for a Question to be answered at a convenient time when it would not be reached and then hurriedly left the country?

The Prime Minister: On that last allegation, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will withdraw that statement. I had no contact whatever with my hon. Friend. The Question was put down without my knowledge and it was answered—[HON. MEMBERS: "0h."] If hon. Members opposite do not accept that statement, they had better think about their relations with the whole traditions of this House. Now, will the right hon. Gentleman withdraw?

Mr. Godber: No, I will not withdraw. [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw."] The Prime Minister said that he would make a statement, and a Written Answer is very far from a statement.

Mr. Shinwell: rose—

Mr. William Hamilton: On a point of order. I understood that the right hon. Member for Grantham (Mr. Godber) made a direct allegation that a Question had been "planted" by my right hon. Friend.

Mr. Geoffrey Hirst: Of course it was.

Mr. Hamilton: My right hon. Friend has subsequently denied this. [An HON. MEMBER: "Who believes him?"] Is it, therefore, in order to ask the right hon. Member for Grantham to withdraw the allegation?

Mr. Speaker: As far as I know, it is not unparliamentary to say that a Question has been "planted". As to what the right hon. Member for Grantham (Mr. Godber) said, I could hear not one single word. I do not know what happened. Mr. Shinwell.

Mr. John Hynd: On a point of order. The right hon. Member for Grantham (Mr. Godber) clearly made an implication against the behaviour of the Table when he said that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister had arranged that a Question should be so placed that it would not be reached. Is that not an attack upon the Table and the institutions of this House? [HON. MEMBERS: "No."]

Mr. Speaker: That is a non sequitur.

Mr. Shinwell: Since the behaviour of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has been questioned by right hon. Members opposite, may I ask whether my right hon. Friend is aware that his behaviour during the election compares more than favourably with the behaviour of the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd) on racial affairs and, in particular, the disgraceful behaviour of the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg)?

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: If the Prime Minister is so sensitive, why is he still trying to wriggle out of his original pledge to institute a searching inquiry?

Mr. Speaker: Our prospects of making progress with Questions are not good if hon. Members spend their time saying things and asking for them to be withdrawn and asking points of order about words used when the din is such that I cannot hear what words are used. I respectfully suggest that the sensible thing to do is to get on with Questions.

Mr. Channon: In view of the most unsatisfactory nature of the Answer, I beg to give notice that I will raise this matter at an early opportunity.

Mr. Robert Cooke: On a point of order. Could not the Prime Minister have got the House out of the difficulty by asking leave to answer the original Question orally? [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: I can only partly hear what is said. In any event, it does not seem to be a matter for the Chair to inquire what the right hon. Gentleman could do should he want to do it. Do let us get on. Mr. Joan Evans, Question No. 5.

PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON (TALKS)

Mr. loan L. Evans: asked the Prime Minister (1) if he discussed with President Johnson the possibility of calling a summit conference between Great Britain, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Sccialist Republics;
(2) if he will make an approach to, or if he has been approached by, the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with a view to a top-level conference.

Mr. Rankin: asked the Prime Minister (1) what particular aspects of foreign policy he discussed with President Johnson; and if he will make a statement;
(2) if he will make a statement on the request he has received from President Johnson to provide British troops for South Vietnam.

Mr. Wall: asked the Prime Minister if he will, following his talks with President Johnson, now make a statement on defence policy covering such issues as nuclear arms, the multi-

lateral force, the future of the TSR2 and P1154, overseas bases and increased supplies of conventional weapons.

Mr. Monslow: asked the Prime Minister what arrangements he made with President Johnson during his recent talks with him about future meetings between them.

Mr. William Hamilton: asked the Prime Minister what arrangements he has now made with the United States of America for the re-negotiation of the Nassau Agreement.

Mr. Burden: asked the Prime Minister if it remains the intention of Her Majesty's Government to refuse British participation in a multilateral force.

The Prime Minister: I would refer hon. Members to the speech I made in the debate yesterday.

Mr. Monslow: Is my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister aware that his initiative has given intense satisfaction to many hon. Members in this House and has created a spirit of optimism in the country that his endeavours will be successful in preventing, an extension of the suicide plot?

Mr. Ioan L. Evans: May I join in congratulating my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, whose initiative is welcomed in the country? May I ask that he continue his efforts to reduce the £40,000 million that the world is spending on armaments so that some of these resources can be diverted to helping the under-developed areas?

Mr. Burden: Does not the Prime Minister remember that during the election he made a statement at Chatham in which he said that the M.L.F. was a complete and absolute waste of money—he certainly did not say that yesterday, when he left the door open—and, furthermore, emphasised his position regarding the M.L.F. by saying at Chatham that if returned as Prime Minister, he intended greatly to increase the size of the conventional Navy? This House and the country would like to know exactly where the Prime Minister stands.

The Prime Minister: On the second point, I said yesterday that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence will


shortly be announcing our policy on the procurement side. As I have already explained to the House, we have first to make those much-needed cuts in the fantastic level of programmes that we inherited before we start talking about increasing any part of the expenditure programmes. With regard to the statement I made at Chatham and elsewhere,I certainly attacked in very strong terms the concept of the mixed-manned surface fleet and I showed yesterday what we thought about the mixed-manned surface fleet.

Mr. Wall: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether that part of Question No. 12 which I put down, affecting conventional weapons and types of aircraft, will be answered by his right hon. Friend today? If not, will he tell the House when we shall get an answer?

The Prime Minister: I did say yesterday that my right hon. Friend, before the time of the year comes for the Defence White Paper, will be dealing with this question about the weapons procurement programme.

Mr. Victor Yates: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether he will bear in mind, in view of the alarming statements which are made in the Press, and are being made, and statements on the other side of the House, which are causing tension rather than relieving it, the urgent necessity for a top-level meeting as soon as it is possible?

The Prime Minister: Well, there are a number of meetings planned. I am not responsible, of course, for what is said in the Press, but certainly there are a whole series of meetings planned. They started last week and will be continuing in the new year.

HEATHROW AIRPORT (NIGHT JET FLIGHTS)

The following Question stood upon the Order Paper:

Mr. A. E. HUNTER: To ask the Minister of Aviation if he will now make a statement about his policy regarding night jet traffic at Heathrow Airport for 1965.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Aviation (Mr. John Stonehouse): I will now answer Question No. 117.
We have decided to change the hours during which the limit of night jet movements should apply. Last summer the hours were 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. Next summer the hours will be 11.30 p.m. to 6 a.m.
During the designated night period last summer, 5,500 movements were allowed. Next summer the number to be allowed during the revised night period is 3,500.
This represents a reduction of 700 movements between the hours of 11.30 p.m. and 6 a.m. on the figure for the same period last year.
This part of the night—between 11.30 p.m. and 6 a.m. —should, therefore, be less noisy than it has been, while there will be an increase in movements between 11 and 11.30 p.m. and between 6 and 7 a.m. The night take-off noise limit of 102 perceived noise decibels will continue to apply between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m., as now.

Mr. Hunter: In thanking my hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask whether he has discussed this matter with the Heathrow Consultative Committee and, if so, what is its reaction?

Mr. Stonehouse: Both the airlines and the Committee have been consulted. I am very glad to say that I met the Committee last week and that it approved of this new arrangement with only one vote against.

Mr. Maude: Could the hon. Gentleman say whether, in consultation the airlines, all agreed willingly to this proposal? Secondly, could he say whether the Government decided not to proceed, as the last Government decided, with the recommendations of the Wilson Committee in regard to the grants for soundproofing of houses?

Mr. Stonehouse: The airlines did not all agree, because they would have liked to have had more flights during this particular night period of 11.30 p.m. to 6 a.m.
In reply to the second point, our discussions are continuing on this matter.

Sir B. Craddock: May I ask whether further arrangements are being made for the measurement of noise at this particular time during the night?

Mr. Stonehouse: The existing arrangements are continuing, that is, to check all take-offs by jets at Heathrow, and, of course, we are continuing research in this direction.

Mr. A. Royle: While appreciating the work which the hon. Gentleman himself has done on this, may I ask whether he is aware that his statement will be greeted with gloom and despondency by those people who live beneath the glide path into London Airport? In view of the pledge given by the Prime Minister, when he said he would stop night jet flights for a period of each night—which pledge he has not kept, like all the other pledges he made during the election—when will the hon. Gentleman carry out this pledge and stop night jet flights into the airport at night?

Mr. Stonehouse: I would advise the hon. Gentleman, before he attempts to make a point like that again, to read in full the statement made by my right hon. Friend. He will then see that he is inaccurate. So far as a ban on night jet flights is concerned, we did, of course, consider this, but feel that it would be too great an economic burden on the airlines.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins: While any improvement will be welcomed by the people in the area, will my hon. Friend note that it will be regarded as only part of the measures towards further improvement of this situation? Will he continue the policy of carrying out these improvements. whether the airline companies are willing or unwilling?

Mr. Stonehouse: We shall certainly bear all these points in mind.

Mr. Marten: Can the hon. Gentleman say what is the estimated loss of revenue to the airport due to this action?

Mr. Stonehouse: We expect the airlines to readjust their flights in and out of Heathrow and to bear in mind the new revision of restrictions, and we also hope that more of them will fly into Gatwick, so that we shall have increased throughput there.

Mr. A. Royle: In view of the thoroughly unsatisfactory nature of the Minister's statement, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will state the business of the House for next week?

The Lord President of the Council (Mr. Herbert Bowden): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY, 21ST DECEMBER—Second Reading of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill.
TUESDAY, 22ND DECEMBER—Second Reading of the Cereals Marketing Bill.
As the House is aware, the Chairman of Ways and Means has set down opposed Private Business for consideration at seven o'clock.
WEDNESDAY, 23RD DECEMBER—It is proposed that the House should meet at 11 a.m., that Questions be taken until twelve noon, and that the House adjourn at five o'clock, until TUESDAY, 19TH JANUARY.
In the week when the House returns from the Christmas Adjournment the business will be:
TUESDAY, 19TH JANUARY—Supply [3rd Allotted Day]: Motion to move Mr. Speaker out of the Chair, when a debate will arise on an Amendment to take note of the 9th Report from the Select Committee on Estimates on Military Expenditure Overseas, and the Special Report relating thereto.
WEDNESDAY, 20TH JANUARY—Second Reading of the Administration of Justice Bill [Lords], and the remaining stages of the Science and Technology Bill.
THURSDAY, 21ST JANUARY—Supply [4th Allotted Day]: Report stage of the Winter Supplementary Estimates, which, if the House agrees will be taken formally to allow a debate on an Opposition Motion on Comprehensive Education and the Grammar Schools.
FRIDAY, 22ND JANUARY—Remaining stages of the Ministerial Salaries and Members' Pensions Bill and of the Airports Authority Bill.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: We are obliged to the right hon. Gentleman. Would he say what proposals the Government have for a special marking of the seven hundredth anniversary of Simon de Montfort's Parliament?

Mr. Bowden: Yes, Sir. It is proposed that on Wednesday, 20th January, the House should meet at 11.30 a.m. and that the sitting should be suspended after Prayers and a statement which, it is hoped, you, Mr. Speaker, will then make.
I understand that similar arrangements will be made in another place. Members of both Houses will then proceed to the Royal Gallery.

Mr. William Hamilton: Would my right hon. Friend recall that a protest was made yesterday about taking Supplementary Estimates formally and then proceeding to a debate arranged by the two Front Benches? Does he not recognise that he and the two Front Benches have done precisely the same in connection with the business for the first week after the Christmas Recess and that the back benchers are increasingly concerned about this practice?
Does he not realise that Sub-Committee G of the Estimates Committee has been established for two years now specially to deal with Supplementary Estimates and present reports to this House before the Estimates are debated by the House, and that the whole point of Sub-Committee G is that debate may take place on a report from that Sub-Committee, and that if the Government deliberately ignore this practice, then Sub-Committee G may as well be abolished?
Will he not reorganise the business so that Supplementary Estimates may be debated by the House?

Mr. Bowden: By long precedent arrangements for the debate on Supply days have always been made through the usual channels, with the Opposition choosing the subject. In announcing the business for next week, I said that this would be done if it was the wish of the House.
Although the figure is £60 million, the scope of debate is narrow, because on a procedural debate we can discuss only the additional Estimates, in relation to the original Estimates, and it was hoped

that on this occasion it would be convenient to do as the Opposition suggested and debate comprehensive education.

Sir E. Boyle: In view of the widespread interest in the Bill that we shall be debating on Monday, will the right hon. Gentleman consider a limited suspension of the rule for, say, one hour on that day?

Mr. Bowden: I have received representations about this. It is the intention to put down a Motion to suspend the rule until eleven o'clock on that day.

Mr. W. Baxter: Reverting to the question put by the Leader of the Opposition about the celebration of the seven-hundredth anniversary of the English Parliament, am I to understand that the English Parliament is still in continuous being? If so, would that presuppose that the Scottish Parliament could be recalled at any time when Scottish Members so desired? I ask that because it was my understanding that the Scottish Parliament was continued in suspension until there was a dissolution of this Parliament.

Mr. Bowden: As the arrangements for celebrating the seven-hundredth anniversary of Simon de Montfort's Parliament are in the hands of a committee under your chairmanship, Mr. Speaker, I announced what was likely to happen in this Chamber on 20th January, which will be the seven-hundredth anniversary of the actual meeting. If I could go further, it would be to say that perhaps when we reach the Royal Gallery some refreshment may be provided. I assure my hon. Friend that there is no intention of asking the Scottish Grand Committee to meet on that morning.

Mr. Maude: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a fortnight ago, when discussing the business of the House, he made a quite encouraging statement on the question of the necessity for alleviating the uncertainty in the aircraft industry? He did that in relation to a Motion on the Order Paper.
[That this House deplores the damaging state of uncertainty which now surrounds the future of the British aircraft industry, and the lack of confidence which has been created by the hasty and confused


statements of Her Majesty's Government; and calls upon Her Majesty's Government to repair as much of this damage as possible by giving an immediate assurance that no major projects will be cut without full discussion in Parliament.]
Will the right hon. Gentleman please try to see that we get a statement at least on the Concord before the House rises for the Christmas Recess?

Mr. Bowden: Since I made that statement a fortnight ago, in reply to a question, a Committee of Inquiry has been set up, and I think that it would be for the general convenience of the House to await the report from that Committee.

Mrs. Renée Short: May I draw my right hon. Friend's attention to the Motion on the Order Paper which refers to the redundancy and unemployment which hundreds of workers face this Christmas at the Four Ashes Factory, near Wolverhampton?
[That this House, gravely concerned at the threatened closure of the General Electric Company's factory at Four Ashes, near Wolverhampton, and the resulting redundancy of over 700 workers, and disturbed by the short notice given to the men and women employed there and the inadequate redundancy payments offered, calls upon the Minister of Labour and the President of the Board of Trade to investigate the reasons for the closure, and what the management intend to do with the factory, and to take steps to keep the factory working or to take such other steps to ensure that the employment of the workers of the factory is not in any way prejudiced.]
In view of the urgency of this matter, will he give the House some chance to discuss it?

Mr. Bowden: I do not think that there will be any opportunity to discuss this before the Recess, but the Minister of Labour made a statement in the House on, I think, 7th December on this matter, and the President of the Board of Trade is aware of what is happening at this factory.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I thought that on a previous occasion the Minister of Aviation said that none of the particular projects mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-

Avon (Mr. Maude) would be held up pending the inquiry. Can the right hon. Gentleman clarify the position?

Mr. Bowden: My impression was quite different. I thought that the inquiry covered the whole field, but I will certainly have a word with my right hon. Friend to see what is the position.

Mr. Grimond: Reverting to the question of Simon de Montfort's Parliament, now that the Leader of the House has whetted our appetites a little more about the proceedings on the 20th, can he say what will happen in the Royal Gallery besides a modified amount of drinking? Some people may wish to rearrange their engagements in view of what he said.

Mr. Bowden: Mr. Speaker, I understand that your committee will be issuing a Press notice which will give rather more detail. As far as I understand it, the idea is that the main celebration should be later in the year, perhaps in June.

Mr. Shinwell: On the question of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill, can my right hon. Friend say why, without any consultation with the sponsors, he has agreed to suspend the rule and continue the debate until eleven o'clock? Does he suggest that an extra hour's debate will make all the difference in persuading either side of the House, or any hon. or right hon. Member, to come to a conclusion on the matter? In any event, as this is a Private Member's Bill, is there any reason why its sponsors, of which I am one, should not have been consulted before a decision ,of this kind was taken?

Mr. Sydney Silverman: Before my right hon. Friend answers that question, may I say that any responsibility for not consulting the other sponsors of the Bill is mine, and not my right hon. Friend's. He asked whether I thought there was any objection to extending the time for debate by one hour, in view of the large number of Members who wish to speak, and I informed him, I am afraid without consulting anybody else, that I saw no objection to it.

Mr. Bowden: We thought that the arrangement would be for the general convenience of the House.

Mr. Shinwell: If I may say so with respect to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House, this matter is not the concern of the Government. As this is a Private Member's Bill, this is purely a House of Commons matter. In those circumstances, surely the ordinary arrangements should be complied with and the Division should be taken at ten o'clock.

Mr. Bowden: On this occasion I was acting not as a member of the Government, but as Leader of the House. As a result of a number of representations, I came to the conclusion that eleven o'clock was not a difficult hour at which we could come to a decision, and I certainly consulted my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman), who is the first sponsor of the Bill.

Mr. Prior: May I ask the Leader of the House whether his right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture is to make a statement on Channel Island milk? Is he aware that we have been waiting for two months for a statement on this relatively simple subject? Are we to take it that Question No. 30, tabled by his hon. Friend the Member for Falmouth and Camborne (Mr. Hayman) for Written Answer today, is a planted question, which means that we are to get an unsatisfactory reply? Are we to have no chance of debating this matter before the House rises for Christmas?

Mr. Bowden: I have no idea of the contents of the reply, but it certainly will be a reply to my hon. Friend's Question.

Mr. Popplewell: Will my right hon. Friend please say when he hopes to do something about Motion No. 27, which relates to the sittings of the House?
[That this House, appreciating the fact that Parliamentary work is now a full-time occupation for back-bench Members as well as Ministers, urges Her Majesty's Government to consider the introduction of more appropriate hours of sitting, and suggests that the House should meet daily at 10.30 a.m., take Parliamentary Questions for one and a half hours and proceed with normal business until 7.0 p.m.]
My right hon. Friend will remember that last week he suggested that he would consider sending this matter to a Select

Committee on Procedure. Is it his intention during next week, or when the House reassembles, that this matter should be so referred?

Mr. Bowden: Yes, Sir. I hope, on Tuesday, to move that the Select Committee on Procedure be asked to look at this and other matters.

Sir F. Bennett: The right hon. Gentleman will recall that last week several of my hon. Friends and I were told, "not this week" when we asked when we were to get a statement on the Government's new credit squeeze. Can the right hon. Gentleman give a more helpful reply this week, or is it seriously suggested that we should adjourn for the Christmas Recess without the Government making their views known at all on this very serious imposition?

Mr. Bowden: I presume that the hon. Gentleman is referring to the question of the capital gains tax, which he raised on a previous occasion. I have nothing further to add on that other point.

Sir F. Bennett: I did not mention the capital gains tax. I referred to the credit squeeze and being told "not this week" when we raised the matter last week. Perhaps I might repeat my question and ask whether we are to get a statement before we rise for the Christmas Recess.

Hon. Members: Answer.

Mr. Speaker: I cannot make the Leader of the House answer something. It is not my responsibility.

Mr. Kitson: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us something about the business on Tuesday? Is it intended to finish the Cereals Marketing Bill by seven o'clock, or are we going back to it at ten o'clock?

Mr. Bowden: We shall have to see how we get on. Business is interrupted at seven, but if we have not completed Government business it normally continues after ten o'clock.

Mr. Longbottom: Is the Leader of the House aware that the very long statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the corporation and capital gains taxes has made the situation even more uncertain than before?


Will he consider asking his right hon. Friend whether he will make a further statement on this matter before Christmas?

Mr. Bowden: I do not accept for a moment that my right hon. Friend's statement has made the position more uncertain. In fact, my right hon. Friend did what he was asked to do. He made a statement, and a lengthy one.

Sir Rolf Dudley Williams: May I oppose the suggestion made by my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Longbottom)? Every time the Chancellor comes here he makes things worse. May I repeat the question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Torquay (Sir F. Bennett), who asked if we were to have a statement before the House broke up about the credit squeeze, in respect of which the Government have given instructions? Does not he realise that it is very important that we should know what is going on, and that our constituents should know what is going on?

Mr. Bowden: The answer is "No, Sir".

Mr. Corfield: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the statement that he has just made about the Concord, and the implication that a decision will not be made until after the inquiry reports, will merely add immensely to the anxieties of the aircraft industry? Will he seek an opportunity to make an early statement on the question whether or not this is to be the fact?

Mr. Bowden: I accepted the point earlier that it may not be included in the general inquiry. If it is possible to make a statement before the end of this inquiry, we will certainly do so.

Mr. Galbraith: What is the gestation period between a leak and a statement? In view of the large number of leaks regarding Dr. Beeching, when can we expect a statement to be delivered?

Mr. Stratton Mills: Why are the Government proceeding with the Double Taxation Relief Order, 1964, tonight? Is not the Leader of the House aware that this will have to be completely renegotiated as a result of the corporation tax?

Mr. Marten: Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the Motion standing on the Order Paper in the names of my hon. Friends and myself concerning the Polaris base at Holy Loch and the number of Ministers of the Government who are apparently opposed to it?
[That this House welcomes the Prime Minister's statement that the United States Polaris base should remain in Holy Loch; and calls upon those Ministers in Her Majesty's Government who signed the Amendment to the Address in November, 1960, opposing the establishment of the base to declare forthwith their wholehearted support for this clear statement of Government policy.]
Does he realise that according to my researches four Cabinet Ministers and 10 other Ministers and P.P.S.s are on record as being against the Polaris base at Holy Loch; that the Prime Minister is in favour of it, and the Government are in favour of it? Before we rise for the Christmas Recess can we expect a statement by all these Ministers, clarifying their own positions?

Mr. Bowden: The hon. Gentleman has answered his own question. The Government have made a clear statement on the position of the Polaris base.

Sir C. Osborne: When the right hon. Gentleman is formulating the business for the week immediately after the Christmas Recess will he find time, as soon as possible, to discuss the effect of the 15 per cent. ad valorem duties? This afternoon his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade said that those duties would be taken off as soon as possible. They are causing a lot of confusion and anxiety in the business world, and the sooner we know whether or not they are coming off the better. Can he arrange for a statement to be made as soon as possible?

Mr. Bowden: I do not expect one to be made before the Recess, but my right hon. Friend will be made aware of the hon. Gentleman's question.

Mr. William Clark: Can the Leader of the House say something more about the corporation and capital gains taxes? Is he aware that there is a Motion standing on the Order Paper, signed, curiously enough, only by hon. Members


on this side, although it is obvious that hon. Members opposite are concerned in this matter?
[That this House deplores the uncertainty created by the recent statements by Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, and calls on Her Majesty's Government to issue immediately a comprehensive statement that will clarify beyond doubt the structure of the proposed corporation and capital gains tax.]
Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether, when we come back early in the New Year, he will provide an opportunity to debate this matter? If he refuses, I hope that he will not suggest that a Supply day should be used for the purpose, because the idea of having a debate on these two taxes is to endeavour to kill the uncertainty which has arisen as a direct consequence of the action of the Government.

Mr. Bowden: I cannot give any such assurance. As I said last week, my right hon. Friend the Chancellor cannot be expected to make his next Budget statement now.

Mr. Maudling: In view of the fact that the partial disclosure to date by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the subject of these taxes is doing great damage to the economy, will the right hon. Gentleman represent to the Chancellor the great and real need for urgent clarification of these matters?

Mr. Bowden: My right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer was under great pressure to make a further statement, which he did. I think that his further statement was helpful, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends agree.

Hon. Members: No.

Mr. Speaker: Could there be complete silence? I know what will happen. Many hon. Members wish to speak in the foreign affairs debate, if and when we get to it. All the noise and interruptions which are going on now, and all the irregular questions, merely deny these opportunities to fellow Members.

Sir Harmar Nicholls: Is the Leader of the House aware that the lack of justification by the Government for their own credit squeeze—

Mr. Shinwell: On a point of order. Mr. Speaker, will you be good enough to tell the House whether these questions are directed to business? If not, are they in order?

Mr. Speaker: The difficulty is that I have to listen to them before I can reach a conclusion. So far, the hon. Member is within the rules, which entitle him to emphasise the importance of the topic which he is raising. I have not heard enough of his question to know what it is about.

Sir Harmar Nicholls: Is the Leader of the House aware that the lack of justification by the Government for their own credit squeeze is militating against improved production? Will not the right hon. Gentleman ask the Chancellor to make such a statement before the Recess?

Mr. Speaker: What is wrong with that question is that business questions having already been answered are as much out of order as any other questions which have been answered.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: Why cannot the right hon. Gentleman give an answer to the demand of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Galbraith) for a statement on Dr. Beeching's position, in view of the great interest in this matter? If there is to be an early statement, why cannot he say so?

Mr. Bowden: When the Government are ready to make a statement on Dr. Beeching, or any other matter, they will do so. They are not yet in a position to make a statement.

Mr. Gower: Why does the right hon. Gentleman say "No" to so many helpful questions? Why is he so adament? Does not he appreciate that, in view of the uncertainties which have arisen, the status and standing of the Government depend largely on some clarification of these taxation proposals, either in a debate or in the form of a statement?

Mr. Bowden: No, Sir; I do not appreciate that.

Mr. Speaker: It is not in order to ask again a question that has already been answered, or—what is the equivalent for House of Commons purposes—has been refused an answer. That counts as an answer.

NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE (CHARGES)

The Minister of Health (Mr. Kenneth Robinson): I wish to make a statement about the Government's intentions regarding National Health Service charges.
First, prescription charges. These comprise the ordinary 2s. charge for prescriptions and charges for elastic hosiery, which are payable both by the patients of general practitioners and by hospital out-patients, together with the charges payable by hospital out-patients for certain appliances.
With effect from 1st February next, we propose to abolish all these charges which, since 1952, have created a financial barrier between the patient and the treatment he needs.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland and I are starting at once the necessary consultations with the professions on amendment of their terms of service, with a view to making regulations for this purpose when the House reassembles after the Christmas Recess. Until 1st February, the existing charges will continue to be payable.
There will remain the charges for dental treatment and appliances and those for spectacles. It is our aim to abolish these charges also, in due course, by means of legislation which will revoke the statutory powers authorising the levy both of these charges and of prescription charges.
It will not be possible to introduce such legislation during the current Session.

Mr. Wood: Is the Minister aware that any suggestions for improving the methods for relieving from the charges those who would find it difficult or impossible to pay them would have the wholehearted support of the Opposition? Will he agree that the former Minister of Health, Mr. Barber, earlier this year, was working precisely to this end?
Does the right hon. Gentleman's statement mean that, among all the needs of the Health Service, he and the Government are prepared to give a very high priority to relieving from the charges those who, quite frankly, are well able to pay them?
Further, can he give any estimate of the increase in the number of subscriptions which this will cause and, particularly, can he assure us that the doctors will be able to cope with the increased load in the middle of the winter?

Mr. Robinson: The Government have given priority to implementing a specific election pledge which represents and reflects Labour Party policy consistently over a period of 12 years. We have never believed that taxation of the sick is an appropriate method of financing the Health Service. It may well be that my predecessor was working on some other scheme, but I note that we do not have the support of the Opposition in abolishing prescription charges completely.
There will, in all probability, be some increase in the number of subscriptions, which it is impossible to quantify at the moment, but there will also, I hope, be some reduction in the amounts prescribed by doctors now that they no longer have any need to consider the ability of their patients to pay the prescription charges.
I am aware that some doctors are anxious about the possibility of an increased work load. I believe that their fears in this respect are exaggerated but, in so far as they will he meeting a need that has hitherto been deterred from emerging by the charges, I am sure that they will accept this load, and welcome it.

Mr. Woodburn: As one of the two Ministers who negotiated the introduction of the National Health Service, may I ask whether my right hon. Friend is aware that the medical practitioners and those in the medical services insisted that no obstacle should be placed in the way of the medical practitioner giving what was required for the health of the patient; and that any breach of that was a breach of the original conditions for the introduction of the Service?
Is my right hon. Friend also aware that from 1912 most of our workers had free medicine and free prescriptions, with no abuse of doctors, or objection from the doctors in treating them, and that if any objections have come later it is because, unfortunately, of a minority of people


who have been prepared to take advantage of the scheme in order to bring discredit on it, by overprescribing, or by abuse in other directions?

Mr. Robinson: I am obliged to my right hon. Friend. It is the fact that for more than 10 years the medical profession has opposed prescription charges, and that only on a single occasion—the annual representative meeting of the British Medical Association early this summer—did they reverse their policy.

Mr. Lubbock: While congratulating the Minister on the abolition of these charges, may I ask why it has been impossible to remove the charges on dental treatment at the same time? Is he aware that the present charges deter patients from seeking treatment on a regular basis? If it is not possible to introduce legislation during this Session, would he find some means of varying the incidence of these charges so that those seeking treatment regularly are not made to pay the most for the treatment?
Finally, has the right hon. Gentleman made any estimate of the administrative saving that will result from the abolition of prescription charges?

Mr. Robinson: Perhaps I may deal with the last part of the hon. Member's supplementary question first. It is difficult to estimate the precise administrative savings, but to set against the lost gross revenue from charges there is the amount of just under £3 million representing National Assistance Board refunds to patients who qualify for refund on grounds of hardship, which will no longer be payable.
As to the other part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question, I can only repeat, as I have said in the statement, that it is our aim to abolish all the charges in due course. We shall do this as soon as practicable.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Is my right hon. Friend aware, first, of the very great welcome we on this side of the Chamber give to his announcement and, secondly, of the value this will be to old people and the chronic sick who have been most hard hit by the charges? Those who do not receive any Assistance Board payments, and there are many of them, will be particularly helped by the new arrangements.

Lord Balniel: While welcoming policies designed to bring benefits to people really in need—the chronic sick or the elderly—may I ask whether the Minister is really satisfied that this step, which will bring benefits to people of whom some are not really in need, is a higher priority than spending an additional £20 million, for instance, on improving the care of the mentally handicapped, the domiciliary services, or the hospital building programme? As Minister in charge of the National Health Service, is the right hon. Gentleman really saying that this is the highest priority that he can think of?

Mr. Robinson: There are, of course, a number of things we need to do and would like to do in the National Health Service which were left undone by previous Governments. I can only say that, apparently, the previous Government tried to find some suitable methods of relieving solely those who suffered from hardship from prescription charges, but were unable to do so. We prefer to take this first major step towards restoration of the free Health Service which the Labour Government introduced after the war.

Dr. David Kerr: Will my right hon. Friend note that the satisfaction expressed particularly on this side at his statement will be shared by a number of forward-looking doctors, as well as by the patients whom they are treating? Will he also note that the low morale induced in the whole Health Service by the deprivations of 13 years of neglect demand from us all a responsible attitude to the development of the Service, and that we all look to this as the first hopeful beginning?

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot debate this now.

BILL PRESENTED

WAR DAMAGE

Bill to abolish rights at common law to compensation in respect of damage to, or destruction of, property effected by, or on the authority of, the Crown during, or in contemplation of the outbreak of, war, presented by Mr. MacDermot; supported by the Attorney-General; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 56.]

SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE

House to meet on Wednesday next at Eleven o'clock; no Questions to be taken after Twelve o'clock; and at Five o'clock Mr. Speaker to adjourn the House without putting any Question.—[The Prime Minister.]

ADJOURNMENT (CHRISTMAS)

House, at its rising on Wednesday next, to adjourn till Tuesday, 19th January.—[The Prime Minister.]

ADJOURNMENT

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Charles Grey.]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

4.9 p.m.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: We are now beginning the second day of a foreign affairs debate which, I think, is widely recognised as being of the first importance. It was opened by my right hon. Friend the Member for Saffron Walden (Mr. R. A. Butler) in a constructive review in which he posed many pertinent questions, to which, I may say, we have not yet had an answer. I shall repeat some of them to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Defence, whom I am very glad to see in his place following the N.A.T.O. meeting.
There were many thoughtful contributions made in yesterday's debate, including some maiden speeches which we were privileged to hear and which were particularly welcome and effective. We look forward to hearing those hon. Members again. The centre-piece of the debate was, of course, the speech of the Prime Minister, in which he made a detailed examination of the questions of defence and foreign policy. He made some very important statements during that long speech.
If I may be allowed to say so, there floated into my mind at one time the comment of the tutor on the essay, "The jam was thin, but you spread it very well". Nevertheless, the right hon. Gentleman made some very important statements. I shall treat them with the seriousness that they deserve, because some very far-reaching consequences may follow upon what the right hon. Gentleman said.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Saffron Walden touched on one point which has been clear every time we have debated foreign affairs or defence in this Parliament. Every such debate is of necessity dominated by the issue of the British deterrent. Until the Prime Minister and the Government have declared unequivocally whether paragraph 9 of the Nassau Agreement is scrapped and, therefore, that the Socialist Government no longer support the idea of Britain as an independent nuclear Power, or whether paragraph 9 remains and, therefore, the situation remains as it is today, our debates will be dominated by this nuclear issue.
There are many other situations in the world scene which ought to be discussed and hon. Members yesterday made a valiant attempt at times to do so. There was, for instance, discussion of the question of disarmament, but we came back again and again to the same topic for the very good reason that it simply is not possible until we know whether we are to continue to be a nuclear Power and, therefore, a Power with political influence in the world—until we know that it is really impossible to discuss either our rôle as a nation with political influence or the intelligent deployment of our military power. Therefore, it is of paramount importance that we should know about paragraph 9 of the Nassau Agreement and whether or not we are to lose our status as a nuclear Power with authority on the world stage.
There were one or two hon. Members who spoke about disarmament, notably the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson). This is a very good illustration of what I was saying. If I may interpolate, I hope that the Prime Minister will resist the temptation always to decry the efforts at disarmament which were made by the last Government and the disarmament plans which we put forward. If he was tempted to do this in Washington I have no doubt that he got a very frigid response, because the plans which were advanced by the British Government, first, by myself at Geneva, as Foreign Secretary, and then by my right hon. Friend the Member for Saffron Walden, were in every detail worked out with the United States. They were a joint British and United States plan, a joint Western plan. So far as I know, they still represent the Western position and nothing better has been put in their place.
When the right hon. Gentleman belittles the work of people like Sir David Ormsby-Gore and Sir Michael Wright, my right hon. Friends the Members for Grantham (Mr. Godber) and Conway (Mr. Peter Thomas) he is showing himself very small-minded, particularly when he claims—as he constantly does—that all these ideas were his own. He knows quite well that they have held the field for a good many years now and that we worked on them as hard as we could. Until now as an independent nuclear

Power we have been able to influence international discussions and international decisions in this nuclear field.
I was in the negotiations all through on the nuclear Test Ban Treaty. I have no doubt whatever that we would never have got that treaty unless the United Kingdom had been in a position to intervene from knowledge and had a status which could not be denied. We would not have got it if it had not been that we were a nuclear Power. If, as I fear, the Prime Minister intends to sign away most of our V-bomber force and the Polaris submarines when they come, all I can say is that decisions of future nuclear policy will be made by the United States, France, China and Russia, plus those other countries which, when the processes of making enriched uranium are cheapened, as they almost certainly will be, they will be decided for their own national ends.
Therefore, I hope that the Prime Minister will think again on this matter. The Prime Minister and his Ministers may travel the world in the coming months and the Minister dealing with disarmament may sit permanently in Geneva or sometimes move to New York, but they will not carry the voice of conviction or authority with other countries unless this country is in the position of a nuclear Power. I do not intend to use this debate to redeploy the general arguments for keeping this country a distinct independent nuclear Power, but I have two requests to make.
If the Socialist Government are to hand away our nuclear weapons, do not let them pretend that we can do this without an enormous sacrifice of power and influence for the British nation. Please do not let us have—if I may make a particular plea for this after yesterday's debate—any of the right hon. Gentle-mans' supporters talking any more about the immorality of the ownership of nuclear weapons.
If ownership of the nuclear weapons is a sin, we do not gain absolution by appointing a master sinner to deploy the weapons for us, nor by joining a syndicate which deals in these weapons, nor indeed, as the Prime Minister made clear yesterday, by keeping bombers ourselves with a nuclear capacity. So I hope that we shall not hear anything more of that kind—

Mr. Sydney Silverman: Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne) rose—

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I think that I am coming to the point which the lion. Member wishes to make, because I am about to deal with the dissemination of nuclear weapons. The speech of the Prime Minister yesterday fell into two parts.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: The right hon. Gentleman is now passing from the point and I should not like him to pass from it without this being noticed. Will he bear in mind that those of us who think that nuclear weapons are totally immoral as well as being totally useless nevertheless think that any movement which prevents their proliferation does at any rate lessen the moral burden which the world bears?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Where the hon. Member goes astray—this is why I asked him to wait—is that I do not think the measures the Prime Minister proposes will do anything to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons.
The Prime Minister's speech was divided into two parts. In the first, he quite properly talked about the relationship of defence to the economy of the whole country and the proportion of defence expenditure to the whole budget of the United Kingdom. He talked, also, about the general purposes of British foreign policy and, in particular, on the world rôle which he quite rightly wishes this country to fulfil. Then, in the second part, he made his particular proposals for an Atlantic force. I want to deal with those two halves separately.
My right hon. Friends and I have no quarrel at all with much of what the Prime Minister said under the heading of the necessity for a Government constantly to review defence expenditure in relation to the nation's resources. We have no quarrel with what he said about his purpose to achieve greater integration in the N.A.T.O. Alliance; although I shall have something very pertinent to say a little later, because I cannot conceive how the Atlantic force which he proposed will assist integration within the N.A.T.O. Alliance. When I heard the Prime Minister talk about political harmony in Europe, I must say that in view of the events of the last few weeks I thought his words a little hollow and unreal.
I want to make one particular comment on what the Prime Minister said about the cost of defence, in the light of his own stated desire to see Britain play a world rôle. First, let me put our defence expenditure in perspective. The Prime Minister said that it would rise to about £2,400 million next year; that is, between 7 per cent. and 8 per cent. of the gross national product. Let me subdivide it further. The conventional element in our defence forces represents 92 per cent. of the cost of our forces now and will rise to about 95 per cent. in a few years. The nuclear now represents 8 per cent. and will fall to 5 per cent. in a few years.
Those figures are worth bearing in mind. If we want a world rôle for our forces, both sets of figures are worth bearing in mind. I think that a country which seeks a world rôle should ask itself whether 8 per cent. is too much, whether the nuclear is over-weighted.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): Will the right hon. Gentleman explain whether the figure of 8 per cent., which it is possible to calculate by one means, includes the provisional expenditure on those bombers which the late Government intended to have a nuclear rôle?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I think that the answer is that it includes this. I do not want to go into research and development, because I am coming to that in a moment and it is connected with that. The total figure for our defence should he between 7 per cent. and 8 per cent. If the Prime Minister can correct me and show that I am wrong, I shall be glad to hear the figures. The conventional element represents about 92 per cent. The nuclear element represents about 8 per cent. now and will fall to 5 per cent. in future years.
The right hon. Gentleman, as is his way—he repeated it again at Question Time today—said that there had been a lot of waste by the former Government and that it was his intention to cut this out. As he listed the rôles for which he cast our forces, I found myself increasingly asking where the economies are to be found. The Government have said that they will retain our overseas bases, for the very good reason that they are related to considered commitments. The


Prime Minister said that we shall raise our numbers in the Army of the Rhine to 55,000. I hope that he is successful in getting more money out of the Germans to help us with this. He is to increase the Navy and the other conventional forces. I do not quite know how this is to be done without conscription. I do know that increasing the conventional forces is the most expensive item of all.
Then apparently, from what we heard yesterday, we are to pay for the nuclear submarines to go into the Atlantic force, although we are not to control them. I do not see any economies under any of those headings. Indeed, I think that the bill of the present Government will probably be higher than that of the Government who went out of office this autumn.
I turn to weaponry, because the right hon. Gentleman said one or two things about having less sophisticated weapons and about research and development costs. As to less sophisticated weapons, the Prime Minister must realise that we cannot arm our troops with less efficient weapons than those held by a potential enemy. We are not thinking only of war with, let us say, Soviet Russia, or even Communist China. Indonesia has Russian planes and submarines and Egypt has modern equipment. Therefore, when we are thinking in terms of arming our troops with less sophisticated weapons, I do not believe that there is very much scope in that direction if we are to give our own forces a chance if the battle comes.
It is worth remembering, too, when talking about research and development, particularly in the air, that many of the discoveries which have been made in America have derived directly from the military research that has been done, although they can always do it on a far larger scale than ourselves.
I think that the Prime Minister, when he has examined a little further the record of the late Government, the weapon programmes and all the rest of it, will find that, if he really wants a substantial economy in the defence forces, he will have to cut some big commitments. That is the conclusion, I am afraid, to which he will come and, therefore, I think it will impinge on his own desire to see Britain an active world Power.
May I say to the Prime Minister at once that I very much welcome his decision to keep the bombers in the Far East. It is certainly realistic. They will be useful there for a long time. I myself would not have tied our hands in this way by keeping only a few in the Mediterranean and a few in the Far East. I would have kept the whole of our armament flexible. I think that this is certainly what the Prime Minister ought to have done. Nevertheless, I am very glad that he has decided to keep these bombers.
I shall not pursue the question whether these bombers are intended for a conventional or a nuclear capacity. I give support to the Prime Minister; what he said yesterday was quite right. It is not in the public interest that he or I or anybody else should comment on this.
I must give my first reactions to the central proposal of the Prime Minister's speech, which was for an Atlantic force. He will correct me if I am wrong, but I think that this force is partly to consist of national contingents, irrevocably committed, partly mixed-manned, subject to a veto by each member, the veto by those who contribute to the mixed-manned element possibly being exercised individually or collectively, that being a matter for future decision.
I should like to recall to the House the purposes of this force as we were told them in the past few months and as they were advertised to the country month after month and week after week before the General Election. Hon. Members will recall that the main purpose of the Government in trying to create a force of this kind was to give Britain a greater say in the use and control of the United States and French nuclear weapons. That was one purpose. A second purpose was greater and closer integration within the N.A.T.O. Alliance.
I must say at once that I have doubts, almost amounting to certainty, whether the force as explained by the Prime Minister will achieve any of these objectives. I will try to state, shortly and clearly, why I think as I do. First, the United States will retain the veto. I am not complaining of that. It was an essential element in any force, but I am simply stating the facts. Having stated that fact. it is, therefore, quite inconceivable that the United States could agree to the use


of this force, unless it also, at the same time, brought into play its strategic deterrent.
What, then, are we in the European countries asked to do? We are asked to pay, as I understand, our contributions to the force, a force presumably meant to be of considerable significance and to have a strategic, a semi-strategic and a semi-tactical rôle. But in reality, as I see it, this force will be an extension of the United States strategic deterrent, which is already vast. Each member of this force will have a veto and, therefore, there may be eight or nine fingers on the safety catch. The force will be almost totally incredible as a deterrent. I think little of this force—and I shall say a little more about it—when I come to compare N.A.T.O. as it is now and as it would be if the Prime Minister had his way.

The Prime Minister: I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, but this is very important. Does this mean that the kind of multilateral force on which the right hon. Gentleman was working involves a situation in which either we or our partners in Europe who will be members of this force would be able to plunge into a nuclear war with Russia without the United States being committed to that war? Is that what the right hon. Gentleman was meaning?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I will come to that, if I may. I want to deal with this matter in an orderly and detailed way. I will come to the question of a multilateral force. If I had been subscribing to a multilateral force it would have been a force in which everybody would have had a veto, including the United States, but I would have made such a contribution—perhaps a small contribution to a multilateral force of this kind—first within the N.A.T.O. Alliance, and, secondly, retaining for this country an independent nuclear deterrent which was viable. That is the difference.
The Prime Minister has put this forward seriously and we should consider it seriously and I now come to what I think is the most damaging criticism of his project. I believe that it is fatal. The right hon. Gentleman's purpose is to unite N.A.T.O. In answer to an interruption by myself yesterday, the right hon. Gentleman said that he thought that I and

others would appreciate that there were strong reasons for putting this new Atlantic force and its controlling body outside the N.A.T.O. Alliance—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—although he kept an open mind. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] If I was not absolutely stone-deaf, that was what the right hon. Gentleman said. I must look at it in HANSARD.
The Prime Minister, in response to that interruption by myself, said that if I gave it thought I would see that there were very important and good reasons for having this outside the N.A.T.O. Alliance. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Can I read what the right hon. Gentleman said? I said:
Surely the whole purpose of this was to unify the N.A.T.O. Alliance and to assist it. This is something outside, which it seems to me at first glance might seriously split it.
I added that I could not pursue it then because I wanted to study it more closely, and so on, and the right hon. Gentleman replied:
Yes, I think that the right hon. Gentleman should. I think that he may come round to this view. If not, we are certainly prepared to debate it with him.
The right hon. Gentleman wants me to come round to the view that it is probably—not certainly—a good thing not to have this in the N.A.T.O. Alliance.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Dennis Healey): indicated dissent.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The right hon. Gentleman was not here.

Mr. Healey: I have taken the trouble to read HANSARD, unlike the right hon. Gentleman, obviously. It would be for the convenience of the House if the right hon. Gentleman could read from HANSARD any passage which carries the meaning and is within the terms which the right hon. Gentleman has just used. There is no such passage.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The right hon. Gentleman was not here, but was. I heard the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, in reply to me yesterday, said:
First, on the question of the authority controlling the force. we feel that there are strong arguments for it not being the N.A.T.O. Council as such."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th December, 1964; Vol. 704, c. 436.]

The Prime Minister: Exactly.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Let me take the Prime Minister's actual words, that it should not be under the N.A.T.O. Council as such. What follows? All N.A.T.O.'s nuclear arms, presumably, will be transferred to the new control body which will not be the N.A.T.O. Council as such. There would be then two bodies controlling the nuclear arms. Does that make sense? Can anybody possibly believe that this can be conceivably anything but nonsense? And what happens within the Atlantic system? Does SACEUR control the conventional force and some other body the nuclear? I am asking. It was very obscure when the Prime Minister said it.
If this control body is to be something other than the N.A.T.O. Council or the N.A.T.O. Nuclear Committee, one is driven to the conclusion that there are to be two controlling bodies within the N.A.T.O. Alliance, both controlling nuclear weapons. How can that be? This would rend N.A.T.O. in half and would weaken it irrevocably. If the Prime Minister persists in this, he need not go to Paris. To save him the trouble, I can tell him long before the Russian leaders come here how they will react to the proliferation of Atlantic commands, and I shall be surprised if European nations will be keen to pay for an expensive force which in itself will be incredible.
In reply to the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman), I would say that the way to get non-dissemination is to bring forward again the Irish Resolution and to put into it a clause pledging that if a mixed-manned force of any kind comes into being it will not involve dissemination of nuclear knowledge or of nuclear arms. That is the way in which we should try once again to promote a non-dissemination agreement.
On the question of whether a new force is required, I should like to refer to what goes on at present inside the N.A.T.O. Alliance, and I should like to say a word about N.A.T.O.'s capacity as it is. The Prime Minister himself has lent some currency to the fashionable statement that the N.A.T.O. Alliance is in disarray. It is very easy to work on false premises here and to come to pre-

mature and false conclusions. I should like to give the House certain facts.
The N.A.T.O. Alliance has been in operation 15 years and during that time it has preserved the security of Western Europe. All the original members are still members of it. They all work together within the organisation and in the committees which deal with both conventional and nuclear arms. There are 27 divisions deployed on the ground. There are thousands of aircraft, and a great many of them with a nuclear capability. The N.A.T.O. nuclear force includes United States weapons and the British bomber force and an enormous number of tactical nuclear weapons are deployed. In other words, N.A.T.O. already has a vast nuclear force with a formidable strike, and its targets are semi-tactical and semi-strategic.
I invite the House to remember that this force on its existing basis is one to which anyone can subscribe and from which anyone can withdraw. This force, as the House will remember, was accepted at the N.A.T.O. Ottawa meeting by all the members, including the French, and it is on that basis that it works today both in its conventional and in its nuclear capacity. There are, of course, problems for N.A.T.O. Do the circumstances today warrant a return to the trip-wire conception which was the case in N.A.T.O.'s earlier years?
How far have we gone from that? Is it possible to bring troops to bear upon the Western German frontier with the same impact by bringing them from further afield? Has the superstructure of N.A.T.O. in Paris become top-heavy? These are matters which are capable of rational settlement in the military committee of N.A.T.O. and in the N.A.T.O. Council. They do not require either a new force or new machinery. There exists, too, the N.A.T.O. nuclear command, with a Belgian officer in command of it—a citizen of a non-nuclear Power, let us remember—second in command to SACEUR. There is also the N.A.T.O. nuclear committee, to which the interests of every member in respect of the deployment of weapons and the targetting of weapons can be brought and coordinated.
The question to which we have to address ourselves, I think, is this: is


anything more needed in this nuclear field, bearing in mind that N.A.T.O. has this immense nuclear strike already and works it under a system agreed by every Member, including the French? Is anything additional needed in the particular direction of mixed manning? Here, I think, there have been false premises and false action. The Americans, in particular, have always assumed that the Germans, and possibly the Italians, would wish to manufacture or acquire their own nuclear arms. I have always believed, and still believe, that this is untrue of both countries.
One after another, German statesmen have denied any such intention. Even if they did not recognise the public obligations which they have undertaken, they know that any action of this sort would shatter the N.A.T.O. Alliance and that with it would go their own security. So the interest of the Germans and the Italians in mixed-manning is not, in my belief, what is so often generally supposed and stated.
In my belief it is this—if German, Italian and American soldiers or sailors are seen together in a mixed-manned unit, particularly in a ship, this would make it, in their eyes, more difficult for the Americans ever to withdraw from Europe, in spite of the fact that they know that the Americans would operate the veto. So, from that point of view, the psychological and the political, it is worth considering whether a limited application of mixed-manning may not be worth while for some units. For myself, I would be willing to consider that and I would not rule out a ship or ships. Those who want it ought really seriously to weigh the advantages and disadvantages within the N.A.T.O. Alliance, because there are advantages, and very serious disadvantages, too.
I would, therefore, plead that these should not he hurried. I do not mind that it has taken a long time to consider it; it wants long and sober consideration. One must remember, in particular, that if a new weapons system of any kind is to be started—even if it is a small mixed-manned force—it must have a military purpose, otherwise the political purpose will be lost. A good many people who have been advocating this ought to keep this in mind.
My conclusion, then, and my first reactions—subject to what I hear from the right hon. Gentleman this evening on the Atlantic force—are that it would be disruptive and divisive in N.A.T.O. If he can say that it will not, I am willing to revise my opinion. I also believe, at the moment, that the force as a deterrent is incredible and little less than an extension of the United States strategic force.
Finally, there are some questions which I want to ask the Secretary of State and to which we did not have an answer from the Prime Minister or from the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, who wound up the debate yesterday. Will the Secretary of State for Defence say categorically that if the Polaris submarines are to be put into the Atlantic force the British Government will not allow anything like an electronic lock to be placed upon them? Will he also say that the communications systems of these submarines will not be so scrambled into the United States system that they could not be resumed under British command? I want an answer to these questions. My right hon. Friend the Member for Saffron Walden asked them and did not receive a reply from the Prime Minister. My right hon. Friend the Member for Conway, also, did not get a reply from the Minister of State. It is imperative that we should know whether this is so or not.
The second question which I want to ask is: what is the meaning of the word "irrevocable" in the context of paragraph 9 of the Nassau Agreement? Is this agreement being renegotiated? Is it being scrapped? I notice that the Prime Minister, in an interview on the B.B.C. a short time ago, said that this matter had not been discussed in Washington. I have the transcript here if he wants it. The Foreign Secretary, in N.A.T.O. yesterday, is reported as saying, in response to a challenge by M. Spaak, that the Macmillan arrangement and paragraph 9 of the Nassau Agreement were no longer in existence and were being swept away. This was hailed in the N.A.T.O. Council—so we understand from the report—as making it quite clear that paragraph 9 of the Nassau Agreement was no longer operative.
Can the Secretary of State, who was in Washington with the Prime Minister


and at the N.A.T.O. Council meeting with the Foreign Secretary, say which is right—or are both right? Has paragraph 9 of the Nassau Agreement gone, or is it going? My right hon. Friend will have more to ask him, but I hope that on these two questions the Secretary of State will be explicit, because on this depends whether we can ever resume the command of our nuclear submarines and whether we can have any hope of remaining a nuclear Power.
I must say that I was puzzled by the Prime Minister's attitude yesterday. He told us that he was keeping bombers in the Far East and I was very glad that he is doing this at least in one area of the world. He seemed to be convinced that this was necessary because they might have to be used either in the conventional or the nuclear capacity. It is possible, now that he knows the facts, that he would like to keep all our weapons systems flexible to meet the changing scenes in the world. I am certain that the sensible thing is not to do anything irrevocable, but to keep the whole of our nuclear arms flexible for any need which might arise in future years.
The right hon. Gentleman is a prisoner of the past, desperately hunting for a force into which he can say that he has sunk our independent nuclear submarine without trace and that we shall, therefore, have no independent deterrent in the future. I am sorry if this is so. I hope still that it is not. I am sorry, because there are great opportunities for this country. I think that we all want to broaden the economic base of our economy to enable us to carry world responsibility. He said so himself. I think that we might be able to swing the rather confined outlook of the Europe of the Common Market towards a wider Atlantic community. We might be able to bring the Russians closer to the West, and we might be able to have an opportunity to begin serious disarmament talks and perhaps get some results.
But if I may say so with great respect to the Prime Minister, the mistake which he is making is to think that we can do any of these things if he takes the irrevocable action which he intends and deprives the nation of nuclear power. That is the essential mistake which the

Prime Minister and his party are making. I fear that he knows it.
We cannot do things in this nuclear age unless Britain is an independent nuclear Power, and it is because I think that the Government are guilty of this grave misjudgment that unless the Secretary of State says something which will seriously alter our opinion I am bound to advise my colleagues to vote against the Government today.

4.51 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Denis Healey): I first apologise for my absence from the debate yesterday. As hon. Members know, I was attending a Ministerial Council meeting of N.A.T.O. in Paris. I particularly regret being absent because it meant missing four excellent maiden speeches from the hon. Members for Westbury (Mr. Walters), Brighouse and Spenborough (Mr. Jackson), Dorking (Sir G. Sinclair) and Preston, South (Mr. Peter Mahon). I think that the concrete and pragmatic tone of their speeches contrasted favourably with the theological approach of the Leader of the Opposition. It was very primitive theology at that. The bulk of his speech was based on a simple dogma which he never attempted to explain or to justify—that neither Britain, nor presumably any other country in the world, can have influence or authority unless she is what he called an independent nuclear Power.
That is the basis of his speech. Frankly, I find it difficult to understand his now absolute attachment to the concept of independence when I remember that he and all right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite until two years ago were trying to put the whole of the economic life of this country under the control of a Government in which foreigners would have a permanent built-in majority. But I do not propose to deal with the theological side of the argument. I will leave that to the Prime Minister this evening. I will deal with the questions which the Leader of the Opposition asked which deal with hard facts and hardware.
I must say that the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden (Mr. R. A. Butler) did better yesterday in basing his speech not on this simple theological dogma but on certain very reasonable questions. I


do not quite see how he squares what he said with what the Leader of the Opposition said. The right hon. Member for Saffron Walden said that the Opposition would judge the Government's policy by three tests. He defined them as follows:
First, will it keep Britain strong, and ensure our national defence and security in a nuclear age? Secondly, will it enable us to make our full contribution to the strength and unity of the Western Alliance? Thirdly, does it uphold our many world-wide responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security outside the N.A.T.O. area?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th December, 1964; Vol. 704, c. 403.]
In contradistinction to the questions by the Leader of the Opposition I consider these criteria valid and eminently reasonable, and I propose to measure our policies against them. But we on this side of the House would add two more: first, will our defence and foreign policies enable us to maintain a powerful and expanding economy at home, because that can be the only possible base for Britain's influence in the world; and, secondly, will they help, not hinder, the achievement of agreements on disarmament? For we believe that in the nuclear age general disarmament is the only final guarantee of security for Britain or for any other country in the world. I suspect that it is in the high priority which we give to economic strength at home and to disarmament in the world that the real differences between the Government and the Opposition mainly lie.
But there is another difference of the greatest importance, and that is that we on this side of the House do not believe that the first two questions asked by the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden are really separable. We think that Britain's national defence and national security in a nuclear age depend totally on the strength and unity of the Western Alliance. It is only if we make our full contribution to that strength and that unity that we can ensure our national defence until disarmament is achieved.
No one who knows the details—as right hon. Gentlemen opposite do—which I was able to learn in Omaha last week of the stupefying nuclear power which the United States has committed to our alliance can doubt its strength, at least so far as atomic weapons are

concerned. The real question lies on the unity of our alliance, and the unity of the alliance has been threatened for several years by two factors which lie at the heart of the questions which we are now discussing. The first is anxiety among the non-nuclear members of the alliance about whether the tremendous deterrent power of the United States' nuclear armoury will always be available at need.
This is an anxiety which has in part been deliberately created by statesmen like President de Gaulle in France and Herr Strauss in Western Germany; and I would say has been deliberately and consistently created by leaders of the Conservative Party both when they were in office and when they are in Opposition. The major justification used in the last General Election and since by Conservative Members for the retention of what they call an independent British nuclear capability is the belief that the American deterrent may not always be reliable. We have even had Conservative Members quoting the possibility that Senator Goldwater might become President of the United States, ignoring the possibility that the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) might become the Prime Minister of Great Britain—a very much more frightening possibility in this context.
But in addition to this anxiety about the reliability of the American deterrent, there is another factor which has been eating away at the unity of the alliance on which our security depends, and that is the concern in Western Germany and to some extent in Italy, too, about what some see as their inequality inside the alliance—the feeling that the present nuclear arrangements inside N.A.T.O. discriminate against them. On reading HANSARD, I was very glad indeed to discover that the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden yesterday said that the Opposition fully accept German claims to equal rights and status in the N.A.T.O. alliance. I hope that we may take it that this is a genuine and unanimous view on the Opposition benches, because, if it is, we should find it easier to reach agreement. He asked the Prime Minister yesterday how he proposes to solve the problem of meeting the German demands for some further influence, different from the part which they already play in N.A.T.O.
What do we offer Germany in these new proposals for an Atlantic nuclear force? This, I suggest, was a question which the Prime Minister totally evaded examining. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear,hear."] I give hon. Members the benefit of that slip of the tongue. The fact is that the Leader of the Opposition did not examine this question at all in his speech this afternoon. I think that it is very important that it should be answered by them as well as by us.
I will answer it on behalf of the Government. The question which the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden asked yesterday is perhaps the key question corroding the unity of N.A.T.O. at present, if it cannot be answered. What do we offer Germany? We offer her participation in ownership, management and control of a new strategic N.A.T.O. nuclear force on terms of absolute equality with all other participants. Moreover—and this is a consideration to which Conservative Members consistently refuse to address themselves—by renouncing our right to go it alone in case of a war in Europe, we not only offer Germany equality but we also offer the German Government and decent Germans a decisive argument against those inside Germany who are pressing for Germany to seek an independent nuclear rôle.
I put it to hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, if they have the fear to which the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden referred yesterday of Germany seeking an independent nuclear rôle, somehow or other they must give some support by some means, by some new arrangement inside N.A.T.O. to those many Germans, indeed the majority in the German Government, who want to resist the pressures from Bavaria and to resist the pressure from other parts of their society.
The Leader of the Opposition and the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden asked a number of other questions which I will answer one by one. First, the important question of the rôle of France in the discussions which are now under way. As the Prime Minister said yesterday, one of our objectives is to find a solution which will foster the strength and unity of the alliance as a whole, and I agreed entirely with the Leader of the Opposition when he suggested that

any solution which proves in the end to divide the Atlantic Alliance, whatever its other virtues, is not worthy of acceptance.
We hope that France will participate in the Atlantic nuclear force which we have proposed, and the discussions which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has been having in Paris this week have, naturally, included the French. We shall continue to seek their participation. We believe that in many respects the proposals we have made—involving, as they do, the inclusion of nationally contributed forces, particularly missile forces, in an Atlantic nuclear force—offer possibilities for French adhesion which the American proposal for a mixed-manned surface fleet did not offer. This is one of the arguments for the proposals which we have made. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said yesterday that he will be going to Paris in the new year, and this will, no doubt, be one of the subjects for discussion.
The Leader of the Opposition got himself into some trouble by asking questions about nuclear control. He finally had to admit that the Prime Minister said nothing whatever about keeping the Atlantic nuclear force outside the N.A.T.O. Alliance. The question is, what are the political control arrangements for the proposed Atlantic nuclear force? The Prime Minister explained that there would be a collective authority for the force on which all countries contributing to it would be entitled to be represented. He described the duties of that authority.
Suggestions were made in the debate that these arrangements might be taken to imply that, in some way, the authority set up for the purposes of the force would supersede the N.A.T.O. Council. This is not so. As the Prime Minister said, one of our aims is that the strategic nuclear forces thus committed to N.A.T.O. should be united under a single unified system forming an integral part of the defence of the alliance as a whole. With respect to the Leader of the Opposition, tactical nuclear weapons are now, and will remain, under the control of SACEUR. They are quite separate from the new nuclear strategic system which it is proposed should be set up as an Atlantic nuclear force.

Mr. Peter Thorneycroft: rose—

Mr. Healey: The Atlantic nuclear force would be collectively owned by the participating countries, and the countries contributing forces to it would transfer title over them to the force collectively. The collective owners would then assign the force to N.A.T.O., to be used in coordination with the other forces available to the alliance, in accordance with the approved strategy and operating procedures of N.A.T.O. Thus there is no question of superseding the N.A.T.O. Council or of setting up an alliance within the alliance.
The authority of the Atlantic nuclear force would stand in exactly the same relation to N.A.T.O. as a country which assigns national nuclear forces to N.A.T.O. The commander of the Atlantic nuclear force would be in the N.A.T.O chain of command. The question of whether he would be one of the existing commanders or whether it would be a new appointment is one of the matters which we will have to discuss with our allies.

Mr. Thorneycroft: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves that point, for these are important matters and I want to be sure that I understand just what is the answer; the Prime Minister made it perfectly plain that the authority would control all strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. He made no distinction between the two. He lumped the whole lot together. He went on to say plainly:
…on the question of the authority controlling the force, we feel that there are strong arguments for it not being the N.A.T.O. Council as such."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th December, 1964: Vol. 704, c. 436.]
I am still not clear from what the Secretary of State has said—and I would like to be clear about this—whether the N.A.T.O. Council is going to preserve the authority over the planning, targeting, and all the rest of it, which it holds as the ultimate authority.

Mr. Healey: To some extent this question is still for negotiation among our allies. [Interruption.] Really, hon. Members opposite, especially those on the Front Bench, must know that we are discussing a proposal which requires negotiation inside an alliance which has 15 or 16 members. We cannot lay down, in advance, every single detail of this.

The right hon. Member for Saffron Walden was right to insist that we should not commit ourselves in detail on every one of these issues in the first 100 days of our Administration.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I have the OFFICIAL REPORT with me and I do not think that my impression was wrong. I would not have interrupted unless the Prime Minister had given me the most definite impression that this would be outside the N.A.T.O. Council. Indeed, the Prime Minister went on to say:
It would be very closely linked to N.A.T.O., but the controlling authority need not itself be the N.A.T.O. Council."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th December, 1964; Vol. 704, c. 436.]
This is different, surely? The N.A.T.O. Council now controls the policy of N.A.T.O., whether it is nuclear or conventional. This would be another body controlling nuclear matters, so, in fact, there would be two. This surely cannot make sense. I am asking the Secretary of State for information.

Mr. Healey: I think that the Leader of the Opposition is making a confusion here—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—perhaps a permissible one in view of what was said about the operational authority for the force, which would be separate from the N.A.T.O. Council, but operating with it, and the commander of the force, who would be in the N.A.T.O.chain of command. This is, after all, an entirely new nuclear force. At the moment the targeting of national forces inside N.A.T.O.—[Interruption.]. I know that some hon. Members opposite do not know the existing procedures and, to some extent, they are not entirely for public knowledge. But the fact is that at present the targeting of the nuclear forces which work with N.A.T.O. is not entirely under the control of the N.A.T.O. Council because the targeting of the European assigned forces and the forces assigned to SACEUR is integrated with the targeting of quite a separate Strategic Air Command force in the United States.
The point I have made clear—and I hope that this sets the mind of the Leader of the Opposition at rest—is that there is no question here of establishing something parallel to or outside N.A.T.O. The new force would be part of the Atlantic


Alliance. The precise nature of the relationship which it would have with the N.A.T.O. Council is something still for negotiation with our allies. I do not think the Opposition can ask me to go further now, particularly if hon. Members opposite want me to answer some of the 49 questions which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Saffron Walden asked yesterday.

Mr. Hugh Fraser: rose—

Mr. Healey: I will not give way because I want to pass to the question of the Government's view on the communications system for the Polaris submarines assigned by us to this new Atlantic nuclear force and the question of physical electronic controls which might be established over the weapons available to an Atlantic nuclear force.
I appreciate that the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden had in mind particularly the British Polaris submarines. As to the communications system, that matter will be entirely British-manned and controlled. This will be entirely British. Just as we propose that the British components of the force should be subject to the same juridical controls as all the other component forces, including a British veto, so we envisage that such physical controls as may be agreed on should he applied to all component parts of the force.
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made clear in Washington, and our American allies fully accepted, that both the juridical and the physical control should he such as to permit the recovery of British and any other national contribution from the force if, by any extraordinary mischance, the N.A.T.O. Alliance were dissolved. In such a case, but only in such a case, it will be juridically and physically possible to recover the submarines and aircraft which we have committed to the force.
That brings me to the question, about which the Leader of the Opposition made so much, of the renegotiation of the Nassau Agreement. The right hon. Member for Saffron Walden and the Leader of the Opposition referred to paragraph 9 of the Nassau Statement. We have often been asked whether we contemplate the renegotiation of the Nassau Agreement and

what we mean by this. What we mean is, our proposal is, that any British or other national contribution to the Atlantic nuclear force should be committed to it for as long as N.A.T.O. may continue to exist. This, we hope and believe, means indefinitely. We believe—and this I agree is the difference between us and some hon. and right hon. Members opposite—that so long as N.A.T.O. exists its nuclear defence is, and must be, indivisible. We cannot conceive a situation in which, so long as N.A.T.O. exists, any British Government would seriously think of "going it alone" in a nuclear attack upon the Soviet Union.
In so far as our position affects paragraph 9 of the Nassau Agrement, and in so far also as the arrangements which have been concluded in respect of the Polaris missiles may have to be modified when we reach the final decision on the number of Polaris submarines we shall complete the arrangements made at Nassau will have to be modified; they have not been modified so far.
I think that I have answered in detail the more important questions which have been asked and the tangential questions asked by the Leader of the Opposition. In the last two years—

Sir Harmar Nicholls: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Healey: On one last point.

Sir Harmar Nicholls: Are we to take it, then, that it is the Foreign Secretary's version and not the Prime Minister's that is Government policy?

Mr. Healey: If the hon. Gentleman would clear up the confusion on his own Front Bench on this matter, I might be interested to reply to this question.
I think that we have given pretty fair replies—I know that they will not all be agreeable to hon. Members opposite—to the more important questions which they have asked about the Atlantic nuclear force. I think that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister gave an exceptionally detailed account of our proposals in his speech yesterday. I think that we are equally entitled to ask this question of the Opposition. How do they propose to meet the problems to which the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden referred yesterday, the uncertainty in the alliance of the dependability of the American


deterrent and the growing demand in Germany and other European countries for equality of status? After all, hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite were in power for the whole of the last 13 years during which this problem has been emerging. They were in power for the last two years since the United States of America formally proposed the mixed-manned surface fleet as one means of solving this problem. We never had it clear what was the view of the Conservative Government or the Opposition on this, or whether they had any alternative to the mixed-manned surface fleet at all.
We do know that exactly a year ago today the right hon. Member for Monmouth (Mr. Thorneycroft) put some proposals to the N.A.T.O. Council, but he was completely sold down the river by his colleagues. Let me quote from the Daily Express of 20th December last year:
Mr. Thorneycroft left high and dry. Defence Minister Mr.Peter Thorneycroft was left out on his own yesterday with his surprise proposal to N.A.T.O. to substitute the TSR2 force for the Polaris mixed-manned fleet. It became obvious that his idea was purely personal—shunned by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, and rejected by U.S. Secretary of Sate Mr. Dean Rusk…only Mr. Thorneycroft's own Ministry continued to insist that the proposal would soon be tabled officially at the mixed fleet talks. Elsewhere in Whitehall the idea was either being studiously ignored or written off as 'merely philosophical'. British and American diplomats said the proposal was not even mentioned during any of the long talks between Mr. Rusk, Mr. Butler and the Premier.
It is true that six months later the right hon. Gentleman finally won his battle and got permission from the Cabinet to put these proposals forward again, but by that time he had missed the boat. What he was proposing was too little and too late, because by that time our allies had made up their minds that if the Conservative Party won the General Election they would join the multilateral mixed-manned surface fleet in any case, and I cannot blame them.
On 10th October, only two months ago, the Leader of the Opposition, while he was still Prime Minister, told his briefing conference in London that there was a strong political argument for Britain to go into a multilateral force. Just listen to what he said only two months before and compare it with what he said this afternoon.

At some point, the Prime Minister added"—
he was still Prime Minister then—
there would have to be a switch over from nuclear bombs to intermediate-range missiles. The question would then be whether the missiles should be on land or ships. A strong body of opinion held that they ought to be on ships, and there was a question whether they should be mixed-manned. There was nothing wrong with mixed-manning.
I do not know how hon. Gentlemen opposite feel that this ties up with what the Prime Minister said this afternoon. If anyone is uncertain about what it means, it was spelt out in words of one syllable by the right hon. Member for Enfield (Mr. Iain Macleod)—now a distinguished member of the Opposition Front Bench—in a signed article in the Spectator on 16th October, written possibly just before the election, published just after it. This is what the right hon. Member for Enfield—with his unrivalled knowledge of the Opposition policy—then wrote
The logic of events will take a Tory Administration into the MLF, if only because the alternative of what would, in effect, be a joint U.S.-German venture in the nuclear field is unacceptable.
This is the crude reality behind the pseudo-Gaullist braggadocio of the right hon. Member for Monmouth in our last debate. The right hon. Gentleman may have bamboozled his own back benchers—[HON. MEMBERS: "That is not difficult."]—that is not difficult after dinner, but that is what the people of this country would have let themselves in for if they had elected right hon. Members opposite for another term of office.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The right hon. Gentleman keeps quoting me, so perhaps he will allow me one more intervention. He quoted words which I had said and he said that they were at variance with what I had said to the House. I said exactly what he has quoted to the House only a fortnight ago. I said that if we are going to get a nuclear force and decide what we want and whether there is to be a mixed-manned unit, the way to do so would be to see what was the N.A.T.O. military requirement for missiles because missiles would have to succeed the bombers. Should we then decide to have some on the sea, or fixed sites on land, some possibly on aerodromes and movable? That seems to me a sensible way


to go about it. I did not rule out the possibility of the mixed-manning of ships. The right hon. Gentleman has entirely distorted the sense of what I said.

Mr. Healey: Hon. Members can form their own judgment on this. All I can say is that when he addressed his political journalists on 10th October the right hon. Gentleman stated quite definitely that there would have to be a switch over to intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The only question was where they would be put.
The right hon. Member for Monmouth never accepted that there was a requirement in N.A.T.O. for intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This has been one cause of our objection to the mixed-manned surface fleet. We do not think that there is a military requirement that it needs to meet. Here there is a long-standing division between the right hon. Gentleman and the Leader of his party. Perhaps they can sort it out among themselves afterwards.
The fact is that Her Majesty's Government's new proposals provide a way out of the dilemma. I do not deny that the right hon. Member for Enfield was probably right when he suggested that if no alternative proposal was to be put forward, we should be faced with the stark choice between joining a mixed-manned surface fleet and seeing an American-German nuclear alliance. That of course is why our new proposals have received such a favourable reception from our allies. They are no keener than we are to be impaled on the horns of that particular dilemma. I believe, as a contribution to the strength and unity of N.A.T.O., our new proposals for an allied nuclear force meet the first and second test which the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden sought to apply to our policy. For it is only through the strength and unity of N.A.T.O. that we can achieve national security until disarmament is under way.
His third question was whether our policy upholds the world-wide responsibility of the United Kingdom for maintaining peace and security outside the N.A.T.O. area. I do not propose to say a great deal about it.

Mr. Hugh Fraser: rose—

Mr. Healey: I am sorry for the right hon. Gentleman, but I have had a great

deal of interruption from the benches opposite and I want to conclude my speech at a reasonable time.

Mr. Hugh Fraser: It is on a point of clarification.

Mr. Healey: I dare say, but I know that sometimes some people take longer to get ideas clear in their minds than others.
One of the advantages which have flowed from this debate so far is that there is at least agreement between the two sides of the House that Britain's worldwide rôle is an essential rôle which Britain must perform and which, indeed, no other country is capable of performing if Britain does not.
We have responsibilities to the Commonwealth and to our allies. We enjoy at the moment facilities in Aden and Singapore particularly which could not be transmitted to any other country if we abandoned them. The only thing that I want to stress here is that our aim in maintaining a military capacity outside Europe is not to protect selfish national economic interests or to fight a world-wide battle against Communism. It is quite simply to contribute to stability and peace in that third of the world where political stability is most deeply threatened.
All of us have been most deeply shocked in recent weeks to hear of the reversion of parts of the Congo to a state of primitive barbarism, and all of us must be conscious that Britain has the ability, and I believe has the duty, to do what she can, if need be by military action, to ensure that other parts of Africa or Asia are not plunged into a similar state of chaos. We must be in a position to prevent more anarchy of that nature until the United Nations can take over. But we cannot operate in those areas without the consent of those among whom our military facilities are located. That is why Her Majesty's Government attach such extreme importance to creating the political conditions, both in Malaysia and in South Arabia, which will enable us to continue to fulfil a peace-keeping rôle from those territories.
But what we need for this rôle are highly mobile conventional forces capable of rapid deployment. Often a rifle or even a stave and wicker shield will be enough, but we need some sophisticated


weapons as a deterrent against the escalation of a local conflict, and therefore we must keep some bombing aircraft outside the Atlantic nuclear force in at least the conventional rôle.
Several hon. and right hon.Gentlemen—[Interruption.] I think that if the hon. Gentleman listens he may hear something to his interest. Several hon. and right hon. Gentlemen have asked whether the aircraft which Her Majesty's Government intend to retain to support operations outside Europe will be restricted entirely to a conventional rôle. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said yesterday:
Previous Governments have never answered any questions about the rôle of bombers outside the N.A.T.O. area. I intend to follow the line that has been taken."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 16th Dec., 1964; Vol. 704, c. 442.]
I was glad to see that the Leader of the Opposition agreed about this this afternoon.
But perhaps I might put to the House some of the considerations which must govern the decision of the Government on this issue. First, let me say to the right hon. Gentleman that I do not think he will find anything in the Prime Minister's speech which suggested that any aircraft we kept in this rôle would be based in one particular part of the world, still less outside the United Kingdom. We recognise the need for flexibility here. But the most important consideration is that, by exploding their atomic device two months ago, the Chinese Government have faced their neighbours in Asia with an agonising choice. Some of them have, or believe they have, the capacity to produce atomic weapons for themselves in self-defence, and, indeed, are under pressure by their own countrymen to do so. I think that we would all agree on both sides of the House that to start an atomic arms race in Asia just at the moment when the existing nuclear powers are on the verge of halting the atomic arms race in the Western world would be an unparalleled disaster to the whole of humanity. Yet, we cannot ask our friends in Asia to renounce this possibility unless we can find some means of filling the gap in their defences which the Chinese bomb has opened. By far the best answer would be for the existing nuclear Powers on both sides of the Iron Curtain to give solemn and effective guarantees to the non-nuclear Powers against nuclear blackmail or attack.
This, I believe, must be a major priority in our negotiations with the Soviet Union, but if Russia refuses to consider such a step, then we shall have to see whether it is possible for the Western nuclear Powers to give such a guarantee by themselves. If it comes to this, serious problems might arise for those non-nuclear Asian countries which are committed to a policy of non-alignment. These are grave and complicated matters whose full implications are not yet apparent to any of those concerned, but I think the House will agree that they justify Her Majesty's Government in reserving their position for the time being on the question of the rôle of aircraft outside Europe.
I have tried to test our policies by the criteria which the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden asked me to apply. I believe that they emerge from his tests with all honours, but we on our side must apply two further tests—economy at home and a contribution towards disarmament. I believe, in spite of what the Leader of the Opposition said, that he does not really appreciate the need for choice and priorities in our defence policies. I heard of him talking recently about using Polaris submarines in the Pacific, but he must know, or should know, that the base facilities and communications this would require would add at least £200 million or may be £300 million to the nuclear bill. If he seriously considers retaining the independent nuclear capacity against all corners through the next decade, then he must start now spending hundreds of millions of £s on research into new weapons systems to follow the Polaris submarines, with thousands of millions of £s to follow later on in development and production. If we committed ourselves to such a course we should rule out any other military contribution at all. We are still over-committed in defence. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said that we must cut our commitments, but he did not suggest where we should cut them.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The right hon. Gentleman really must give way. He must not misrepresent so much of what I said. I do not mind his misrepresenting a little, because he always does, but so much is going too far. I said that they would find when they came


to assess things that if they wanted a world rôle the Government would have to cut their commitments, probably, because they seemed to be letting us in for so much.

Mr. Healey: I will ask my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to deal in detail with the figures on this question, but I must say that the way that the right hon. Gentleman phrased his question then shows that he understands very little about the nature of our defence expenditure at the present time. But he asked me a question which I am prepared to answer: how can we make savings if we intend to maintain a world rôle and maintain a contribution to the strength and unity of N.A.T.O.? I believe that savings are possible if we look more rigorously at the actual needs of war outside Europe. I believe, as the Prime Minister said yesterday, that we may find it possible to cut at least the numbers of the sophisticated and very expensive weapons which we are at the moment planning to produce. It may be possible, after rigorous analysis, to rule out certain types of sophisticated weapons altogether. I hope to give a fuller statement of my views on this matter when the defence review is completed. It may be possible to save money by organising closer co-operation with our allies in these other parts of the world. This, also, needs looking at.
The main threat to economy in our defence arrangements still lies—I know that the right hon. Member for Monmouth will agree here—in the grossly unrealistic demands which are still being made by some of the military for our contributions to the defence of Europe inside N.A.T.O. The Leader of the Opposition asked me some questions about the trend of N.A.T.O. thinking at the moment. I can tell him honestly that the meeting of the Ministerial Council yesterday may mark a turning point inside N.A.T.O. towards greater realism on this matter.
Some of the military commanders are still asking for increases in manpower and resources which no Government will make to fight a war which will never happen. The only realistic basis for N.A.T.O. defence planning is to accept that we cannot expect any of the allied Governments to invest a greater pro-

portion of their gross national product in the defence of N.A.T.O. than they are doing now. Therefore, we must see whether we can secure better value for money by examining possible suitable changes in the rôle, deployment, tactics or equipment of the forces which we have.
Here, certain major questions arise. Is it sensible to tie down such a high proportion of our forces and resources to the concept of fighting a long drawn-out major war in Europe? Is this really the danger which we face? The United States has spent countless millions of dollars on constructing a deterrent force of stupefying efficiency and destructive power. Has this expenditure been so futile that it has had no effect whatever upon Soviet intentions towards N.A.T.O.? Do the size, fighting capacity and deployment of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe suggest any intention of major aggression? Whatever our conclusions on this question, are we bound to assume that we shall be attacked without warning, and must we, therefore, base our supply and reinforcement plans on this assumption?
If a major attack does take place, if we meet it as planned in our present strategy, and if the Russians persist in an attack and we then escalate to general nuclear warfare, how long will the campaign last—for months, for weeks, for days or for hours?

Sir Cyril Osborne: Minutes.

Mr. Healey: Knowing the sombre and terrifying facts about the scale of destruction and casualties to be expected in a nuclear war, we must answer "Days", and we may even answer, as the hon. Gentleman just suggested, "Minutes".
Precisely because we know the terrifying consequences of nuclear war, we cannot limit ourselves to a strategy which allows us no alternative in any circumstances. This is why the present Government reject the so-called trip-wire strategy. N.A.T.O. must have conventional forces which can raise the threshold at which nuclear weapons are brought to bear to a point high enough to be credible if an enemy is thinking of a major attack. But we do not need to plan to fight, still less to win, a lengthy major war on the ground in


Europe after the thermo-nuclear exchange has taken place.
If we accept this, as I think we must, we can then consider how our defence resources can be used in N.A.T.O. to deal with the real danger. The real danger in N.A.T.O., I suggest, is not a general attack by the Soviet Union but is an ambiguous local conflict in which Soviet intentions are unclear and in which an unpremeditated action has sprung from a local political crisis. We must be able to suppress such a conflict by conventional means, but in order to do this we shall need forces far more flexible and mobile, far better armed conventionally, and more capable of fulfilling a conventional rôle, than those which we now possess.
If we take this line inside N.A.T.O.—there were many signs yesterday that there is a growing feeling among the other Governments that this is the line which we should take—we shall not only get very much better value for every £1,000 we spend and for every battalion which we contribute, but we shall also create a military situation in which the prospects of disarmament are better.
There is no point in endlessly multiplying weapons in Central Europe when both sides already have more than sufficient. Cannot we now get together with our opponents to reach agreement on maintaining the balance of power in Europe at a lower cost, to agree on inspection posts, to freeze existing forces, and move on ultimately to reduce the level at which the balance is maintained on both sides? I believe that we can and must.
The basic aim of N.A.T.O. must be to create a situation from which we can negotiate to achieve a security which is based on co-operation in stopping the arms race, not on competition to win it. But the principal condition for achieving such an agreement is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons inside each of the existing alliances. This is the major aim of our new proposals for an allied nuclear force. This is why Her Majesty's Government insist so strongly that no force must be set up unless it satisfies the following two conditions. First, whatever solution is found for the nuclear problem inside N.A.T.O., it must not involve an increase in the overall nuclear capacity of the West. At best,

it should not involve the creation of any new strategic system at all. Every conceivable target East of the Iron Curtain—I know that the Leader of the Opposition agrees with this; I think that he mentioned it in his speech—is already covered by forces already in being or under construction. If political or psychological arguments make the addition of a new system inevitable as a component in an allied nuclear force, then existing systems must be reduced in size in order that the overall balance between East and West is not upset. That is the first major condition which we pose.
The second, which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister set out yesterday, is that we insist that equality inside N.A.T.O.—the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden made this the basis of his approach to the problem—must be
achieved not by putting more fingers on the trigger but by putting more fingers on the safety catch. In no circumstances can we agree to arrangements which would involve the dissemination of nuclear weapons. On the contrary. This is why we insist that, when the Atlantic nuclear force is set up, all the participants should sign a declaration of non-dissemination if they are nuclear contributors, and of non-acquisition if they are non-nuclear contributors.
The British Government's new proposals will not only enable N.A.T.O. to round a dangerous corner—right hon. Members opposite know how dangerous a corner N.A.T.O. had reached by the time they left office—but will also make a major contribution towards stopping the spread of atomic weapons. Allied with other measures of defence and foreign policy which we shall put before the House in the coming months, our proposals will enable Britain to resume her rightful place as a major influence on world affairs.

5.38 p.m.

Mr. J. Grimond: Under the pressure of events, the two sides of the House are coming nearer and nearer together on defence policy. I welcome this. For the sake of old quarrels, or for the sake of pacifying the dissident members of the two parties, I hope that there will not be an attempt to maximise our differences, but that we shall see how much common ground there can be in this most important matter of defence.


For this reason, I welcome the suggestion of the Prime Minister that some access to information should be afforded to the Opposition. I think that it will be difficult to confine this simply to the Leaders of the official Opposition. Some method may have to be found of allowing back benchers, including members of my party, as well as the official Opposition, some access to information.
All defence debates should be about the future. We cannot alter the present situation. It is the "given" in the problem. I propose to address myself to what I consider the policies of this country and of the Western world should be over the next 5, 10, 15 or 20 years.
The present situation sees Britain with two features which are not shared by her European neighbours. One is her possession of some strategic nuclear capacity and the other is her possession of bases which are spread around the world. These are features which will decline in importance. It is impossible for this country to keep up a sufficient stable of nuclear weapons to enable her to remain in the race with the Russians or the Americans, and, as I shall try to explain, I also believe that our worldwide rôle, important though it may be now, is also a diminishing rôle.
What I think we have to do, looking to the future, is to see how we can use these special features of this country today so that we can make the fullest contribution to the general safety and defence of the free world and also to our own safety and defence tomorrow. I want to deal with that in the context which was set by the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister told us that the defence budget now cost 7·1 per cent. of our gross national product and that this was too much. He emphasised that this was too much not so much because of what we are spending now but because it would inevitably increase. I agree with him. I believe, however, as I said in the defence debate on 23rd November, that this brings us straight back to the fact that, in defence, as, indeed, in economic policy, this country is operating on too narrow a base and that we must try to broaden our base. This is the prime reason for seeking some political collaboration with Europe, which I still

believe should be a major aim of British foreign policy.
The next point made by the Prime Minister was that the emphasis in defence should be shifted from Europe to the Far East, and that was repeated by the Defence Secretary today. Here I agree that the instability in the Far East is alarming when set beside the stability in Europe generated by the nuclear stalemate and the very powerful deployment of nuclear weapons by stable alliances on either side of the European frontier. But, looking ahead, I should not like to think that this House under-estimated the dangers in Europe. I would make plain that Berlin is still a very dangerous spot in the world. I would very much agree with what was said at one point by the Defence Secretary—that, whatever we may think of the chances of a major nuclear war breaking out deliberately in Europe, there is still grave danger of incidents escalating to a point at which they cannot be prevented from entering into nuclear hostilities.
We should remember that Europe remains the place where the freedom of the world can be lost practically in one night. I wholly agree with the Defence Secretary that we must not be in the position of relying entirely upon nuclear arms in Europe. That brings me to my first question. What is to be done about the Rhine Army? I do not think that we have been told whether the Government intend to bring it up to strength, and not only up to strength but to a better condition of readiness and supplied with all the equipment it requires.
The Prime Minister also laid great stress on the worldwide peace-keeping rôle of this country. Here I disagree with him, at any rate in the emphasis he placed upon this rôle in his speech. We have, of course, specific obligations which we are bound to discharge. We have obligations in the Persian Gulf and in Malaysia. We have bases of great value and I should be the last to suggest that this country should in any way unilaterally throw up specific obligations which it holds throughout the world.
We have done an excellent job in Africa, but this is a passing phase in world affairs. I do not believe that we shall be asked again to intervene in African countries in the way we have been asked. I am not sure that it is at all


desirable that we should. I do not think that this country can undertake to be, so to speak, a long stop for peace throughout the world. I do not think that it can undertake an open ended obligation of some peace-keeping rôle throughout the Indian Ocean, the Far East and Africa.
I do not think, even if we could undertake such a rôle, that we should. When we were an imperial Power it was a natural obligation on us. Now we are not an imperial Power and it is a wholly unnatural obligation for us to undertake. Furthermore, in such places as Malaysia, it seems that we may be involved already in a very long campaign which will be extremely difficult to end and which will be a continual strain upon our resources and manpower.
Therefore, in so far as the Prime Minister emphasised this general peace keeping rôle, I would dissent from him and say that the sooner we get rid of that general rôle, either on to the United Nations or some form of alliance much more suitable for ensuring peace in Africa and Asia, the better. I suspect that the Government hold the same view. Indeed, the Defence Secretary at times suggested that they do.
While I make it clear that, in my view, we must maintain our current and specific obligations, we should not count on continuing to act as general policemen, whether it is done with nuclear weapons or with batons and wicker shields.

Mr. Will Griffiths: I agree very much with what the right hon. Gentleman has been saying, but, so long as these obligations remain in Asia and Africa, does he think that our rôle will be helpful in Asia and Africa with British planes carrying independent nuclear weapons?

Mr. Grimond: I do not think that nuclear weapons are helpful at all. I want to get rid of the rôle on to some international body which could discharge the job more easily and without nuclear weapons.
I want to draw attention to what the Prime Minister said yesterday in talking about a shift in our resources and total defence expenditure:
In certain areas of the world, therefore, perhaps it is right that while some weapons must become more sophisticated, we should recognise that in other areas military effect-

tiveness depends on more, simpler and earlier, rather than on fewer, more complicated and later."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th December, 1964; Vol. 704, c. 423.)
That may be so but I suspect that this means manpower and helicopters and aircraft for Transport Command and so forth. I doubt whether this would make, in the long run, smaller demands upon our scarce resources than more sophisticated weapons do. I hope that, tonight, this breakdown between the nuclear defence budget and the nonnuclear will be given in more detail. I suspect that the 10 per cent. of the defence budget taken up by the nuclear element might be a great deal more in real terms because of its consequent strain on our resources.
The Prime Minister laid great stress on the maintenance of British bases, but these bases probably cannot continue to be in our hands. We may assure them that we are the best neighbours in the world but many countries in which we have bases are chronically suspicious of the British. They may be wrong but we shall not overcome it all that easily. Furthermore, some of these countries are neutralist or will become neutralist, and even those who are not and will not become neutralist will not indefinitely permit bases on their territory unless they are active members of the alliance such bases are supporting.
We must face this fact. It is a lesson we should have learnt. Again and again we have felt that we were on good terms with countries where we had bases and again and again we have been thrown out. In the long run, we must face the fact that these bases must become, in some form, international. One high priority of policy, therefore, should be to build up effective alliances in the Far East and I was glad to hear what the Defence Secretary said today about that.
One particularly difficult part of the Far East is India. I am sure that the Government are right—and here, too, I think that the Opposition agree with them—to say that we must offer all aid to India, although, as the Secretary of State of Defence said, it is for very serious and difficult and deep consideration whether we should go as far as offering India a nuclear umbrella, because it is peculiarly difficult to give a nation which wants to remain neutralist such protection. It


would be folly to underestimate this difficulty. It would be difficult for the Indians to say that they wanted non-alignment and for us to say, "In spite of that, we intend to protect you." No doubt something like this must be worked out, but this again can be only a temporary situation and in the long run there must be some sort of international guarantee, not only to India, but to other nations in her position.
I want now to turn to the subject of the Atlantic nuclear force. The first point I have to make is also concerned with the Prime Minister's speech. The Prime Minister said that he felt that an objection to the multilateral force was that it was extremely unlikely that the Americans would give permission for the use of nuclear weapons by the multilateral force in circumstances in which they were not prepared to use their own Strategic Air Force. This seems to be a good objection to the multilateral force, but, of course, it is equally an objection to the Atlantic nuclear force.
The first question which we must ask then is why the Americans should allow the Atlantic nuclear force to trigger off a nuclear war if they were not prepared to do it direct. The answer is that they will not. The object of the Atlantic nuclear force is not to add to the West any very logical components for defence, but, as has been said often enough, to satisfy the Europeans, to make them feel that they have some say in the targeting and build-up of the force and discussions about how nuclear weapons may or may not be used and to give them some assurance that if America should ever withdraw from Europe, the Europeans would not be left without any nuclear shield.
I was greatly interested in one thing which the Leader of the Opposition said today. He said quite clearly that it was his party's policy to consider—I do not say that he said that his party was committed to it—making a contribution to the multilateral force and also maintaining an independent deterrent. That would be an extremely expensive operation and I wonder whether we should be able to do it. I strong suspect that this would put up the defence budget to a very high level. But it is much the same position as the Government now take.
I am still not quite clear from the right hon. Gentleman's speech how he regards

the dangers in the world. He repeated the view that a country can be a major nation only if it is a nuclear Power. He may believe that and I have no doubt that he does, but he cannot believe that it is a desirable state of affairs. One of the objects of British foreign policy, if that is the general opinion of the world, should be to change it. The sooner we convince nations that they can be major Powers without being nuclear Powers, the better. I would have thought that that was one of the objects of building up some international force in which nations could feel that they had some say, at any rate in the planning of the matter, even if the ultimate triggering were elsewhere.
I have understood that in recent years the main argument for the independent deterrent was that it might be necessary to use it in a situation in which, say, Indonesia began to threaten Malaysia with nuclear weapons. This would be outside the N.A.T.O. area and would be the responsibility of no one but ourselves, runs the argument. It is said that if we could not offer Malaysia some nuclear umbrella, then China or someone else coming in behind Indonesia with nuclear weapons could force Malaysia to capitulate. If that is the case, the Conservative Party has its answer in that there is to be no diminution of the Air Force in the Far East.
I would also have thought that the Conservative Party would largely agree that in Europe the United States Strategic Air Force is a sufficient strategic deterrent and that whatever the British might add in Europe would be of small account. I do not want it said that I am belittling the V-bomber force or our nuclear submarines. I have no doubt that they can blow Moscow to bits, but so can the Strategic Air Force, and to much smaller bits than the British can. I would not have thought that much was added by our contribution in that respect.
If there is an Atlantic nuclear force this will give our European allies a greater feeling that they are in on the planning, and I would have thought on the financing, of nuclear defence and that they are being treated more or less as equals. I must say that Mr. Butler was quite right—I am sorry; I should have said the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden (Mr. R. A. Butler). I keep on thinking of him in his electoral capacity when he


created such a powerful impression on public opinion. I cannot get out of my mind this picture of him in railway trains, but now he must be called the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden.
The Government were tactless even this afternoon in their references to the Germans. If it is to be acceptable, the Atlantic nuclear force must be free from two handicaps. First, the Europeans are profoundly suspicious of the British claim to have a special relationship with the United States. For one thing, they all think that they have it. They believe that most of us regard N.A.T.O. as simply a sort of rationalisation of our special relationship with the United States. The Government must disabuse the Europeans of that idea and in any form which the Government have suggested for the A.N.F. it looks as though we are still harping on our special position.
Secondly the Europeans must not be treated as having an inferior status. I am not certain from what the Prime Minister said yesterday what their status in the A.N.F. is to be. Dealing with the authority which would control this force, yesterday he said:
The United States, the United Kingdom, and France, if she took part, would have a veto…European countries could either have a single veto or, if they wanted to do it on some group basis, that would be a matter for them."…[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th December, 1964; Vol. 704, c. 434–5.]
I appreciate that this has not been negotiated, but the proposal seems to be that a nuclear Power should definitely have a veto and that non-nuclear Powers should have some veto—but on what basis? Would it be on the basis of their collaboration in the multilateral force? If so, is the force to have some political body in charge of it? I had not imagined the multilateral force as other than a purely military operation, but if there is to be a veto, some sort of political council must be superimposed on it, and that would be extremely difficult.

Mr. Healey: May I clear up one issue which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal Party has raised? If there is a force to which non-nuclear and nuclear Powers contribute, the nuclear contributors must have a veto, or the force will constitute a proliferation of nuclear weapons. Whether the other Powers have a veto is irrelevant from that point of view, but of course we wish

to offer them the right of veto if they want it and we would allow them to be able to exercise it in any form they wished, either separately or collectively.

Mr. Grimond: There is not the slightest chance that they would join unless they had an equal power of veto with everybody.
If the Government's proposal is to run, we must prove that we are better Europeans than we have been in the past. To take up what the Secretary of State for Defence said about it not being logical for the Conservative Party to want to go into Europe and yet to want to have control over the weapons, his party is equally illogical the other way round in saying that it will not go into Europe but will hand over weapons. We must have some political coming together as well as some military coming together.
The Europeans may say that the real test of our sincerity is whether we are willing to join the M.L.F. I should like to know the Government's answer to that. The Prime Minister has made extremely hostile noises about the M.L.F. and continued even yesterday to say that he did not like the idea, but I suspect that the Europeans may say that the real test of our sincerity may be not only whether we are prepared to put our Polaris submarines and some V-bombers into the A.N.F., but whether we are prepared to joint the M.L.F. The Government may be prepared to do that, but it will be a drastic change from everything the Labour Party said during the General Election.
We may make some special approach to Germany. The Germans are anxious to have something in the nature of a standing group, or even a joint AngloGerman conference, on the subject of the unification of Germany and the arms situation in mid-Germany. For my part, I view with some disquiet the thought of a sea of atomic minefields across the middle of Europe, but this is exactly the sort of thing which we want to discuss at a political level before it becomes an accepted defence idea.
Will the council, whether it is the N.A.T.O. Council or a new council, have any political control? In one passage of his speech yesterday, the Prime Minister inferred that the new council might well have a political as well as a purely defence rôle to play. I think that


I am right in saying that this, too, may be something in which the Europeans are interested. One of the inducements which the Americans put to the Europeans to persuade them to accept the M.L.F., or to enable them to point out what a good idea it was, was that it would have some political content.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: This is what puzzled me very much yesterday, and obviously it puzzles the right hon. Gentleman. The Prime Minister said that this new control body was
to provide the force commander with political guidance
and went on to talk about
the decision to release nuclear weapons to the force commander."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 16th Dec. 1964: Vol. 704, c. 435.]
The Secretary of State for Defence said today, when we were having exchanges across the Floor of the House, that this was consistent with control by the N.A.T.O. Council. It is very difficult to see how.

Mr. Grimond: I am greatly obliged to the right hon. Gentleman. I was wondering what the Prime Minister meant by what he said in column 435.
Finally, I should like to repeat the question which has been asked already: what does irrevocability mean? I have indicated my view. The argument about irrevocability is slightly theological. In the sort of Göterdammerung in which the world will be destroyed, I have the feeling that the alliance will end anyhow, and the idea that there will be some formal ending of the alliance before the atom bomb is dropped is unreal.
We should not get too involved in a discussion about revocability or irrevocability. The situation in which this might arise is difficult to see. I take the point that weapons are irrevocable in normal circumstances and in Europe. I should have thought that that was reasonably acceptable. But we should like to know whether this is to be fortified by an electronic device, and, if so, who will control it.
As for the Far East, where the aircraft are to be under our control, is it envisaged that in time, when a suitable political body has been found—I make hat important qualification—the same

sort of arrangement will be reached there? If not, we are simply continuing the nuclear deterrent in the old way, and the world will not be greatly impressed by the fact that we have put some of our weapons under international control. I take it that it is the Government's intention, if and when a suitable body is in operation, to guarantee some defence policy in the Far East. I should like some assurance on that.

ROYAL ASSENT

6.3 p.m.

Message to attend the Lords Commissioners:

The House went:… and, having returned;

Mr. SPEAKER: Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

1. Finance (No. 2) Act 1964.
2. Gambia Independence Act 1964.
3. Expiring Laws Continuance Act 1964.
4. Travel Concessions Act 1964.
5. National Insurance &amp;c. Act 1964.
6. Protection from Eviction Act 1964.
7. Edinburgh Corporation Order Confirmation Act 1964.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Question again proposed, That this House do now adjourn.

6.15 p.m.

Mr. Grimond: I should have thought that in five years' time the present policy of the Government will look fairly sensible if it is ever acceptable to our allies. It seems to me at least to make proposals for meeting the legitimate demands of the Europeans. It seems to allow for more countries to be interested in nuclear planning without setting up a new centre of nuclear power, because the whole of the Atlantic nuclear force will be under the American veto. I agree with the Leader of the Opposition that there will be essentially a prolongation of the American defence system. But I do not cavil at that.
The Government's policy will, however, give some assurance that should the Americans, which I do not think is likely,


suddenly pull out of Europe altogether, a vacuum will not be left. In addition, it attempts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, although I am extremely doubtful whether this is now possible. I do not, however, intend to go into that. My own doubt is whether it will be acceptable to the Europeans. I somehow think that it will not be, but I wish the Government well in their effort.
I should have thought that the Government's policy should be extremely acceptable to the Conservative Party. I do not think that the Conservative Party ever totally rejected the idea of a contribution to the multilateral force and, therefore, they cannot object to a British contribution to the Atlantic nuclear force, which will contain the M.L.F. and will be essentially designed to meet the same sort of problems.
The Conservative Party has stressed the danger of our being left without nuclear cover in the Far East, but the Government have now told us that some of the aeroplanes which as essential in the Far East will remain there under our control. I do not think that in five years' time it will be any more possible for this country to set out to replace its existing nuclear capacity with a new generation of nuclear weapons. I should like to ask the Government what views they have on developing new nuclear weapons. Whether the Leader of the Opposition is right or wrong in saying that the country's prestige depends upon nuclear weapons, this is a state of affairs which, granting that contention to be right, will inevitably change. Therefore, I am somewhat astonished that the Conservative Party should be dividing the House tonight. I could understand somewhat the nuclear disarmers being disturbed about this policy, but I am surprised that the Conservative Party is disturbed by it.
While I am not one of those who thinks that the whole world waits in anxiety to know the results of votes in this House, and I have always laughed a good deal at the idea that this House cannot divide in case we upset the nations of the world, I believe that the time is coming when there is a real chance that there will be sufficient basis for agreement about the general lines of defence policy to make it possible to go back to what I would take the liberty of calling a tripartisan policy. If that is so, I would welcome it

and I believe that people outside the House of Commons would welcome it.
I do not believe that the public at large will thank the House of Commons for maximising the differences of defence policy. I do not believe that people outside will thank us for getting ourselves irrevocably bogged down in what appeared to me to the equivalent of medieval theological controversy about how many angels can stand on the point of a needle.
I see on the benches opposite a distinguished former Minister of Defence, the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell). He has for many years appealed for means by which the Government should share their knowledge with the rest of the House. The Government now offer to do that and I hope that their offer will be seriously examined. There may be practical difficulties which make it impossible, but now we have at last the chance of being able to have serious and informed discussion of the realities of defence and to get a little away from the semantic disputations which have been the common form of defence debates for the last five years.

6.20 p.m.

Mr. Peter Shore: I do not intend to follow the detailed arguments we have heard this afternoon but rather to use my maiden speech, during which I would hope to receive the customary courtesies of the House, to address my-self to the main theme of this two-day debate. The main theme, as I see it, is the new course which my right hon. Friends are about to set in foreign policy.
To me, the most striking sentence in the speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister yesterday, and, indeed, the starting point for many of us, was that
…we need to…question the basic assumptions on which we have been operating for so long…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th December, 1964; Vol. 704, c. 418]
That, I think, if the full logic of it is developed, is one of the most revolutionary sentences pronounced in this House for a very long time.
The basic assumption which has informed policy for the last 15 or so years has been that the greatest danger facing this nation arose from an antagonistic Communist system lying on the other


side of Europe. That has been the basic assumption on which we have operated in these post-war years, and following from it there arose the system of collective defence in N.A.T.O., there arose the opposing Warsaw Pact, there arose competitive rearmament, and there arose, too. many instances of maximum danger and tension when the two sides came into conflict. That was the basic assumption, but now we have put forward to us an entirely different assumption, that the greatest danger we in Britain and the world face today is no longer the threat from the other side.
I think most hon. Members will agree that that is so. I am not going to say there is no menace of any kind, or that it has entirely passed away, for that would be to exaggerate the position; there is still a problem.
However, what my right hon. Friend seemed to be saying was that the major threat to world peace now and in the future arises not from a threat of Soviet attack but from the spread of nuclear weapons and their dissemination through out the world. This seems to me, as a starting point, to give an entirely new direction and emphasis to the whole foreign policy of this country and it seems to me that it is the master thought which gives shape to the whole of the very far-reaching proposals which the Prime Minister revealed yesterday.
Let me just briefly remind the House what these major proposals are. The major proposal, as it affects N.A.T.O., is, of course, to put the various groups of weapons which he mentioned under a new form of command. If this scheme is accomplished I think we shall make a change in the very nature of N.A.T.O. itself. The major purpose of the new scheme which was put forward is not to build up any further nuclear arms—indeed, that point is specifically made by the Minister of Defence as well as the Prime Minister—not to increase nuclear strength: the only purpose is to try to find a way of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons so that N.A.T.O. itself becomes decreasingly a collective security system and increasingly an international arms control system, at least so far as it affects a large part of the Western world. This is a very important development.
The second consequence of the Prime Minister's new approach—inevitably, since he tells us that proliferation of nuclear weapons is the greatest danger—is that a way must be found of putting the British deterrent under lock and key. I shall not go into the arguments for this, nor the detailed arrangements which remain to be made—we shall hear more of them—but the attempt to do this seems essential, if we are to encourage other nations, which might otherwise be tempted to pursue the elusive objective of independent nuclear power, to follow suit.
Third, and what I thought very important, was this proposal, once again with the predominant objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, since a new situation has arisen since China exploded her bomb, to make it unnecessary for certain countries in Asia to follow China along the path of nuclear independence and, instead, to find a different way through the development of collective security arrangements. Admittedly, this is still a very vague proposal, and we shall need to hear very much more about it before we are satisfied with it, but above all it is an arrangement which could relieve countries like India, and, perhaps, Israel as well, of both the fear of nuclear blackmail and the necessity of manufacturing their own weapons.
Quite frankly, if this is the new basic purpose of British foreign policy, if we accept that this is the great danger which threatens the world today, I must say that this is a policy which, my right hon. Friends need have no fear, commands enormous support, certainly from this side of the House, and, I would have thought, from the other side as well.
I want now to make just one or two points about some anxieties I have. One, which has been mentioned already, is whether or not France and General de Gaulle will be or can be persuaded to come in on this. Obviously it is going to be extremely difficult. All I ask my right hon. Friends to do at this stage is, as it were, not to give up hope, to take plenty of time with the French. Let us have a lot of discussion with General de Gaulle to see whether we can persuade him to follow us, perhaps in both purposes for which, we have announced, our nuclear force in the future may be used. Let it be discussed. Let my right


hon. Friends take their time and discuss it with him to see whether we can reach agreement whereby France is not excluded.
The second thing, a much more serious problem, which worries me is the reaction of the Soviet Union to these proposals. Here I see a basic conflict of objectives. On the one hand, my right hon. Friends have put forward almost at the forefront of their policies this desire to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. But I think that they have equally in mind further relaxation of the cold war. They want to see the tension which has obviously diminished in recent years diminish further. Their basic dilemma is that it may be that these two policies are incompatible. I very much hope that they are not incompatible—I very much hope so—and I am very glad to hear that the Soviet leaders are coming to London, and there will be plenty of opportunity to discuss it with them.
I hope this plan prospers. We wish it well. However, I say this to my right hon. Friends. Please do not get discouraged if you run into serious difficulty; the world will not come to an end if at the end of the day we cannot persuade the whole of Europe and other countries to accept this particular set of proposals; do not feel that the only alternative is the old M.L.F., which is as dead as a duck—for I cannot conceive any serious American pressure to get a M.L.F. in Europe which would exclude both France and Britain. I think there are other possible alternatives, which they know better than I do. If they cannot make progress towards this particular form of nuclear arms control let them look at some other proposals in the field of disengagement, in the field of the Geneva talks, and, above all, in the field of multilateral disarmament.
I conclude by saying to my right hon. Friends, look to the future rather than to the past. I am not at all sure we have many lessons to learn from history in this nuclear age, and certainly there are many lessons in the past which will not stand up to the tests and the needs of today. Look to the future. Look well into the late 'sixties and 'seventies, because the whole nexus of problems with which we are confronted today has changed so much in the last few years

and they can be guaranteed to change almost beyond recognition in the years ahead.

6.30 p.m.

Mr. Michael Alison: Like the hon. Member for Stepney (Mr. Shore), I ask for the forbearance of the House for a few minutes as a maiden speaker.
I should like to take as my theme an idea which has had a good deal of currency in recent weeks and months, particularly before the General Election, and indeed in speeches that we have heard more recently, namely, that the crucial factor in Britain's position in the world in the 'sixties is the question of our economic, industrial, and technological strength. This is set over against the erstwhile military stature which we were alleged to have enjoyed in the past and which was the measure of our past greatness. The Prime Minister made this point with some force in his recent speech at Brighton, when he said that Britain's authority depended far more on her economic strength and independence than on what he called nostalgia and nuclear pretence.
I should have thought that the assertion about the priority and the overriding importance of our economic and technological strength was one which was generally acceptable on both sides of the House. Our fundamental economic strength is of crucial importance, but where we have to be rather careful is in imagining that there is anything fundamentally new in this assertion about the priority of Britain's economic and technological strength, as if this has somehow superseded a situation which existed in the past but no longer exists.
If we take our minds back to the feats of arms accomplished by Britain in her days of former imperial power and authority, the sort of feats of arms by which we always think our past greatness as opposed to our present stature, was measured, we find that although these feats of arms, such as the sinking of the Kaiser's fleet in the First World War, and the defeat of the Luftwaffe in the last war, are expressions of courage and human skill, they are also expressions of an underlying and undeniable economic, technological, and industrial strength.
What I want to stress is that this logical connection between our erstwhile authority and influence in the world and the underlying economic industrial and technological strength which it really represented in days gone by is just as indivisible today, and yet there is a tendency—and this was noticeable in the speeches during this debate, particularly from the other side—to ignore this logical connection which has always existed between our past military stature and our economic and industrial strength.
The typical proposition at the moment seems to be that in days gone by we were a great Power because we had a potent Army, Navy, and Air Force, and even a potent nuclear deterrent, but today things are different and we can make our way in the world only if we substitute for these childish baubles of the past the hard modern currency of something different, namely, economic strength, industrial strength, and technological expertise, as if these had not been present at a former period of our history.
One has only to study the proposition to see how fallacious is the implication that there is a change, that we have to move into a period of economic strength out of an epoch of military greatness in the past, as if the two were divisible, and not interdependent. This comes home when one considers the great nuclear debate at the moment. Whatever else may be true about Britain's independent or nuclear deterrent at the present time, one thing is supremely self-evident, and that is that our nuclear deterrent is evidence of absolutely top-notch technology in this country, an absolutely immense industrial base, and a tremendous economic framework. This is fundamental to the possession of the deterrent.
It serves only to underline the reality of that when one considers the sweat and toil by which two great Powers at the present time, namely, France and China, are struggling to reach the pinnacle of nuclear status which we in this country have long possessed, and when one compares it also with the scale and size both of manpower and natural resources of the other two great nuclear Powers in the world, namely, the Soviet Union and the

United States, who are on a par with us in terms of nuclear technology and expertise.
I feel that in no sense should we have a sense of inferiority about Britain as a potent and present industrial and technological Power. When the Prime Minister travels to Washington, the whole world is agog at the proposals that he is to make there, and the discussions that he is to have. When he announces visits to half the capitals of Europe, when he announces that the Leader of the Soviet Union is to come here for consultation, surely this bears out the point that this is no requiem of formalities for an erstwhile military Power which is about to expire. On the contrary, it is the proper activity of a formidable economic, technological, and industrial Power which has every expectation of further expansion.
In other words, we are in a real sense a Samson among the tribes. Samson may have had his weaknesses, but give him the proper anchorage and a measure of steady growth in a certain direction, and see what happens when he flexes his muscles. Britain is a Samson among the tribes at the present time, and possession of the nuclear deterrent is simply a reflection of this underlying economic power which I believe my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition was right to refer to as Britain's economic strength, an assertion which has been much maligned, but its evidence is to be seen in the status that we enjoy as a nuclear Power.
There is a new situation at the present time, but I think that it is slightly different from the ones that we heard the Prime Minister describing today. We may have been a great economic Power in the past, but what is needed at the present time is not any change in our economic power, as if we were having to recoup something, or gather something which we did not have before, but the redeployment of these resources in new directions. This is the new demand of the age, and we all felt that the Prime Minister was right when he said that nuclear technology and nuclear science which are features of the world today, and in which Britain was a pioneer, have done the generals out of a job.
In listening to the right hon. Gentleman, I felt that in many ways he betrayed the logic of his own position in


the proposition that he went on to make. He was right in suggesting that we were moving out of an area of increasing military tension into an area of economic competitiveness. But if this is the case, should not Britain be looking increasingly for her anchorage amongst, and in those directions, economically speaking, where our future prospects lie? In an environment in which warlike threats and tensions are beginning to increase, Britain should be turning to the United States, one of our staunchest and most powerful friends.
If it is true that the coming environment in which Britain has to make her way in the world is one of economic competitiveness, as everybody tells us, there is a certain lack of logic in the passionate zeal with which the Government are trying to develop our links with the United States, of all Powers. The Americans, who are our best friends in defence, are our most ruthless economic adversaries and competitors in the markets of the world. If we are to move out of the warlike era into the era of economic competition, why is it towards the United States that our whole policy is now being directed? The logic of the situation seems to indicate that we should be leaning in the direction of closer links with those countries and those parts of the world where our real economic interest lies, and those are partly in the direction of Europe and partly in the less developed countries, for whom we represent the largest single market.
I would be much more anxious to find in the broad defence policy which the Government are putting forward something which sought a solution to the problem of German security not so much in closer links with the United States—an Atlantic solution, in which Britain and America formed the buttress of Europe under which the Germans could shelter and find their security, leaving in the cold the French, who are the logical and strategic kernel of the Continent of Europe—but under a system in which, perhaps, the French and the English were the cornerstones of the nuclear arrangement in Europe and the Americans the buttress outside it.
That is as it may be. Certainly the tendency of the Government to formulate

and develop strong links with the United States in an era in which we are admittedly moving out of the operations of war into the environment of peaceful commercial competition will mean that we shall be assuming the rôle and the position simply of the pilot fish swimming along in front of a great commercial and industrial shark. It is the wrong tie-up. Our tie-up should be with the Europeans, not only in defence but in economic development.
I naturally stress the economic and commercial aspects of the future situation because they will be the decisive ones in the future, and this fact is enormously important for all our constituencies. Although Barkston Ash, as its name implies, is only a very small village, it nevertheless lends its name to a large constituency representing an enormous diversity of technological, industrial and social interests. My constituency is a microcosm of the country as a whole. We have shipbuilding, coal mining, brewing, farming, paper manufacturing, food manufacturing, light industry in its many forms, the National Science Lending Library, a famous racecourse, and a notorious toll bridge. These are all features of this complex, varied and distinguished constituency, and it is natural that I should stress its social and economic aspects in talking about the right anchorage for Britain in the future.
No Barkston Ash Member now or in the future should make a speech without trying to introduce the regular refrain which I must take it upon myself always to introduce, rather after the pattern of the classical Roman Senator, the Elder Cato, who used to conclude all the speeches he ever made in the Roman Senate with the inevitable and relentless refrain, Delenda est Carthago, which, being translated into our local patois of today, is equivalent to, "Selby toll bridge must be freed".

6.44 p.m.

Mr. Frank Tomney: It falls to me to congratulate the hon. Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison) upon what was in many ways a remarkable maiden speech. I also congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Stepney (Mr. Shore), who is not new to my hon. Friends. He also made a thoughtful and well-informed speech. I congratulate both hon. Gentlemen, who


are new to the House, on their temerity and courage in making their maiden speeches in a debate on foreign affairs. I hope that we will hear both of them on many occasions in the future.
They are both of an age group which foretells well for the future of British politics. They both arrive at the House of Commons with the right amount of political maturity behind them, and they are in that group which has a modern outlook and is able quickly to appreciate developments of worldwide political importance.
The House of Commons will surely acquit me of any inconsistencies in the speeches that I have made on foreign affairs. We have now arrived at the situation when my party forms the Government, and where the position of some of my hon. Friends gives me great satisfaction. In opposition I was never able completely to divorce my responsibilities as a Member of Parliament from my responsibilities on the two questions which confront the nation—foreign affairs and defence. I have always considered that, in a sense, a perpetual responsibility in action and thought has been required. That is why the offer held out yesterday by the Government to have consultations with the Opposition on defence matters—which was first made by the former right hon. Member for Bishop Auckland, Mr. Dalton, some years ago—ought to be taken up.
We are living at a time in which decisions taken now, for good or evil, may decide what type of world will develop or what type of society we shall become. It is becoming more apparent every day that national frustration in the non-possession of nuclear weapons or nuclear capacity can find satisfaction only through the medium of multilateral agencies and in association and integration with other States. This is the only sure way of building up good will on an international basis and of alleviating the fears of other nations which have found themselves at a grave disadvantage over the last 30 years, during which time the solemn words of Governments have been broken from time to time, with disastrous results.
That is why I find the complexities of General de Gaulle's situation so tantalising and infuriating. Throughout his

career this man has never ceased to amaze me. From the war onwards, possessing only a cap badge to begin with, he has been able to achieve remarkable things for France. Until two days ago he was holding up the Common Market negotiations with an eleventh-hour threat of withdrawal. There was a threatened collapse of negotiations on the vital issue of grain prices. General de Gaulle was prepared to go as far as that despite the fact that the economic value of the Common Market as a whole, apart from its value to France, must have been immense.
He is a man who, coming to power at the time he did, realised more clearly than anyone else that the Soviet Union was a Western-orientated nation which would, in time, find its true position in the West. He acted quickly on this realisation in respect of his own French empire. It took some considerable time and not a little bloodshed to get rid of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, but this he did, because he saw the enormous advantages in the other position. This has resulted in France, along with Germany, becoming one of the strongest economic nations of the world. One could ponder the fact that Germany lost the war and now has resources of no less than £50,000 million, while Great Britain is staggering from crisis to crisis—not of our own making but brought about by the pressure of world trade and events which have operated against us because our responsibilities have been so widespread and because of the position which we have taken upon ourselves in defence of our former positions in the Empire.
Be that as it may, France, in pursuit of her nuclear deterrent, will be in a position to inflict the gravest damage on the N.A.T.O. Alliance if she decides to withdraw. This is why I most strongly support the plea of my hon. Friend the Member for Stepney to take as much time as we can to arrive at some conclusions with de Gaulle before this position is reached. No matter how it drags on, even if it takes unlimited time, we should make as many concessions as possible to the French position so long as this alliance is not broken up. We have seen the recognition of Germany's strength and her great industrial power, which has grown up from a number of factors, including allied control and the granting of allied loans, the small diversity


of trade unions in Germany, fewer disputes, end heavy concentration of capital in German industries. All this has led to Germany asking for a position of equality in the Western Alliance which can no longer he refused.
That is why the proposition put forward by the Prime Minister is so right in its timing. It is absolutely right. World military power has reached the stage at which it can threaten international extinction. There has grown up, through the nuclear weapon, a balance of mutual power between Russia and the United States. Both of them possess it and neither of them is able to use it. Great Britain developed an independent deterrent, but with the rapid advance of nuclear science and rocketry and the ability to pinpoint a target miles away, our position as an independent nuclear nation became impossible.
We had to move from this position, and when one moves away from such a position one has to move into another position of integration with the people with whom one associates. If we do otherwise we shall deny our responsibilities. We have had responsibility for a great Commonwealth and its development; we have had to give, in the context of democratic demands, freedom for the peoples of Africa; we have much responsibility for the progress of these former colonies; and we have to compete with an ever-rising standard among nations on the same industrial basis throughout the world. It is obvious that the British people would not, and could not afford to, lag behind.
This has meant a great strain upon our resources. I have always contended that these responsibilities throughout the world should have been more fairly shared among the Western Alliance, through the United Nations agency or otherwise. Certainly there have been United Nations aid programmes, but never a concerted plan based on the gross national product of each nation, in order to place at the disposal of the nations on a proper co-operative basis the benefit of that product where it would be most needed.
We are approaching a situation in which the Soviet Union may find itself in greater integration with the West. In the last 18 months, a threat has arisen in the Far East from the Chinese, which

may once again place us in the position of having to make decisions of such a character in the alliance which will be a heavy drain on resources.
In this context these countries which are locked in close alliance should say, "All right, what do we do in this context? If we wish to further the interests of the alliance throughout the world, it is surely our object to place a proportionate part of our gross national product where it will show most reward in terms of the alliance." In this respect I intend to take a long look at Africa, a veritable Eldorado of a continent with a small population, at present an area of great rivalry among the world Powers for influence and progress.
What can we do in a situation like this? Do we decide, as a matter of policy, to let things drift, or do we invest our resources in such a way that the fate or the freedom of these countries in the future rests with the older of the Western democracies? Are we prepared to accept the position which has existed over the last few years of wholesale interference by people whose only objective has been international mischief? This kind of thing has to be faced by the West before very long. I do not think that we can very much longer evade the question of the proper place for China in the world. After all, the Chinese are an old people. They were making silks and ceramics and glass when the early Britons were living in caves. There must be some accommodation. Just as the nuclear shield has been the protective strength of Europe since Berlin, of necessity we may have the responsibility of shifting that shield to the Far East.
Let us face the reality of Korea. What happened in Korea is a salutary lesson for us. The Russian intervention in Korea, followed by the Chinese intervention, could mean only one thing, that the Chinese were determined to lock that back door against the Soviets, and lock it they did. Their foray into India five years later was for the same purpose. The United States have been pouring aid and money into India, some of it in supplies which were misused, some of it foolishly, and they have had a return of probably less than 8 per cent. This is not a tenable situation for a capitalist country like America.
Obviously, the United States is fully aware of what might happen if India were to go Communist, and she has taken such measures as she thinks necessary to resolve that position. She has done this in the context of her wider responsibilities, and of her wider responsibilities to Europe, which, although still great, are not so necessary or so stringent as they were. There is in the world, we know, an over-kill nuclear capacity far in excess of anything which is sensible or just, and the United States veto operating within the alliance on nuclear weapons must, in my opinion—and on this I agree with the Prime Minister—remain an absolute veto.
Whether the new N.A.T.O. Council as set up or the extra body in N.A.T.O. should be responsible for future strategic planning, which could involve long-term planning from bases in the United States, is another matter. What matters, too, is that the United States must retain the veto over both positions—both in the N.A.T.O. Alliance and in the Atlantic nuclear force, and in any other area where there are agreements of this character. This nuclear umbrella, beneath which we have been sheltering for so long, must be spread to protect other nations until the world reaches final sanity in dealing with the two problems of nuclear independence and the threat of force.
This leads me to another point which has not been resolved. I see the necessity, despite all the difficulties, for the retention of the Simonstown base in South Africa. I also see the necessity of the Suez Canal being opened to all types of shipping of all nations at all times—and it is not so at the moment. Nasser exercises the right to keep out of the Suez Canal the ships of Israel on their legitimate trade. This is an international highway, an international waterway, vital to us and vital for communications. How much longer can an alliance, the United Nations or other Western alliance, tolerate this situation? Surely it is only a matter of time.
Unfortunately, on occasions we have been in conflict on these issues throughout the world with the United States. On many issues they have not adopted the same view as we have adopted. Consider the situation in Saudi Arabia. The

United States' view has always been dominated by her oil interests there and the royalties from them, to the exclusion of almost everything else—and that includes the progress of the people and the use to which the oil revenues are put, as well as Britain's worldwide responsibilities and her need to operate from bases such as Aden, which are vital to defence communications.
We have reached a situation in the world in which a review must take place. It should take place with France in it rather than without France. These bases place a heavy drain on British resources, and they must become an international cost-sharing operation. They are vital to us all. We know their purpose. It is wrong for any one nation to have to take more than its fair share of the burden. We have found in the N.A.T.O. Alliance that the United States constantly reserves to itself a position of dominance in the supply of materials to the exclusion almost of everyone else. With the strength which the United States has, it is able to do this, but the position is not satisfactory for this country or for France, and it is certainly not satisfactory for West Germany.

Mr. Thorneycroft: I apologise for interrupting the hon. Member in his most interesting speech, but I wonder whether he shares my regret that his remarks are being listened to on the Government Front Bench only by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health? In a Government which possesses an enormous range of Ministers dealing with defence and foreign policy, I feel that perhaps the full import of his remarks is not receiving the attention which it deserves.

Mr. Tomney: I am not responsible for who is present in the House or for who attends on behalf of the Government. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, I have taken an independent position on foreign affairs for years. As I said earlier, I am concerned, whether in opposition or in Government with the real issues facing the country.
It at this time we have to move from the former position of independence towards integration, then that move is conditioned by changes in world events. In these moves we should take with us as many allies as possible. We have arrived


at a position at which world strength must be tempered by the will of the politicians. The will of the politicians must remain paramount over the military aspect if we are to succeed in evolving the type of world we want.
Whether Mr. Kosygin or Brezhnev come to Great Britain in a few weeks' time, or whether the Prime Minister goes to Bonn or Paris, the arguments applicable will be the same in all the capitals of the world, because there is a growing together of nations. We are all becoming full-consumer societies. The quicker this broadens and there is an interlocking of interests, the better. I remind hon. Members that when Mr. Khrushchev returned from America he said that he had seen the capitalist world and he liked what he had seen. This is not insignificant. The Russians are always taking notice of themselves as they become a full-consumer society. They recognise that they can never hold down the hopes which are rising among their people.
But in contemplating the Soviet mind nobody seems to know what is their real purpose. They have made many mistakes. The Brussels Treaty was one and the opposition throughout the world to E.D.C. was another, for it resulted in the creation of the German Army. One does not know what is in the Soviet mind at present. It may well be that the Soviet Union believes that her opposition to an Atlantic nuclear force will bring Czechoslovakia and Rumania more closely to her—countries which have felt in recent times a loosening of the Soviet bond. No one can say exactly what thinking will emanate from the Soviet Foreign Office and the Kremlin.
With the position as fluid as it is today, we should take unlimited pains. We should explore and re-explore every avenue of agreement. If possible we should hold the alliance together in its entity. From this we should move on to a position of world responsibility, if necessary in consultation with the Opposition—an offer on defence made by the Prime Minister—but ever realising that the ultimate goal is the abolition of all arms and disarmament by some means within the capacity of Western culture and civilisation.

7.8 p.m.

Mr. Percy Grieve: It is with great diffidence and a spirit of humility

that I rise to make my maiden speech in the House and to intervene in this important debate. May I express my gratitude to you, Mr. Speaker, for giving me the opportunity of so doing, and may I crave the indulgence which the House ever gives to a speaker addressing it for the first time.
I have the honour to represent the constituency of Solihull, which has been an independent constituency since 1945. In the 19 years of its life, until the last election, it was represented in the House by one Member of Parliament, Sir Martin Lindsay. In those 19 years he rendered very considerable services to the House, to his constituency and to his country, and I am sure that I echo the sentiments of all here who knew him and who know him when I say that his retirement from politics will be regretted as much in the House as it is by his constituents in Solihull. I am happy to have had the honour of being elected by the electors of Solihull to succeed him, and I hope that I may follow him in the service which he was able to render to his constituency and to his country.
It is a great honour to represent Solihull. Remarkably enough, in 30 years its population has increased fourfold from 25,000 to 100,000. It is the seat of a great industry and of the Rover car works. It has beautiful agricultural areas and it has a splendid residential area.
If I may be forgiven for a breach of what I think is one of the traditions of a maiden speech, I do not intend to take hon. and right hon. Members on a conducted tour of my constituency. I hope that many of them will visit it in due course. But I should be failing in my duty if I did not say that Solihull is inhabited by large numbers of technical and executive leaders of the great Midlands industries. They export on a large scale to Europe. They take great interest in European affairs. Many believe, as I do, that with all our worldwide interests we are nevertheless an essential part of Europe and that our destinies are indissolubly linked with those of our European allies.
I hope that this may be a sufficient excuse for the intervention in a debate on foreign affairs of one who for many years has been the diligent servitor of that


jealous mistress, the law. If that were not sufficient, I should add that I have close personal ties with France and am honoured by the friendship of many French and Western European people, both on the Continent and in London.
Our friendship with France is an indispensable part of our foreign policy. It is something which is very close to my heart. It is for this reason that I am speaking on this subject today. Whatever the difficulties which governments, rightly or wrongly, may sometimes create in relations between our two countries, there can be no doubt that there is a great fund of good will, not only throughout France but throughout the Benelux countries and Western Europe towards this country. Should it not be the bounden duty of any government, whatever their political complexion, to foster and cultivate that friendship at all levels and in every way?
When we were excluded from the Common Market there was, throughout Western Europe, a huge body of opinion which wanted us to join. It may be that one of the principal things which kept us out was the belief in France—an erroneous one, but a belief which had some basis in recent history—that we regarded ourselves as part of an Anglo-Saxon group and that our European allies and friends were second-class allies and friends.
I say that it had some foundation history. One has only to go back to the end of the war, to the attempted creation of the General Giraud régime in Algeria, or to the apparent intention of the allies to inflict military Government on France, to see how such an error could subsist and last to this very day. Nevertheless, I believe—and I hope that many hon. Members believe with me—that there are enormous political advantages in our active participation and support of the cause of European union; not only political advantages but economic ones as well.
One need only look at the trade figures of the last few years to see how our trade with Europe—E.F.T.A., E.E.C. and France—has increased. I do not want to weary the House with a large number of figures, but to give a few; in the last five years not only have our exports to E.F.T.A. and E.E.C. greatly increased, they have increased as a percentage of

our world trade. In 1959 we exported to E.E.C. £465·8 million worth of goods. In 1963 that had gone up to more than £826 million worth of goods. To E.F.T.A. we exported £383·7 million worth of goods in 1959 and in 1963 they had risen to more than £554 million worth.
Taking these figures as percentages of our world trade, in 1959 our exports to E.E.C. were 14 per cent. of the total and by 1963 they were over 20 per cent. To E.F.T.A. in 1959 our exports were 11·5 per cent. of the total and in 1963 they were 13·6 per cent. It is interesting to note that our exports to France in this period more than doubled and that in 1962–63 we had a favourable trade balance with France, as we had with both the E.E.C. and E.F.T.A. Can there be any doubt that our relationships, for economic and political reasons and for the future of world peace, with Western Europe in both its manifestations, in E.F.T.A. and E.E.C., should be cultivated with honour, goodwill and mutual trust?
I hope that I will not be thought to be trespassing beyond that domain of the non-controversial, which is the traditional sphere of the maiden speaker, if, in this connection, I say a word about the recent imposition of the import surcharge. However necessary the Government may have considered its imposition, the manner of its imposition, hon. Members may think, tended very greatly to damage our European relations. It contravened nine international agreements, including our agreement with E.F.T.A., G.A.T.T. and our commercial agreement with the European Coal and Steel Community.
Surely it should have been possible for us to do our allies the courtesy of giving them at least advance notice, without seeking to debate the point, of what we were going to do and our grounds for doing it? What may well have made matters worse from the point of view of our European friends and allies is that if we gave anybody advance notice it was apparently not them but the United States, who were far less directly concerned. What more could we have done to foster the belief, which I believe to be erroneous, that somehow we put our European allies and friends into the second class category?
We are told that the surcharge will be temporary. I hope it will, but one cannot help, when reflecting on it, venturing a quotation, the French expression, "Iln'y a rien de plus permanent que le provsoire''. I hope that the Government will see that the surcharge really will be provisional, and certainly no more permanent than the life of the Government.
I listened with interest and great sympathy last night to the assurances given by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs when replying to the debate, for he said:
The Government will work for European co-operation on the widest basis…We attach great importance to E.F.T.A. and will work to strengthen it. We desire increasingly close political and economic co-operation with the Six."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th December, 1964; vol. 704, c. 520.]
He went on to stress the importance in our foreign and European relations of our information services. They are indeed important, but much more important than making our policies known is that they should be founded on a basis of goodwill, a spirit of co-operation and on trust.
That brings me to the last matter I wish to raise, the Concord project. Here, if anywhere, was something which epitomised the spirit of Anglo-French co-operation, which put it on a practical basis and which was going to put us in the forefront of one technical sphere compared with any one in the world. It is an outstanding example of Anglo-French co-operation in the technical sphere, and I would like to say how much I admired and found myself at one with the courageous and cogent observations of the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) when he dealt with this matter in the debate on the Gracious Speech. I am happy to find that the hon. Member for Coventry, North represents a constituency so near to my own. I hope that by continuing this project and not abandoning it, not whittling it down, the Government will increase the extent of Anglo-French co-operation and will go on to seek such co-operation in other fields. If we are to succeed in building up a new Europe, as I believe that we ought, then our aims and our policy should be founded on ideals of trust and co-operation, and our friendship with Europe should be an integral part of our scheme of things.

7.20 p.m.

Mr. David Ennals: ; This is the third time that I have had the privilege of addressing this House. On the first occasion I had to ask for the indulgence of the House for my maiden speech. On the second, and on this occasion, I have had to assure a maiden speaker that he did not need that indulgence. That certainly applies to the hon. and learned Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve) who has just made his maiden speech. I think that hon. Members on both sides of the House would like to express their congratulations to the hon. and learned Member for the confident way in which he made his case.
I am certain that his knowledge of France, and the French language—as he proved by his excellent accent—will be of great advantage to the House. The hon. and learned Member will appreciate that during this debate hon. Members on both sides of the House have put a great deal of emphasis on the importance of improving our relationship with France in respect of the nuclear problem which we face within the alliance, and on doing everything we can to ensure that France plays her part. While the hon. and learned Gentleman will not expect me to endorse some of the other remarks he made, I agree with him that that is the case.
I wish to refer to the remarks of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister during what I believe was an historic speech that he made yesterday. I think it one of the most remarkable speeches given in this House, not only in this Parliament but for a number of years. As an hon. Member said earlier, my right hon. Friend was tackling some of the most fundamental problems facing our alliance and the world. I wish to welcome the fact that my right hon. Friend has taken what I believe to be a bold initiative. Even though the plans put forward may not come out at the end of the day identically as they were put into the machine, at least he has broken the log-jam within the alliance and created a situation of fluidity. Many of the preconceived decisions are now open to be changed. He has bought time in that we are not now being pushed into an inevitable decision about a multilateral force which has


been criticised from both sides of the House.
My right hon. Friend has put forward constructive proposals which involve all the members of the alliance playing their part on a basis of co-operation. He has established a sound and close personal relationship with the President of the United States which I believe will stand him in good stead in the negotiations which are to come. To me this was not surprising, for I had the privilege of being with the Prime Minister on his last visit to President Johnson. I recognised at that stage also that my right hon. Friend had established a close personal bond which I believe will be very important in these negotiations.
I wish to say to the right hon. Gentleman who is to wind up the debate that, like the Leader of the Liberal Party, it is my hope that it will be decided not to divide the House on this occasion. At a time when an historic proposal, emanating from the Government of this country, offers hope of bringing together the alliance and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons; at this early moment in the negotiations I believe that it would be extremely unfortunate if there should be a negative vote in this House which, however erroneously, might send a message to countries now considering negotiation that there was a division in Britain. To me the tragedy is that this sort of bold initiative was not taken months, in fact years, ago. I believe that we can put the blame for this only on the party opposite for their delay in bringing about a General Election and for creating a situation in which they had tied themselves to what were almost slogans, from which they were unable to move into the present position of fluidity.
I believe that the absolute refusal of the former Prime Minister to consider sharing the ultimate control of nuclear weapons with our European allies had condemned Britain to a negative rôle, which fortunately has now been broken. Judging by the statements and speeches made after the Nassau Agreement, it seemed that for many of the right hon. Gentlemen and hon. Gentlemen opposite the main aspect of the Nassau Agreement was not the opportunity that it gave for creating interdependence within the alliance, to use President Kennedy's

phrase, but the opportunity for emphasising the one small phrase in the controversial Clause 9 concerning the independence of the deterrent. In the times that followed the Nassau conference Mr. Harold Macmillan indicated that we needed to have independent nuclear weapons in part to show that we were not a satellite of the United States. The right hon. Member for Saffron Walden (Mr. R. A. Butler) used the rather more homely phrase "camp followers" in a speech which he made to the Conservative Party conference.
I should like to quote Mr. Alistair Buchan, a director of the Institute for Strategic Studies, who, only six weeks ago, wrote
As the British election began to loom over the horizon, and as they sensed that the future of the British deterrent might become an election issue, they began to lay increasing stress on the theoretic independence of British nuclear weapons rather than on the assignment of those weapons to the planning control of N.A.T.O. Even in Ottawa, where lay the best hope of convincing the non-nuclear Powers of the significance of Britain's change of policy towards N.A.T.O., the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, found it necessary to make a speech stressing the national aspects of Britain's nuclear force.
The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition—I can say what I was proposing to say because he has now returned to the Chamber—came to my constituency during the election campaign. Happily for me, his mission was not a successful one, but he was very welcome and he will always be welcomed in Dover. During questions put to him at his meeting the right hon. Gentleman said, "Is there anyone here who is prepared to leave the defence of this country to the Americans? If so, let him stand up and say so." I do not believe that this sort of attitude—a recurring theme during the General Election—that we could not trust our principal ally made any contribution whatsoever to the unity of the alliance. This attitude was repeated time after time by hon. Members opposite who came almost to believe it. They were, therefore, in no position to take the sort of initiative which, happily, has now been taken by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister.
As I said, I hope that these views which were held before the election, and which seem to have come into some parts of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, will


not guide hon. Members opposite to divide the House tonight. What do we want to get out of the negotiations that lie ahead? I agree with all that has been said, that we must not rush decisions, and this is the great thing that the Prime Minister has done. He has bought time in order that the negotiations—

Sir Harry Legge-Bourke: That is the second time that the hon. Member has said that the Prime Minister has bought time. Will he please say what the price has been.

Mr. Ennals: That is a very clever intervention. He has gained time. I do not think that the hon. Member, or anyone on the other side of the House, would agree that the Prime Minister has not gained time. At the time of the General Election it looked to us as if the Americans and the Germans were pushing us into a decision on M.L.F., it looked as though we were to be required to decide before Christmas on indications from the State Department.
This pressure has been broken. The pressure is not upon us from the Americans or from the Germans, because the Prime Minister has gained time. I would have thought that the hon. Gentleman, who I do not suppose is the most enthusiastic supporter of the M.L.F., will welcome this time which has been gained for us on the initiative of the Prime Minister.
The thing which we want to get out of the negotiations is firstly, as has been said on many occasions in this debate, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. It has always seemed to me that the top-table argument, repeated ad nauseam by the present Leader of the Opposition, was only an incitement to other countries to get to the top table. If we had to have the nuclear bomb in order to be there, why should not Germany be involved in consultations as much as any other country? Why should not Italy be involved in consultations? Why not India? This was an argument conducive to the spread of nuclear weapons.

Admittedly the multilateral force was an attempt—

Mr. William Yates: For what purpose did Mr. Attlee give permission to make the first atomic bomb?

Mr. Ennals: That does not seem a relevant question. Once I have thought out the true significance which lies behind that intervention I might give the hon. Gentleman an answer.
The M.L.F. was an attempt to solve the problem of countries like Germany feeling that they should come into a position of equality within the alliance. In fact, as has been said, it was an attempt to solve the problem, but it was the wrong solution. We must admit that there are not very many supporters of the M.L.F. on either side of the Atlantic.
The United States Government had been moving towards a position of greater commitment until the moment when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and his colleagues went there. Germany was in a position of commitment, although even Herr Strauss has now said, "Do not rush". France has always been opposed to it; Norway has made her position quite clear in opposing it; in Italy there is some uncertainty and they will probably follow the British lead. In Belgium and Holland there are also grave doubts and no great enthusiasm. If months and months ago the party opposite had been able to make up their minds on the question of M.L.F. and had come out clearly against it and had put some other constructive proposal before our allies within the alliance, then I believe that the idea of a mixed-manned surface fleet would have been killed a long time ago. But the party opposite were unable to make up their minds.
The second aim is, I believe, to create greater unity within the alliance. I do do not think that there will be much disagreement on either side of the House on this. Some people may argue whether we need alliances, but quite apart from the importance of alliances for our security—in fact, security in isolation is far more expensive than Collective security through alliances—they have an important contribution to make to the progress of the negotiations.
I believe that it is far easier to come to reasonable terms with the Soviet Union and the other Communist countries if within our Western Alliance there is at least a consensus of opinion. We are not arguing that everyone should say exactly the same thing or agree—of


course they will not. If in fact we were able on a number of issues to present a common front, it would be much easier to come to terms with them in discussions at Geneva and elsewhere. I believe that it is no help to us to see a deepening rift between the Soviet Union and China, because there can be no consensus of opinion from the other side. In this sense, because we want to see a greater degree of unity within both alliances, we have a good deal of common ground with the Soviet leaders.
The third aim, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in his speech, and as my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence emphasised, is to move towards disarmament. Nothing can be achieved unless we are able to move towards real disarmament. The only real security for any country lies in international disarmament.
I am very glad that so much stress has been laid not only in the talks in Washington but in this debate and in the statement made by the Prime Minister yesterday on the importance of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. It is not just the question of Germany. Unless some world agreement can be reached, more and more countries may feel compelled to join in the vicious spiral of the arms race.
India is one country that has been referred to. I am sure that all Members of this House will admire the courage of the Prime Minister, Mr. Shastri, in saying that his country does not want to have nuclear weapons. Of course, a country like India, with desperate poverty, does not want to spend its resources on nuclear weapons—a country which has played so noble a part in trying to bring agreement to the world and to promote disarmament. But there is no doubt that behind Mr. Shastri are many voices saying, "Can you feel that your country is secure with China, with nuclear weapons, already having made an attack upon India?"
One of the new aspects of this debate thrown open by the Prime Minister is this challenge to those who have nuclear power to see whether it cannot be collectively used in some form of collective guarantee, not national guarantees but a collective guarantee for the safety of the

non-nuclear Powers. I believe that this will have to be part of a non-proliferation agreement. If India has it, if Pakistan has it, it may be that Israel will have it and Egypt, and so on down the line. Of course, it gets cheaper to produce rough-and-ready nuclear devices, which cannot compete with the nuclear devices of the great Powers, but which would be just as much a threat to their nearest neighbour.
I want, in conclusion, to say a word about Central Europe and the problems there of arms control, and in particular about the proposals made by Mr. Gomulka for a freeze on nuclear weapons in Central Europe. Mr. Rapacki, the Foreign Minister of Poland, is visiting this country this weekend and on Monday will be having talks with the Prime Minister. I believe that the proposals put forward by the Polish Government for beginning a freeze of nuclear weapons and moving then towards a nuclear-free zone are very positive and realistic proposals. I know, as my right hon. Friend the Minister of State said in answer to a Question that I put to him on Monday, that many of our allies have disagreements and some worries about it. I hope, therefore, that the British Government will help to resolve some of these difficulties.
One difficulty is the area. The West German Government say that they do not want to be isolated in being the only country in the West being brought into such an area. Let us extend it, maybe to Norway and Denmark. Some ask why should it be only the warheads that are controlled. Let us suggest that it should be the delivery systems, too, if people are worried about whether there is an effective inspection system.
I believe that the prizes to be won are very great. One is that we may be able to improve the relationship between Poland and Germany, an historic conflict, as acute today as it has ever been, by some such settlement. Even more important, if we were able to have a trial run for an inspection system in a limited part of the world, we should gain experience which might enable us, in the years to come, to expand it into a worldwide inspection system.
I hope that, in his discussions with Mr. Rapacki, my right hon. Friend will give him some encouragement to go ahead


with his ideas, which are relevant to all the subject matter of this debate, and that he will do nothing to discourage the idea that, at some suitable stage, there should be a European conference. As I said in my maiden speech, any solution we may try to devise for the problems of the Western Alliance which worsens our relationship with the Soviet Union and the other parts of the world will be no solution at all.
I am delighted, therefore, that the Prime Minister has invited Mr. Kosygin to come here in the near future for discussions and that the Prime Minister will himself go to the Soviet Union, maintaining a dialogue. It is vital that, while we are looking at the problems of our alliance, we should at the same time have the closest possible contact with the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe. If the British Government can not only break the log-jam in our Western nuclear problems but can, at the same time, tackle the blockage in East-West relations, they will earn and deserve the thanks not only of the British people but of people throughout the world.
I wish my right hon. Friends every possible success in the long and difficult course of negotiations on which they have embarked. It is a tremendous relief that we now have a British proposal which has taken the stage and which gives an opportunity to get away from the confusion and uncertainty which have typified the last few years.

7.42 p.m.

Lieut.-Commander S. L. C. Maydon: The hon. Member for Dover (Mr. Ennals) kept harping on the idea that the Prime Minister had gained time. When pressed by my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke) to explain what had been gained and what had been the price, the hon. Gentleman said that the Prime Minister had gained time against the inexorable pressure to join the M.L.F. I remind the hon. Gentleman that pressure is always resistible, and resistible especially by a Government who know their own mind. This pressure, in any case, will not be resisted if the proposals now before us are accepted. We shall have the multilateral force as part of the new organisation to which Britain will be joined.
What is so terrible about a M.L.F. anyway? I should not myself favour such an organisation because I consider that it would add no further safeguard to peace which we do not have already, but I willingly give way to the hon. Gentleman in order to learn why he thinks that it is so terrible.

Mr. Ennals: I take it that the hon. and gallant Gentleman will not want me to make another speech about why I think the proposal for a mixed-manned surface fleet is a bad one. I wanted to ask him, as he said that, if there had been a Government who could make up their mind, it would be resistible, why his Government did not make up their mind and resist it?

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: The previous Government made up their mind. We said that we would like to see how the thing worked out in practice, but we were not prepared to join it at present. That was made plain to all concerned. We were very swift in making up our minds.
Constantly, during this two-day debate, I have detected in the speeches opposite the old Labour Party hobby horse: if we abandon or surrender to some other body our share in nuclear arms, somehow, as though by magic, this will prevent the spread of nuclear weapons among other nations. The Prime Minister spoke yesterday about "copper-bottomed guarantees" against proliferation. We all agree that this would be most desirable if we could get it. But what sort of guarantees would have prevented China exploding her nuclear device last October? I fear that the copper bottom is so riddled with holes that the right hon. Gentleman could drive a team of Peking horses right through it, possibly with his right hon. Friend the Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay) acting as coachman.
We welcome the desire to make N.A.T.O. more effective—more "purposive", as, no doubt, the Labour Party manifesto draftsmen would have it—but we must look very closely at the proposals which were put before us yesterday. They are only proposals. They have not yet been agreed by anyone. They were not agreed by the United States. Very rightly, President Johnson said, "Go away and discuss them with the allies in Europe. We give no commitment".
The Prime Minister has fought very hard to get the best of both worlds. Most of his speech was directed, I thought, to his own party's Left wing. He has sought to appear to renegotiate the Nassau Agreement without actually going so far. He has sought to appear to abandon Britain's nuclear deterrent, which he now finds does deter, is independent and is British, while at the same time making complicated provisos and exceptions.
The right hon. Gentleman said yesterday that he wished to commit irrevocably to a five-part Atlantic nuclear force, for as long as the alliance lasts—I take it that this is the N.A.T.O. Alliance, which is due for renewal or renegotiation, whatever be the proper word, in 1968—our Polaris-carrying submarines. Today, the Secretary of State for Defence said that it will be possible, juridically and physically, to recover the irrevocable if N.A.T.O. dissolves. This is just one sign of trying to get the best of both worlds.
In contrast, there is something quite sensible. The Prime Minister has reserved to our own initiative and use a section of our V-bomber force for use outside the N.A.T.O. area. I should like to know precisely what is meant by the very loose term, "our V-bomber force". Provided that he does not permit Britain's V-bomber force to be phased out quickly, that is to say, provided that he allows further developments of existing marks, the full development of the revolutionary TSR 2 and the continuing use of existing and future naval aircraft in their nuclear rôle, it seems a sensible plan if these categories of nuclear aircraft are included in the so-called V-bomber force. Provided also that he allows a sufficient section of all these aircraft to be reserved to Britain's independent use, it will be well and good.
I say that because I regard the rôle of the Polaris-carrying submarine as somewhat narrower. At present, and in the future when the British "Resolution" class vessels are in service, these submarines will be deployed in defence of the Western world. Their battle station will be the Atlantic and certain maritime appendices of the Atlantic. That will be sufficient for our purpose, particularly so when the longer range Polaris missile comes into service. To deploy these vessels and to be able to make full use of their capabilities further afield would be

exceedingly expensive in support, in direction, in communications, in targeting arrangements, and that would not be a rôle for these craft that Britain could contemplate on her own. I am sure that even the United States would be very hard pressed to do so.
The Prime Minister almost admitted this yesterday when, speaking of weapons generally, he said that there are
… areas where the weapons appropriate to Europe may not be the most effective; may indeed be far too sophisticated for effective use.
I seem to detect there that he has taken some sound advice from the service chiefs in modifying the ideas that he was blazoning abroad in the country at election time.
What now is to be gained by the Government's new proposal? Will it bind N.A.T.O. more firmly? That is one of the things we seem to be seeking to do. The Prime Minister said yesterday that actual control would be something different from the N A.T.O. Council. This was fairly fully debated today across the Dispatch Boxes. It became evident then that we are to have yet another organisation, or council, or body, or authority—call it what one likes—linked somehow to if not within N.A.T.O.
This is purely complicating the mechanics of control and decision. When we are faced with issues which may have to be decided in a very few minutes, this further complication seems to me to be not only unnecessary but thoroughly dangerous.
The other thing we are seeking to do is to make our defence arrangements cheaper for this country. If we do what is proposed, we shall have the same V-bombers, partly committed to the new authority and partly not, and the same Polaris carrying submarines, all of them committed irrevocably to the new authority. Where does the saving of money come in with such a new organisation?
Then, what of our friends in Europe—if we can still call them friends? I hope that we can still do so after what has happened in the last few weeks, but I would not blame them for turning their backs on us. What of France? Will she be more sympathetic to this new idea than she is to the old N.A.T.O. concept?


She would have a veto, but so would all the others.
Would it placate the German aspirations? The Prime Minister said yesterday:
There would certainly be no German national nuclear contribution. It would merely be in the question of the mixed-manned element, which I want to come to in a moment.—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th December, 1964 Vol. 704, c. 423 and 437.]
That has already been offered to Germany in the present proposal for a mixed-manned force. I do not see that this new organisation provides anything that we have not had already. The Defence Secretary today, when questioned about the German part, said that there would be German ownership, German management and German control. That is not entirely true. It is in contradiction to what the Prime Minister said yesterday of the part that Germany would play in the new authority and organisation.
Thermonuclear weapons have one particularly solid asset, if one can call it that. Enough is enough. There is no arms race in the terms of the 1920s or 1930s. There is no striving for parity or preponderance as with numbers of warships and aircraft, as used to be the case in the past. if a country has enough of these weapons and effective means of delivery to deter potential enemies, that is enough and it needs no more. There is no question of building a few more because one knows that somebody else has an extra thousand under construction. Enough is enough. With that basis in mind, how do we come to reorganising N.A.T.O.?
I have felt very firmly for many years since these matters came to be discussed in public that one wanted the fewest number of fingers on the trigger and not too many fingers on the safety catch. Proliferation of fingers leads to confusion. I have felt that it could be possible to have an organisation in which nuclear weapons, which are all part of the spectrum of the deterrent, whether strategic, tactical or the smaller, almost man-to-man type—for such weapons are being thought about now—even down to the humble firearm we have known in previous wars, were under the control of a council such as the existing N.A.T.O. Council, with a supreme commander as military controller.
Every member nation would be capable of making a veto and the veto would be binding on the other nations except in so far as the nuclear nations themselves would have the right of opting out when a veto was brought into force. One can imagine a situation where, for instance, there was severe threat of military operations in the far north of Europe and the majority of N.A.T.O. members considered that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a limited way, or even strategic nuclear weapons in a limited way, might make our defence more secure.
I can well understand one of the Scandinavian members wishing to veto such use of weapons. I think it perfectly right and proper that any member of the organisation and the alliance should have the right so to do. But, to balance this, the two existing nuclear Powers, with, of course, France when she too becomes a full nuclear member, should have the right of independent action and undoubtedly these nuclear Powers would together consult and decide whether they should override the veto of the single country. That would be an organisation which would be simple, fairly quick to operate and thoroughly decisive.
I put it to right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite that what they are now proposing is not likely to be acceptable to our friends in Europe. There are already indications that the Americans are a bit sceptical about it, too, so why not go for something less complicated, something simple which everybody can understand, something along the lines I have described? Some of these difficulties would then be overcome and every member country of N.A.T.O. would feel that it had a full share, although not a nuclear member and therefore not able to make an ultimate decision contrary to individual vetoes.
I am sure that the Government have striven hard to get, or appear to get, what they promised at the election. I also recognise that they have striven very honestly to preserve the safety of the country. I ask them most seriously to think again about this unwieldy impracticable proposal which they put to us last night. it will not work and every country in Europe will say the same.

8.1 p.m.

Mr. K. Zilliacus: I assure the hon. and gallant Member


for Wells (Lieut.-Commander Maydon) that if the policy declaration of the Prime Minister yesterday had been directed to the Left in this party it would have been rather different in substance. In fact, at one moment I was worried lest our policy should prove so bad as even to be acceptable to the Opposition. Fortunately, I underestimated the capacity of the Opposition to be persistently and flagrantly wrong. They seem stuck with their fictitious independent deterrent, and that is as far as their thinking goes.
The Leader of the Opposition even asked whether we had a guarantee from the Americans that Polaris missiles would be supplied without electronic locks. I would like to turn that question round. During the days when the fiction of the Polaris independent deterrent under the Nassau Agreement was vigorously sustained by hon. Members opposite, did not the Americans insist that the principle of dual control for all nuclear weapons delivered to their allies should be applied to the Polaris missiles as well, so long as those missiles were in submarines which were integrated with N.A.T.O. forces under N.A.T.O.—which means U.S.—command? If and when—an improbable hypothesis—some Government in this country were smitten with suicidal madness and wished to engage in a nuclear war single-handed against the will of the United States, would it not have had to go to the United States and say, "Please, we want to commit suicide and involve you in a nuclear war against your will, so will you kindly release the electronic locks?"? It is not worth wasting powder and shot on that kind of nonsense, but that is the substance of the whole issue, of the Tory case.
I was relieved to find that the Opposition were even several degrees worse than the policy put forward by the Government and therefore I shall vote for that policy in the spirit of the old Swedish saying that there are variations of temperature, even in Hell. Seriously, my right hon. Friends need never fear being in a minority in the House, however much any of us on what is known as the Left are opposed to this or that policy of the Labour Government. Because the more Left we are, the more passionately convinced we are that it would be the worst conceivable disaster if the party opposite were to be returned to power.
What I fear and what the Government need to fear is the progressive loss of support in the country as the economic and social consequences of their defence policy come home to the people and as the hopes of those are blighted who look to the Labour Government for the proliferation of peace and not the proliferation of N.A.T.O., in the paradoxical belief that this is the way to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I should like to consider that doctrine for a few moments.
To put it in homely terms; it is as though a little group of serious drinkers had formed a club and issued a heart felt appeal to the rest of the world to take the pledge, but on the understanding that if anybody had uncontrollable alcoholic cravings or persisted in hitting the bottle he would be admitted to the club; or, in grander terms, rather like the practice of the ancient Chinese Empire when, if the Emperor found that a bandit was too powerful to be subdued he made him a provincial governor. In this case, President de Gaulle refuses the status of provincial governor or satrap in this Atlantic nuclear force while the West German Government has accepted it with alarming alacrity and for purposes and with consequences which I only hope will be different from what I fear they will be.
The only way to limit the spread of nuclear weapons is to get on with the job of peace-making, of political settlements, agreements on disarmament. Incidentally, that is the only way in which this country can be made secure. All Defence White Papers, since 1957 at least, have repeated that we cannot be defended against a nuclear attack and that the only way to defend this country is to prevent a war from breaking out. That, of course, is a political job, the job of making peace.
The one thing I missed in the Prime Minister's speech was any exposition of Labour's Foreign Policy. I was rather disappointed at this and slightly surprised because he himself in his first speech as Shadow Foreign-Secretary on 31st December, 1961, said:
From now on, instead of putting defence first in our minds, weapons and means of destruction, we should put foreign policy, particularly a Socialist foreign policy, first. Then all other things will fall into place".


He also said on 31st January, 1963:
When defence becomes the master of foreign policy, as it sometimes has in recent years, vision and realism alike are banished from our counsels."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 31st January, 1963; Vol. 670, c. 1246.]
This has been a myopic and unrealistic debate precisely for that reason and I regret it all the more because Labour has policies on which we could reach agreement with the other side—for instance, the policy of disengagement in Europe, which was agreed on first at the Scarborough Conference in 1958 as part of what would be a comprehensive and very sensible and feasible policy still today, and which was reiterated by the Prime Minister at the Scarborough conference in September, 1963, when he said:
As a result of our talks in Moscow, I am convinced there is a chance of a breakthrough on two points, first, an agreement to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, second, agreement on areas of complete nuclear disarmament and progressive conventional disarmament…above all in the high tension area of Central Europe, we press again the urgent relevance of what has always been our policy, the creation of a nuclear-free zone, with effective inspection, a zone of controlled conventional disarmament. I believe that this proposal, providing no change in the balance of forces between East and West, could greatly lower tension in this area, could begin the process of détente between East and West and could begin to create the conditions leading to a unified democratic Germany.
I believe that every word of that is true and that it is still the only way in which to reach a settlement in Europe permitting the unification of Germany, because such a settlement can be reached only by agreement with the Soviet Union, and that is the only basis on which the Soviet Union would agree to such unification.
How high do the Government rate their chances of a break-through as a result of this Atlantic nuclear force project, after allowing West Germany to share in—and I quote what the Prime Minister said—
'manning and managing nuclear weapons systems within a mixed-manned component' without however, 'acquiring control over them', although 'sharing in nuclear planning policy and strategy' ".
I think that that is a somewhat complicated concept. But the long and short of it is that Germany has taken a long step toward realising her ambition to become a nuclear power.
I am not interested so much in the paper arrangements or pledges as in the record and in the facts; Western Germany was admitted to N.A.T.O. on the strict understanding that she observed certain far-reaching restrictions about her armaments. Those restrictions have been progressively removed, and this is a further step towards removing the last barrier to her becoming a nuclear power and to enabling her people to be trained in the handling of nuclear weapons, so that she has the physical possibility of becoming a nuclear power at any moment.
What did we get in return for this concession? Did we secure an assurance from the United States that she would insist on the recognition of Germany's frontiers, which is something that the Labour Party has said for a long time should be done? Did we get the agreement of the Americans to make our policies for disengagement, German unification by degrees and a provisional Berlin settlement a basis of negotiation? Were they proposing to support us in that, or have we given away Labour's policy for peace with a pound of Polarises and abandoned the principle that defence should be the servant of foreign policy? Just what is our power now to put forward and press our proposals for settlement, whether our allies agree with them or not?
I am very apprehensive about that, because last Monday, when my right hon. Friend the Minister of State was asked by an hon. Member opposite what proposals the Government had for disengagement, the reply was:
Her Majesty's Government will at all times act in close consultation and unity with her allies
and that
our N.A.T.O. Allies see a number of objections to these proposals on political, milirtary and technical grounds.…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th December, 1964; Vol. 704, c. 13.]
We all knew that. We have know it for years.
In the speech which I made on 23rd November, I quoted at length from George F. Kennan, who, after all, is a pretty big American authority in this field and who cannot by any means be regarded as a man of the Left. He stressed the fact, and gave chapter and verse to prove it, that N.A.T.O. is held


together and unity is maintained between the allies only by rejecting every one of the policies for a settlement in Europe put forward by the Labour Party. The N.A.T.O. Powers reject disengagement even on the basis of reciprocity, the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone or a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw and N.A.T.O. Powers. They even reject the principle of peaceful co-existence, and, as Mr. Kennan pointed out, are heavily committed, particularly the Germans and the Americans, to the general proposition of the destruction of Communism—a hangover of the Dulles policy.
We must face the fact that we cannot try to bolster up and remain 100 per cent. loyal to N.A.T.O., and at the same time pursue our policies for making peace, because the success of those policies—disengagement, disarmament, and so on—would entail the winding up of both the N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Alliance and their replacement by all-European arrangements based on the Charter. We cannot even start that process unless we are able to disagree with our allies.
What impression do the Government think this Atlantic nuclear force will make on the Soviet Union and the East European powers? The Government are desperately anxious—I could not agree more with them—to get some agreement with these Powers on the lines which we propose, both as regards limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and all the other issues. The trouble is that the Soviet Government and the other Governments regard this Atlantic nuclear force, just as they regard the multilateral nuclear force, as a means of spreading and proliferating nuclear weapons. They say that it is a further step to Germany becoming a nuclear power, which, incidentally, was what the Prime Minister said in the House early last year when he argued that the Labour Party was
completely, utterly and unequivocally opposed now and in all circumstances to any suggestion that Germany, West Germany or East Germany, directly or indirectly, should have a finger on the nuclear trigger or any responsibility, direct or indirect, for deciding that nuclear weapons are to be used."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st Jan., 1963; Vol. 670. c. 1246.]
There is no distinction there between a nuclear trigger and a nuclear safety catch. The position now is that Germany

is to be admitted to sharing in controlling the policies of N.A.T.O., particularly on decisions as to when, in what circumstances and for what purpose nuclear weapons should be used, and she will get something approaching a veto on any policies for reaching agreement with the Soviet Union. That is the dangerous part of all this.
I still think that the argument which the Prime Minister used in his speech on 3rd July last year was valid and cogent. He said that he believed that the Americans were wrong to think that this proposal would stop Germany becoming a nuclear power. He stated:
On the contrary, we have feared all along that it would whet the German nuclear appetites, and, in fact, it is doing so, even before we have it. The very mention of it is whetting German appetites.
He then quoted the German Defence Minister and General Lemnitzer to prove his contention that
…there is a very serious development of a desire…for a spread of nuclear weapons.…We have been warned and the House must be very clear about its answer to this warning."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 3rd July, 1963; Vol. 680, c. 392.]
I want to know why that warning has been disregarded by the man who gave it. This really worries me.
The Prime Minister then gave a dire warning that the Soviet Government would regard any such advance towards Germany getting nuclear weapons by participating in a multilateral fleet as tantamount, or a halfway house, at any rate, to Germany getting nuclear weapons of her own, which could easily result in making it impossible to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on any major issue. That warning has since been amply confirmed, first, by the Tass statement which I quoted on 23rd November in the House, then by the subsequent. speeches of the Soviet Prime Minister, Soviet Foreign Minister and Soviet party secretary.
Lastly, since the Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Rapacki, is coming here this weekend to meet the Prime Minister to discuss these matters, it is relevant to quote what he said to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14th December:
The multilateral force"—
and in the eyes of those countries that means any international nuclear force in


which Germany takes part in any capacity whatsoever; they are not interested in semantics, or details, or fine distinctions between the trigger and the safety catch, but are very concerned about Germany taking a further step to becoming a fully-fledged nuclear Power—
would open a new period of tension and a new phase of the arms race in Europe. It would make the discussion of a non-aggression treaty a futile exercise. …One cannot expect that the Socialist countries could then refrain from taking appropriate counter-measures. The existing division of the world into two opposing military blocs would become ever wider and more acute. …It would to say the least make any agreement between East and West more difficult. The question might also arise as to the value of the long-drawn disarmament negotiations, should they become no more than a comforting accompaniment to unilateral military moves and to an accelerated arms race.
Why have we done all this? Why have we gone against our own principle that we would put peace-making first and war commitments second? Why did we start off by tying ourselves hand and foot in a rather Heath Robinson attempt to patch up N.A.T.O.? We should have taken advantage of the tottery state of N.A.T.O. to say, "If you people want us to play any longer, you had better consider our policies for making peace, because the time has now come to wind up all this nonsense". We did not do it.
We started at the wrong end and deprived ourselves of any effective bargaining power by our pathetic addiction to staying in N.A.T.O. at any cost and on any terms. Hence we were pushed around by the United States of America and blackmailed by the Germans. Or rather, to put it another way, the West German Government blackmailed both the United States of America and our Government by its threat that if it did not get what it wanted, it would join France in a Franco-German nuclear force.
That bluff should have been called. To start with, the French nuclear force is derisory and will remain so for a long time. Secondly, General de Gaulle would never permit Germany to become stronger than France in that alliance. In the third place, the opposition in France to any idea of Germany getting ahead in a nuclear alliance is extremely powerful. Finally, if necessary, we could threaten West Germany with counter-

measures if she broke her treaty obligation not to have nuclear weapons. We could say, "Very well. We will take our forces out of the Rhineland. We recognise Eastern Germany. We recognise your existing frontiers. If that is not enough, we will consider what further measures to take if you become a danger to peace". A little toughness in the cause of peace would work wonders instead of always giving way.
My one crumb of comfort in all this business is that nothing has been settled yet. The situation is still fluid. There is still a breathing space. I wish that the situation had been even more fluid and that we could go into the coming talks with the Polish Foreign Minister and with the Soviet Prime Minister entirely uncommitted by all this Atlantic nuclear force nonsense. As, however, things are still in the air, all I can hope is that we will not tie ourselves down to anything vis-à-vis our allies until we have measured the reactions on the other side and until we have tested the possibilities of reaching agreement on the basis of the policies that our Government and most people in this country consider reasonable.
We should take a fresh look at the whole situation and do it from the viewpoint of taking our stand, not on the military alliances, but on the Charter of the United Nations. It is an odd fact that throughout this debate I cannot remember anybody referring directly to the United Nations. I believe that my hon. Friend the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs made a passing reference to it in his speech last night, but there was nothing in the speeches of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister or of my right hon. Friend the Defence Minister. And yet this is supposed to be a foreign affairs debate.
We have said again and again—it was said in the Gracious Speech—that our foreign policy is based on the United Nations and is aimed at strengthening it. In fact, it is the Charter, and not the alliances, which is the sheet anchor of our policy. Even legally, by Article 103 of the Charter, its obligations take precedence over all other treaty obligations, and any treaty obligation which conflicts with those of the Charter becomes null and void as between members of the United Nations. That is a juridical fact.


But the political fact is much more important—that we should be prepared to deal with other countries on the basis of our obligations in the Charter and in accordance with the principles of the Charter. Incidentally, that is the only basis on which we can found a policy for reconciliation between East and West and on which we can build up arrangements and agreements to ratify our own policies for disengagement, disarmament and similar policies in the Middle East and in the Far East.
I have always held the view, and I said so in this House on 12th May, 1949, when N.A.T.O. was first introduced, when I both spoke and voted against it, that N.A.T.O. is not compatible with the Charter. It is tantamount to tearing up the Charter. It goes back to the balance of power. It substitutes brute force for the rule of law. I will not argue that now. But I stress that we should insist that we interpret our other treaty obligations on lines consistent with the Charter.
The Charter, for instance, prohibits resort to force for any purpose except defence against an armed attack. This definition has been stretched in N.A.T.O., C.E.N.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O. to justify policies of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries to put down movements or régimes that we do not like. That is known, I believe, as defence against Communist subversion. That is entirely contrary to the Charter, which prohibits interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
If there are borderline cases where an internal upheaval is being supported from outside or there are allegations that it is being so supported, that is precisely the kind of matter that should be brought to the Security Council and dealt with by the methods prescribed in the Charter, which means that we have to co-operate with the Soviet Union to deal with such incidents. That is what we ought to do.
There have twice been references, once by the Minister of Defence and once by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond), to situations in which there were local incidents or upheavals and some kind of complication or local conflict in international relations. The idea apparently is that the armed alliances should at once jump in. Of course, they should not. This sort of

thing should be referred to the Security Council. Our policy should be one of backing the procedures laid down by the Charter and not of trying to sidetrack the United Nations and dealing with all this by the methods of nuclear power politics, which could be guaranteed to escalate any local conflict into a nuclear war.
Starting with that, the first thing that we should do in the Far East should be to make it clear to the Americans that we regard their policy in Southern Vietnam as constituting a threat to international peace under the Charter, and that if they do not get out of that country and wind the thing up, we will bring the matter before the United Nations Security Council. I repeat what the Prime Minister said on 30th June, when he asked the then Prime Minister, who is now Leader of the Opposition, to make it clear that we would oppose any extension of the war in Southern Vietnam to Northern Vietnam.
Unfortunately, in his speech yesterday the Prime Minister merely said that we were not committed on this subject. I had a slight shiver of apprehension. I wondered whether he had totally reserved his position again. I want him to be committed against any extension of the war in Southern Vietnam, and I consider his remarks of 30th June did commit him against an extension. I should like the Government to make it quite clear that they are committed against it and that they have warned the Americans accordingly. I will say why. Because today in America there is a big conflict about South Viet-Nam policy. There are plenty of Americans, including senators, Senators Wayne Morse, Mansfield and Gruening, among others, who have come out openly and demanded the winding up of this adventure, which has led to a division between the so-called Hawks and the Doves. We ought to be cooing with the Doves in this case, not squawking in the wake of the Hawks. We ought to take a strong line of our own in this situation, and taking it in accordance with our obligations as a member of the United Nations and our views as a Labour Government.
Of course, as far as Malaysia is concerned, although obviously she has got to be helped to defend herself as long as Soekarno goes on attacking her—or so long as whatever Government there is in


Indonesia goes on attacking her—I think we ought to make a very energetic attempt to get a settlement—if you like, through the United Nations or through an international conference—in the Far East, on the basis of the neutralisation of Malaysia, as part of the neutralisation of South-East Asia, and a conference in which the Chinese and Russians would take part, because then the Chinese and Russians could put all the pressure necessary on Indonesia to get her to fall in with this. We ought not to rely only on military methods. We ought also to pay a great deal of attention to policies for winding up this conflict.
This applies also to China. The Chinese Government have said again and again that they will stop their attempt to become a nuclear Power if the rest of us get rid of nuclear weapons. That is, of course, a bit of a tall order. But we should certainly try to get the Chinese into the United Nations, and into the Disarmament Commission at Geneva, and into a settlement in the Far East. On all these issues of Viet-Nam and Malaysia and the rest we should feel our way. We should go on pressing to bring the Chinese into the international circle, so to speak, because this is the only means by which we shall get any kind of relaxation of tension. It is quite hopeless to go on just piling up arms and hoping for the best.
Of course I know that these are pretty tough suggestions. But what I want to say is that unless we do make radical changes in our international policies, which means foreign policy first and defence policy as a consequence of that, we are going to be on the rocks financially and economically, because this country cannot support anything like the present defence budget and at the same time supply the resources, not only in money but in technicians and in manpower and machinery and the rest, which are needed to modernise our economy, to increase our productivity, to expand our exports, and to fulfil the noble and ambitious social programme to which the Labour Party has set its hand. We cannot build up a Welfare State and our economic strength and at the same time go on with the kind of policy which was outlined yesterday, which puts war preparations against the Soviet Union first and making peace with the Soviet Union and China so far behind that it is almost out of sight.

8.33 p.m.

Mr. Humphry Berkeley: I should like to add my voice to the protest which has already been made from this side of the House at what I think is the quite extraordinary discourtesy with which both sides of the House have been treated by the Government in the course of this debate.

Mr. Cyril Bence: How?

Mr. Berkeley: I will explain how. If the hon. Gentleman listens he will learn.
It does seem to me quite astonishing that the speech of the Prime Minister, which has been described by his hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Mr. Ennals) as being a most historical and remarkable statement, should have been made to this House without this House having any kind of prior information whatsoever as to what might have been agreed in Washington between the Prime Minister and the President. When my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition remonstrated with the Prime Minister about this a few days ago the Prime Minister said that he was operating the same precedent as was set at the time of the Nassau Agreement. As we all know perfectly well, this is far from being the case, because although there was no Government statement in advance of the debate on the Nassau Agreement the Government had already issued a White Paper which in fact gave full details of the Agreement. Therefore, a Government statement was totally unnecessary.
I cannot help wondering whether the Prime Minister was frightened of telling his allies what he had done, or whether he was frightened of telling this House in advance what he had done so that we could prepare ourselves for the debate, or whether he wanted the Labour Party conference to go off quietly before any indication of what agreement he had reached was published. It is interesting that the American Press of the weekend, and in advance of the Prime Minister's speech at the Labour Party conference, had full details of what the Prime Minister's proposals were going to be when he made them yesterday afternoon.
Those who have watched the Prime Minister in action in this House over the last few years would not perhaps place the quality of candour as the foremost of


the many qualities which he has displayed here. During the course of his observations yesterday I could not help feeling that there was at least the suspicion of a desire to confuse. I think that the Prime Minister hoped that he might delude hon. Members on this side of the House into thinking that he had fulfilled to the full his election pledge of doing away unconditionally with our deterrent. I think he also hoped that he might delude hon. Members on the extreme Left wing of his party that he had conducted a similar surrender. What he no doubt hoped for was a demonstration of anger on this side of the House, followed by expressions of delight on the faces of hon. Members below the Gangway on the benches opposite, followed in return by dismay on this side of the House.
But something went slightly wrong, because never in my five years in this House have I seen a sadder set of faces than I saw among the Left-wing Members of the party opposite during the Prime Minister's speech yesterday afternoon, because what he had to do—and this may account for some of the secrecy which surrounds his actions—was simultaneously satisfy America, satisfy Germany, and satisfy his own Left wing.
We all remember the statement of Mrs. Gibbs, the Chairman of the C.N.D., at one of the charming gatherings which take place outside the conference hall at the Labour Party conference when she said:
We reaffirm that the campaign's policy is to renounce nuclear weapons and all alliances based on the threat to use the bomb.
Mrs. Gibbs is not an isolated eccentric. On the contrary, she is typical of a large number of Members on the opposite side of the House who share her views. One can therefore well understand the feeling of dismay which many of them may have felt.
As I heard the Prime Minister speaking, I began to ask myself, was his journey to Washington really necessary?

Mr. Bence: Yes.

Mr. Berkeley: Well, let us see what he has done. He has, so he told us, irrevocably committed the British nuclear deterrent to N.A.T.O. As we all know, in fact the British nuclear deterrent was already committed to N.A.T.O. Under

the terms of the Nassau Agreement our V-bomber force was assigned to N.A.T.O. and so, indeed, was the Polaris missile project to be.
What has happened now? Our V-bomber force is still committed to N.A.T.O., apparently now irrevocably, but the fact is that we have the bombers. They are in this country. They are manned by British personnel. I am told that there is a stockpile of about 1,500 bombs. It is, I believe, wholly impossible to inject locks on those bombs which already exist. Therefore, they are physically in this country and still physically under our control. On top of that, we are told that an element of our V-bomber force is still not to be committed to N.A.T.O. but is to be used—quite properly—for our purposes east of Suez.
I cannot believe that the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus), who has just given us so much pleasure by addressing us, could bring himself to vote in favour of a policy which keeps the bomb in Britain, in British aircraft, under the control of British personnel and, on the sheer practicality of the situation, in physical terms, when our commitment to N.A.T.O. could be withdrawn at any time.

Mr. Bence: The hon. Member is saying that we are continuing the situation in which our V-bomber fleet and many of our naval squadrons are seconded to N.A.T.O. In that case, will he support us in the Lobby tonight, on the basis that we are continuing his Government's policy?

Mr. Healey: Answer.

Mr. Berkeley: If the right hon. Member will wait for me to answer I am sure that he will be satisfied with my reply. I believe that it is foolish to make statements that have no meaning. If the commitment is irrevocable, which in the case of the V-bombers it is said to be, it means, if it means anything, a commitment to an authority the nature of which we are still wholly in ignorance. It seems to me that we have heard a lot of double-talk from the Government Front Bench today and yesterday. I could not lend myself to that sort of thing.
In the light of the situation over the V-bombers, the hon. Member for


Rochester and Chatham (Mrs. Anne Kerr), of whose travels we have read about with so much interest recently, might have saved herself the journey. She might have stayed at home, or gone to Downing Street and demonstrated there, perhaps hand-in-hand with the hon. Member for Gorton. I cannot believe that he or she, or many other hon. Members opposite, genuinely approve of what has been arrived at.

Mr. Zilliacus: Perhaps I can allay the hon. Member's anxieties and apprehensions. We think that there is a lot of bad in what has been done—at least, I do. But I also have hopes that the Labour Government will learn by experience, whereas the party opposite has proved that it is incapable of learning.

Mr. Berkeley: The only experience that the hon. Member for Gorton would like the Labour Party to undergo, vis-à-vis the V-bomber force, is to get rid of the bombs—to destroy them. That will not be done. The deterrent power remains and the hon. Member knows it, and he and many of his hon. Friends are deeply and bitterly opposed to a policy of that kind. They would be more candid if they came out in their true colours and said so.
As far as we know, the Polaris programme is to go ahead. I wonder whether the hon. Member for Gorton told his electors that this would happen during the election, or whether many of his hon. Friends did likewise. I suspect not. As far as we can see, however, that programme is to go ahead. So far as we can see, the vessels are not going to be mixed-manned. The Secretary of State for Defence has still not come entirely clean with us and told us whether or not electronic locks will be fitted.
In the physical sense, therefore, I suspect that the repossession of Polaris would not be much more difficult than the repossession of the V-bombers. I believe that it is time we stopped hearing the double-talk that we have heard in the last few days. I venture to suggest that the Prime Minister and his ministerial colleagues have been less than candid with the House in this debate. We understand the reason. We know that they cannot be comfortable

in the same party as the hon. Member for Gorton. We understand also that it would not be very comfortable being in the same party as the hon. Lady the Member for Rochester and Chatham. We understand this, but, nevertheless, we are talking about serious matters now and we think that a little less double talk and a little less disguise is desirable.

Mr. Zilliacus: Since the hon. Member keeps referring to me, may I say quite frankly that I believe that our Government have a policy for making peace which would work. I believe that as time goes on they will take the steps necessary to get the bargaining power for putting over that policy. The hon. Member wants to know what I said during the election. I told everybody that if, contrary to expectations, it was impossible to fulfil our social promises without cutting defence expenditure, then "I ask you to realise that when you vote for me you give me a mandate to press for cutting defence expenditure by as much as is needed to keep our promises to the people." My majority went up from 857 to 4,430.

Mr. Berkeley: I am sure that we are all deeply moved and touched by that tale, both at the way in which the hon. Member for Gorton raised his majority and the obvious pain with which he had to inform the House that he proposed to vote in a way which did not conform with his conscience or with his beliefs. I propose to vote as I think right, and I shall be supporting the Opposition tonight.
I should like to say a few words about the Government's attitude towards the M.L.F., because I find it in some respects rather puzzling. Until their views matured somewhat after the election, the Government have basically led us to believe that they were both against the deterrent and its proliferation and also that they wanted us to give it up, and that our giving it up was as much a moral as a material gesture. It seemed to me that, whatever other merits or demerits the M.L.F. may have, it has at least this—first of all, it would prevent rather than encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Secondly, it would link Germany with America, and of course with America and Britain, if both


were to be in. Thirdly, and this is where I would have thought it may have appealed most strongly to the Prime Minister and his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, it would enable us to abandon gracefully our independent nuclear deterrent. For some reason, none of these arguments has appealed to hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite.
We must ask ourselves why. I think that there are basically two reasons. There is a very large element in the Government party which is anti the possession of nuclear weapons, which supports the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. There is an even larger element in the Government party which is and always has been fundamentally and profoundly anti-German. This, I believe, has to a large extent determined their attitude. The Secretary of State for Defence, in the course of his speech today, said that Germany was to have, under the Prime Minister's proposals, ownership, participation and control. This is what he said. He said it in a rather patronising way, almost as though he thought that there were Members on this side who wanted to deny this to Germany. Yet the present Prime Minister made this statement at their party conference in 1963:
Any measure of German control of nuclear weapons would be as much a turning point of history, as much a fateful milestone on the road to a third world war, as Hitler's march into the Rhineland was towards the last war.
I do not know whether the Foreign Secretary will be conveying these sentiments to Herr Schroeder in the next few days.
What we have to accept—this is where I believe the Government are entirely blinkered—is that Germany is determined to be in the nuclear business anyway. If we, through our policies, deny Germany her aspirations to join, as I believe is the best thing for her to do, in partnership with ourselves and the Americans—and the right hon. Gentleman knows that it is the mixed-manned surface fleet that is most attractive for the Germans—the result is bound to be a German-American deterrent or a Franco-German deterrent. The Prime Minister has already made it clear in his speech and elsewhere—I am glad

that he did—that he would not support a Franco-German deterrent.
I referred earlier to the double-talk which we have had to endure in the last few days from Government spokesmen, who one naturally understands have been very apprehensive as to how their proposals would be received by their supporters. I should very much have liked to be present at the private meeting of the Labour Party when these matters were discussed. Perhaps it will turn out ultimately that that meeting was not quite as private as it was thought to be. We shall see.
The fact is that the Labour Left wing in my view has been hoodwinked in the debate. I believe that we have not yet had anything in the nature of a clear statement from the Government as to what their policy is. It is my personal hope that they will not despise the thought of Britain making a contribution towards a mixed-manned force because I believe this to be desirable in both political and military terms.
Finally, I echo the sentiments expressed last night by my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, North (Mr. Chataway) that if the present Government wish to achieve a solution to their problems and to make themselves more acceptable in Europe, they must show that they take Europe seriously and they must drop this legacy of anti-German feeling which they display so frequently. They must—

Mr. loan L. Evans: rose—

Mr. Berkeley: I will not give way. I have exactly two minutes in which to complete my speech because I have undertaken to sit down by a certain time. I am afraid that my peroration has been destroyed, and I must try to recover as best I can.
I ask the Government to show in practical terms to Europe that they care about Europe. For the last year I have been both on the Council of Europe and on the Western European Union delegation, and I can assure hon. Members opposite that they have a long way to make up. They are not regarded as pro-European by any European Power in Western Europe. What they have to do is to take some action based on some of the sentiments which we have heard them express


from time to time and so see that Britain can be politically, and as far as possible militarily, integrated both into Europe and in the Western Alliance as a whole.

8.59 p.m.

Mr. Peter Thorneycroft: We approach the conclusion of this debate to which, I understand, the Prime Minister will do us the courtesy of replying. The House should be grateful to him for that, for the debate has raised matters of great concern to hon. Members on both sides of the House. It touches on matters of sovereignty over Britain's defences which, whatever view one takes, is an important matter. It touches on matters of foreign policy, which is of interest to all of us.
The debate has been graced by a number of maiden speeches. The hon. Member for Stepney (Mr. Shore) spoke of the importance of non-proliferation. He said that the world would not come to an end if the present plans failed. I thoroughly agree with that sentiment. My hon. Friend the Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison) quite rightly said that military strength and economic strength are not contradictions but are complementary to one another. This is a lesson that the Secretary of State might bear in mind. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve) emphasised the vital nature of our relations with Europe, which will be the theme of much of what I have to say in connection with these discussions.
Having commended these maiden speeches, I am afraid that I cannot commend the Prime Minister's speech or that of the Secretary of State in quite such glowing terms. Yet I am, if I may say so, not simply going to attack them. May I start, however embarrassing it may be, with a few words of praise for the Prime Minister?
After all, the work on the Polaris submarines goes on. These weapons which are going to be provided with Polaris missiles on a continuing basis are going to be available—the most powerful deterrent that modern science can provide—and the V-bombers are to continue. They are not, if I may say so to the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond), going to be run down, as at one time was advocated. They are to proceed in this country and be available in the Far

East, equipped with all the modern methods of delivery, both conventional and nuclear weapons. I am bound to say that when going through the Lobby the other night I heard "Bomber Wilson" being applied to the Prime Minister, I thought that that was a little exaggerated.
Then we listened to the Prime Minister, in a moving passage of his speech, describing the virtues of nuclear power and the effect it had on preserving the peace of the world. When I remembered the stories that used to be circulated, that something like 60 or 70 hon. Members opposite were associated with the Committee of Nuclear Disarmament, I realised that they must have been gross distortions. They would never have sat silent, listening to that exposition of the importance of nuclear power.
The support of the unity of the alliance, N.A.T.O., we were pleased to hear; not just N.A.T.O. but N.A.T.O. equipped with the most powerful nuclear weapons. What a long way we have moved since 1960. At any rate, one can say with certainty that there is no moral opposition left in all this for the Labour Party. They cannot now say that there is something immoral in the possession of nuclear weapons. The only conceivable question now left is, how best are we to organise or arrange these matters?
The objectives which the Prime Minister described indeed commend themselves to all hon. Members—unity in the alliance and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. These are common and serious aims. The objectives are admirable. True, the Prime Minister made a terrible hash of the solution, as I shall seek to show, but I would say to the right hon. Gentleman that no one would assert today that we will not see even closer integration in the matters of conventional and nuclear weapons in the years to come—in the weapons not only of this country but, perhaps, of America, France and Germany.
The day will come when we will see a united Europe and certainly a much more closely united Atlantic union. Political institutions will rise and we must all strive for them. We will see a greater centralisation in economic and military decisions, and these are common to a large number of hon. Members on both sides of the House.
However, that day has not yet arrived. Our criticism is not of these objectives but that the activities of Her Majesty's Government in the last 50 days have been to set those objectives back, that the mission to Washington placed even larger obstacles in its way—[Interruption.]—and the reason for what I deem to be the failure of that mission was that the Prime Minister forgot these larger hopes and wider visions. He quoted the objectives which were so ably set out in the admirable speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, North (Mr. Chataway) last night. He turned most of the discussion on the rather squalid purposes of a political deal with the British nuclear deterrent, a deal which, I may add, is utterly irrelevant to all the great purposes which I have been describing.
It was in many ways an astonishing mission. I think that seldom, if ever, has a Prime Minister returned from such a mission and indulged in such an orgy of self-praise. Seldom has he revealed less, and seldom has more doubt and confusion been spread at the conclusion of any such event. What was the real purpose of the right hon. Gentleman? I do not often quote my own speeches, but may I quote what I said on the last occasion:
We think that it is possible that he is anxious to get rid of the British deterrent, or as much of it as possible, but he cannot think where to put it. What he is looking for is a depository for the thing. He wants to find some sort of organisation…and put it into that…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd November, 1964; Vol. 702, c. 1022.]
That is precisely the objective on which the right hon. Gentleman was engaged. He covered it with a good deal of very quick double-talk. In Bonn and Washington tonight I will warrant that they expect M.L.F. to go forward.
The Socialist manifesto—quoted, to the great embarrassment of the Government Front Bench, by the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins)—plainly said that M.L.F. would not be a part of the Labour Party policy. Indeed, it was absolutely plain that they were not going in. Since then the right hon. Gentleman has said that he has left the whole thing open, the position is reserved. He has told us that paragraph 9 of the Nassau Agreement was not even discussed in Washington. I believe him,

I believe anything he tells me as the Prime Minister of this country. If it was not discussed, what an astonishing thing that the Foreign Secretary of this country within a few days was announcing that it was to be abrogated in Paris.
The awful thing is that I believe it is true. I believe that it is quite likely the way in which the right hon. Gentleman did conduct these affairs. Sometimes it is said that the British nuclear deterrent is to be abandoned. The next moment we hear that it is to be kept for the Far East. We have been told that in Europe the B.A.O.R. is to be increased. That was the first statement. Then it was to be cut, and it is to be kept as it is. Almost every position has been taken up in these last few days. Then complaint is made that the Press do not get these stories quite clear. Anybody who listened to the Prime Minister describing how he was going to get rid of a deterrent which he has said was not there to an organisation which did not exist must have some sympathy with the British Press.
The camera cannot lie, and as we saw the right hon. Gentleman on the television screen coming down the steps of the White House to the tune of "Land of Hope and Glory", the anxieties of the Left wing of his party were as nothing to our own. But the right hon. Gentleman has a remarkable facility for seeing that his actions betray his words. His purpose throughout has been to find some way of getting rid of the British deterrent, and maybe this is the way. But what a way. What a moment for a unilateral abnegation of the British deterrent. The British taxpayer is to spend millions of pounds to sustain these weapons which are ultimately no longer to be under our control. Any enemies are to be informed in advance that we shall never be able to use these weapons in our own defence. What conceivable satisfaction can that give even to a member of the nuclear disarmament committee?
May I summarise our criticisms to the right hon. Gentleman? I will summarise them in this way. Having placed N.A.T.O. in jeopardy, he has put paid, probably for a long time, to negotiations with the Russians in the cause of nonproliferation. He has created a costly and, undoubtedly, incredible deterrent, and he has sacrificed the heart of British defences.
I take the question of N.A.T.O. to start with. The right hon. Gentleman said that his objective was to unite the alliance. Whatever other arguments may be advanced for a M.L.F. or an A.N.F., is the right hon. Gentleman going to stand up tonight and say that the steps that he has taken have tended to unite N.A.T.O? N.A.T.O. is in deadlock. N.A.T.O. is unable to agree on any of these proposals. The right hon. Gentleman's proposals are resisted by France, which, after all, is the heart and centre of Europe—they are deeply suspect by Denmark, Norway, Belgium and Canada. They are all standing aside from this, and, used as they are as a cloak for the unilateral disarmament of this country, they are viewed with increasing bitterness and concern by large sections of the British public.
The proposals which the right hon. Gentleman has put forward have given rise to a speech by the Secretary-General of N.A.T.O. giving the gravest warning to the whole of Europe about what might flow from pursuing these particular suggestions. I challenge the right hon. Gentleman when he replies to state quite firmly whether he really believes that this is a way of uniting the alliance. I also want to pose this direct question to him: Is this force to be inside or outside N.A.T.O? This seems to me to be crucial. The Secretary of State ducked this question when it was put to him. What is proposed was made relatively clear by the Prime Minister. A new political authority is to be set up. It is to have the responsibility to take decisions to release the weapons and to develop an agreed policy on the rôle of all types of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. How is that to be reconciled with N.A.T.O?
N.A.T.O. today has its full nuclear organisation. With weapons assigned, with a deputy SACEUR appointed, with a whole organisation and staff there, what is to happen to them? Are they to stay or are they to be abandoned? Is the deputy SACEUR to remain? What is the proposal? This is a very big and important staff to which SACEUR attaches the very greatest importance, established in the great alliance at the present time. The House is entitled to know whether it is to remain or whether it is to go. That organisation was set up with full agreement, with all N.A.T.O. countries agreeing and has never been used in any way as a suggestion or an

excuse for proliferation. What additional power is to be given to Germany or anybody else under the new set-up, what powers additional to the ones which they have under this closely integrated organisation today? We are entitled to know. I think that other countries in the world are entitled to an answer to that question. If this is to meet some German aspiration—I am not saying that German aspirations should not be met, and I shall say something about them in a moment—what is the aspiration and how is it met?
The strategy and tactics, both conventional and nuclear, of this great military alliance are today discussed in the alliance. They are the responsibility of SACEUR and SACEUR is responsible to the N.A.T.O. Council. Under these proposals, a new political authority is to he established outside that, and, as stated by the Prime Minister, it is to discuss all these matters at present discussed inside N.A.T.O. Inevitably, there will be one body discussing all the nuclear problems and another discussing all the conventional problems. I cannot think of any organisation more likely to create military bedlam in Europe than the one which the right hon. Gentleman has proposed.
He has asked us to think about it. We have been thinking about it. He said that he would debate it with us. Let him debate it with us this evening. This is the time to do it. Let him explain how this organisation is to work. The way we organise the defences of Europe matters a great deal.
What is the purpose as regards proliferation? The right hon. Gentleman says that he is putting non-dissemination first. The whole House will agree that, if it were possible to reach agreement with the Russians on non-dissemination or nonproliferation, it would be the most wonderful follow-up to the partial test ban agreement negotiated under the previous Government. How does the Prime Minister think that his proposal will help agreement with the Russians? Will it help or will it hinder?
The Russians have made clear, in unequivocal terms, that they dislike these arrangements and deeply suspect them. I put aside what they might positively do. Whether they would set up ships themselves or put missiles in them is another matter. I am talking only about


agreements at the moment. But we must take account of the Russian attitude if we want any agreement with them at all. It is no good just talking. The Russian views are based on history and geography. The great fear which they have always had is that the Germans might, by some arrangement of this character, secure an influence over nuclear matter. This is a fact of life which must be faced by those who say that they will come to an agreement with the Russians. The Russians have said that they find it hard to believe that the Germans would be prepared to pay £45 million a year for a weapon over which they could never have any hope of control.
I am perfectly prepared to argue that the Russians are wrong, to argue that this is a military monstrosity and no use to anyone. I can sustain that argument, but the right hon. Gentleman must ponder seriously whether the Russians are more or less likely, in the foreseeable future, to come to an agreement on non-proliferation or non-dissemination if he proceeds much further with the proposals at present before N.A.T.O.
The truth is that when the right hon. Gentleman and his friends talk about non-proliferation and non-dissemination, they are not talking about the world at all. They are talking only about Europe. They are considering whether it is possible to stop proliferation in Europe, and when they talk about Europe they mean not Italy, Norway or France, but Germany.
It is a matter of credit to both sides that no one has risen on either side to try to raise an anti-German case. The hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Donnelly), greatly to his credit, took the lead in this matter yesterday. No one will do it. The Germans have behaved with great statesmanship and great restraint in these matters. They have entered into agreements not to manufacture. They have signed the Test Ban Treaty. In no circumstances have the Germans said, "We intend to make or acquire nuclear weapons". They have not said that.
I must say that I resent and resist the idea that an argument for these proposals can be found in a belief that the Germans wish to break either the spirit or the letter of the agreements they have entered into. I do not believe that is true. I

do not believe that a single responsible German statesman can be found today who would contemplate an action which, after all, would mean that N.A.T.O. would be riven from top to bottom and an end to everything that every post-war German Government has striven for.
What we are entitled, however, to ask the Prime Minister is this: what is his proposal on the M.L.F., the mixed-manned surface fleet? He is the Prime Minister of this country. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] It is right to cheer a Prime Minister, but it is also right to ask him to stand at that Box and give a straight answer to a straight question.
Is the Prime Minister or is he not going to join in a mixed-manned surface fleet? I say this about the attitude of the Prime Minister to the British deterrent: his dilemma is quite simply that he has pledged himself not to enter the M.L.F. —his party is pledged not to do so—while at the same time he has pledged himself to get rid of the British deterrent. But he is increasingly realising that these two pledges are contradictory, because by far the best chance of getting rid of the British deterrent is to get, by some means or other, into the M.L.F.
The purpose of all the Prime Minister's activity has been to get rid of our weapons, to internationalise our bomb and to do it unilaterally. The abandonment of this control is central—and I address this particularly to the Defence Secretary, who has all the military advice and knowledge—to the defence of this country. So long as British control exists there is a certainty in the minds of any enemies that, whatever happens to any alliance, whatever might be the view of any future American President, there is no prize that they could ever win which would compensate them for the damage they would suffer by inflicting an attack upon us.
We could join the M.L.F. We could subscribe our bombers to such a force. But we could still keep control of our weapons. The only relevance of this abandonment of control would be if we were asked by someone else to give these weapons up, and I want to ask the Prime Minister a direct question. Could I have his attention for a moment? I listened to his speech.
Has any foreign Power asked the Prime Minister that this country should


abandon control of these weapons? Has that demand come from either the Germans or the Americans? Have the German Government said to him, "We ask you as part of a deal to give up control of your weapons"? Was such a demand addressed to him by President Johnson? Did President Johnson ask the Prime Minister to abandon the rights under paragraph 9? I do not believe that any foreign Government has asked for this act of abdication. I believe that, if it is done, it will not be done to gain any particular prize or advantage for this country. No one will follow our example. There is no reason advanced by the right hon. Gentleman or his right hon. Friend why we should do it. It will be done for a simple reason. It will be done to secure a particular political decision in order that the right hon. Gentleman can say that in some way or other he has abandoned the deterrent.
I want to say this about the military position. I think that it is generally agreed that the force which the right hon. Gentleman has set up is of no, or very little, military value. All the weapons in it, including our own, will be subject to the American veto. They will never be fired except at the same time as the American deterrent. Indeed, they will be part of it. They will be paid for by British taxpayers. I do not think that ever in human history will such a vast sum have been paid for such a militarily worthless project.

Mr. Healey: If the right hon. Gentleman considers the rôle of these weapons inside N.A.T.O. to be so nugatory, why did he himself make such a thing of assigning them to N.A.T.O. under the Nassau Agreement?

Mr. Thorneycroft: The right hon. Gentleman knows the answer as well as I do—we assigned them with the right to take them out in our own defence. If the Secretary of State has not yet understood that, he has not started to understand what this debate is about.
The Americans know that this A.N.F. which the right hon. Gentleman is setting up is militarily worthless. Whatever the Secretary of State may say, this weapons system, covered with safety catches and fingers and all the other matters which he described, will never be fired. He knows and the Americans know that it can never be fired. I warrant that every target it

covers will be re-covered by the American deterrent. The Americans would never dream of leaving uncovered any target which might be the subject of the veto of any single European country.
The Prime Minister moved on to the rôle outside N.A.T.O. I am glad that he is now having some briefing from the Secretary of State, for he probably needs some briefing on this. He described taking the V-bomber force and cutting it into two. The right hon. Gentleman's main criticism of the deterrent has always been that it was too small—so he gets into power and cuts it into two. What a wonderful solution to a military problem! Anybody could tell him—perhaps the Secretary of State for Defence will tell him—that the whole purpose of the use of V-bombers is their flexibility, their range and their striking power. The right thing to do is to hold them in one force and not allocate irrevocably to any of these purposes, irrevocably to either a nuclear or a conventional rôle.
The Prime Minister should not forget the damage which he may be doing. These V-bombers in their conventional rôle are of crucial importance in South-East Asia at the moment and if he starts tying up large sections of this force and allocating them to one particular postion, he will be doing a great deal of harm.
The policies which the right hon. Gentleman is now pursuing are likely to do considerable damage to the interests of this country. I believe that he is dividing N.A.T.O. tonight, not uniting it. I believe that the steps he is taking will make the proliferation of weapons more likely, not less likely;. I believe that the Government are putting a very considerable obstacle in the way of any chance of signing a non-dissemination pact between East and West.
These are great matters and some simple statement on them from the right hon. Gentleman tonight would be of universal advantage—if he would say what he is to do about the M.L.F., what we are really to do about control of British weapons, what he really has in mind about electronic locks and all the rest of it, and say it in the same language so that it can be understood in Bonn and London, Washington and Moscow, Rome and Paris in identical terms. Let us have for once a moment of truth from the right hon. Gentleman.

9.25 p.m.

The Prime Minister (Mr.Harold Wilson): I think the House enjoyed the speech of the right hon. Member for Monmouth (Mr. Thorneycroft) almost as much as he enjoyed it himself. We all recognise that he is in a competitive situation. Certainly, if vigour and exuberance are the test, he is bidding fair—I am very glad about this—to get into the "top three". I am bound to say that my money is, and always has been, on the Gaullist wing of the party against the Poujadist view of the former President of the Board of Trade. But I am glad to see that the right hon. Gentleman is moving up.
The right hon. Gentleman put a number of questions to me.

Mr. Geoffrey Hirst: Try to give a straight answer.

The Prime Minister: I think that when my right hon. Friend interrupted he said that it is for the Government to answer. I am glad that he takes this view, because I cannot remember a single speech of his from this Box which did not consist three-quarters of questions to the Opposition because he did not have an idea himself to put. One thing was very clear tonight, and that was that whereas the Leader of the Opposition this afternoon made it clear that he supported the M.L.F., the right hon. Gentleman was still against it. Every single argument he used tonight against the Atlantic nuclear force is an argument against the M.L.F., including his argument that the Russians would never negotiate if this came into being.
What is happening, and what has happened today, is that the right hon. Gentleman and his right hon. Friend are still carrying on the same departmental row without departments. There was nothing new whatsoever either in his speech or in that of the Leader of the Opposition. What we have had is the same old speech—we know it so well—[Interruption.] There was quite a lot new in my speech yesterday, and the right hon. Gentleman knows it. But right hon. Members opposite, like the Bourbons of old, have learned nothing and forgotten nothing since the election.
There was one part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech with which I found myself in complete agreement, and that was in the tribute which he paid to the

maiden speeches which we heard yesterday and today—those of my hon. Friends the Members for Brighouse and Spenborough (Mr. Jackson) and Preston, South (Mr. Peter Mahon), the hon. Members for Westbury (Mr. Walters) and Dorking (Sir G. Sinclair) yesterday; and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Stepney (Mr. Shore) and of the hon. and learned Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve) and Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison) today.
The right hon. Gentleman made a bit of a point in his speech about an alleged contradiction between the Foreign Secretary and myself. Let us get the facts clear. I said in a television answer on Sunday that I had not—[Interruption.] The Leader of the Opposition quoted from a television transcript. He had it with him, and I will reply to what he said. I said in this answer that I had not in Washington discussed with the President or anyone else renegotiation of the Nassau Agreement. This was true. We were concerned with future policy, not with past White Papers or past agreements. As to what the policy was, I went on to say on television—the right hon. Gentleman can check this from his transcript—that I was not going further in that interview specifically because I was saving my answer to that question for my statement in the House yesterday. The statement which I made in the House yesterday and what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said were exactly the same as far as this is concerned.
The right hon. Gentleman has just referred again to control mechanisms, which was dealt with at great length by the hon. Member for Lancaster (Mr. Berkeley). This question—permissive links, and the rest—was dealt with by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence this afternoon. The right hon. Gentleman will understand that I cannot go into further detail about this, because he knows perfectly well that if I did—this, I think, is why he did not press it very much—I should have to give publicly information about missile components, about existing control mechanisms and about possible developments of them which I should be utterly wrong to give in public. I shall not, however, take refuge behind this necessary secrecy.
I suggested yesterday that we were prepared, on an agreed basis, to have


joint talks on the changing realities of defence to keep right hon. Gentlemen opposite in the picture. If they accept our proposal, which, I believe, is in the national interest, I should certainly be more than happy to explain in the kind of detail which would be required details of a kind which the right hon. Gentleman knows cannot be discussed in the House. I should be perfectly prepared to discuss with him or the Leader of the Opposition the precise points about the permissive links, the mechanism, and so on, in a degree of detail which would satisfy him.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman, because I forgot yesterday to answer this point about talks with the right hon. Gentleman. He knows the traditional difficulties about the Opposition consulting the Government. We are divided by some fairly fundamental views on defence at the moment and I do not know that we can make much progress. but I am always ready to talk with him and hear his ideas. We know something about locks and devices put on submarines. What we want to know plainly from the Prime Minister is that no lock will be put on which cannot be taken off.

The Prime Minister: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman. Certainly, we will have the talks which he suggests. He also knows enough about locks to know that the kind of question which he has raised can be discussed in private. We shall be happy to do it. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] The question was answered clearly by my right hon. Friend this afternoon.

Mr. Thorneycroft: There is nothing either technical or secret about this question. It is quite simple. Will an electronic lock be put upon these missiles, and under whose control will it be?

The Prime Minister: If the right hon. Gentleman believes that there is nothing technical about this, he has forgotten a great deal that he knew two months ago. [Interruption.] All right. I will agree to meet the right hon. Gentleman; I will give him these details. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] The right hon. Gentleman is not getting me tonight to give details in the House that he would never give.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: We are not asking, and we would not ask, the right hon. Gentleman to give away any secrets.

Mr. E. Shinwell: That is what the right hon. Gentleman is asking. He has no right to ask it.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I am not asking the right hon. Gentleman to give away secrets of any kind. What we want to know is whether any lock will be put on the submarines for the duration of the alliance.

The Prime Minister: My right hon. Friend has explained already this afternoon—[HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."]—that there will not be any system of locks which interferes with our right of communication with a submarine or our right to withdraw the submarine. [Interruption.] That is the answer that the right hon. Gentleman is getting. If he wants the details, the right hon. Gentleman is getting to a very high degree of irresponsibility, because he knows—[Interruption.]He is not the only one.
I should like now—[Interruption.] If some of those hon. Members opposite suffering from a state of postprandial euphoria will recognise that we are tonight debating a very serious issue about defence and if they do not want to listen and cannot take it, there is plenty of room in the Smoke Room for them.
I am now going to turn to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman this afternoon.—[HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] There is one point about which I was not clear. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to say that the new arrangement for an allied nuclear force would not be credible, he said, because of the American veto. I may have misunderstood him and I do not want to misrepresent him, but I think that in a previous debate, on 23rd November, he said it was absolutely vital that this should be continued. Today I thought I heard him say—it was a little difficult—that if the multilateral force were created it would be free to loose off missiles without the American veto. If I misunderstood him I am very ready to give way.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The right hon. Gentleman has not only misunderstood me but has misunderstood me in so


important a matter that he must allow me to say, because I have always said it and have never deviated from it, that of course the Americans must have a veto in a force like this. It is quite clear. If other, if European, countries have a veto, the Americans must have it, too. But it does not make the force credible if there are nine fingers on the safety catch. That was the point I was making.

The Prime Minister: I am very glad that the right hon. Gentleman stuck to the point he has held on the American veto. I am very glad he did, but the result of his argument, of course, is really that if we keep the American veto and our veto—I am sure that he insists on that equally—any multilateral force, A.N.F., or anything else, is not really meaningful for the countries of which he was speaking. I think that that is certainly the view of the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down. All right. We are making progress.
I want to turn now to the speeches of both right hon. Gentlemen about our influence in the world. After all, the vote tonight is really going to be about the one issue, their complaint, as they put it, that we are giving up the independent deterrent. I want to look at that. And first on the point about our influence in the world.
They say that it depends on our having independent nuclear power. On this argument, that if one is to have any influence in the world one must have independent nuclear power, how can one then prevent Germany, Italy, Sweden, Canada, Japan, India, Egypt, Israel from insisting on becoming nuclear Powers? Every one of them could—many within not years but within months could—become a nuclear Power. If hon. Gentlemen opposite have given up any hope of stopping proliferation, this is really a very gloomy situation for us to be facing. We have not. I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman specifically whether he himself would advise India to become a nuclear Power in the light of the Chinese threat. And if India does, what about Pakistan? That is an attitude of direct incitement to proliferation.
Secondly, he talks about an independent foreign policy. I am going to leave on one side, tonight at any rate, the question of how far one can have in-

dependence except on the basis of a strong economy on which one can be seen to be paying one's way. I want to come to this point that our influence depends—[Interruption.] The right hon. Gentleman is perfectly well aware of the figures of trade throughout this year—and the hon. Gentleman was jolly lucky to get in a couple of months ago, too. In fact our influence depends, of course, partly on economic strength, which the right hon. Gentleman referred to this afternoon, but partly on whether we have any ideas to contribute in some of the international conferences. The reason why we are playing a rôle, and a key rôle, is because we have shown our willingness and ability to break the deadlock which has overlain the world community and the alliance for many years. The right hon. Gentleman thinks this so-called independent deterrent is a necessary ticket to all important international discussions. It does not matter about ideas. A bore with a bomb can get to the top tables and other places when no one without the so-called independent bomb has any hope of entering.
What are these negotiations about which the right hon. Gentleman is talking? Where are all these tables? Let us look at them. Our right in the matter of Berlin, Germany, and central problems of Europe derives from one plain fact. Not the bomb, but the fact that we won the war. We are there as of right, first as an occupying, and now as a protecting Power. This has nothing to do with bombs and, indeed, in this respect nothing to do with N.A.T.O.
The 1955 Summit was partly over Berlin, and partly over Indo-China. We held our position then, and we hold it now, as co-chairman of the post-1954 conference. We are there because we are co-chairman. Nothing to do with the bomb. The 1960 Summit, if it had happened, was related, or would have been, to Berlin and the wider questions of Germany, and indeed these talks with the Russians were made possible because of the encouragement which Mr. Macmillan had given on his Moscow visit to certain proposals for relaxation in Europe. Again, nothing to do with the bomb. Because of his visit to Europe, and because he raised certain hopes, these talks were to take place. Unfortunately they were dashed when he came back, and his ideas


were vetoed by Dr. Adenauer and others.
I turn from that to the Geneva Disarmament Conference and the Committee of Eighteen. We are not there because of the bomb. A leading part is played by Sweden and India, who are non-nuclear Powers, and the same is true of debates on disarmament in the United Nations. It is true that sometimes a smaller group can go into a back room from these Geneva talks. That has happened this year, but every vital discussion in 1964, when it has taken place in a back room, has taken place on a bilateral basis between the United States and the Soviet Union and we have not been there. We have not been there, and I thought that we had a ticket to the back room.
Tickets to N.A.T.O. CENTO and S.E.A.T.O. do not require a nuclear bomb. Our central position in the Commonwealth, which I feel right hon. Gentlemen opposite never properly developed, certainly owes nothing to claims of independent nuclear status. It depends far more on our policy on issues like South African arms, and questions of race and colour, and the same is true about our influence in the United Nations. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about the Test Ban Treaty?"] I shall come to that, because I know something about it. Unlike right hon. and hon. Members opposite, I was in Moscow, and I know a bit about it.
I have always paid tribute to Harold Macmillan for his initiative in this matter, which I believe was endorsed by President Kennedy. I believe that Mr. Macmillan played a crucial part within the Western Alliance in creating the position in which the West was prepared to go to the conference table. I have said that before, and I say it again. The Leader of the Opposition signed the Treaty, but he did not negotiate it. When those talks were planned, the West had no other idea apart from getting agreement on a comprehensive ban, including underground tests, which we all wanted, and this, we are all agreed, was possible only if the Soviet Union would agree to permit a certain number of effective inspections. There had been talks about whether it should be seven or three or whatever it was. There had been misunderstandings between the United Sates and Soviet negotiators at a lower level.
When did the then Government first learn that the Russians were not prepared to accept any inspections? The right hon. Gentleman can check what I am saying. He can look at the telegrams again. They had no intimation of this before 11th June, 1963. On that date Mr. Khrushchev for the first time said that there was to be no inspection, and that was reported to the right hon. Gentleman from Moscow. Mr. Khrushchev further said that he was not prepared to contemplate the idea of a partial test ban which had been talked about for years, and which had been the subject of a vital resolution by the American Senate—the Humphrey-Dodd resolution.
Yet, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, by the end of that week Mr. Khrushchev was prepared to talk. I know that there will be titters from his hon. Friends, but I am prepared to challenge the right hon. Gentleman as to the basis of these telegrams. Mr. Khrushchev said on the Monday to my right hon. Friend and myself that he was not prepared to have inspections, that he was not prepared to have a partial test ban, yet by the end of the week he told us, without a Tory being in the room, that he was prepared to reopen his mind on this question. [Interruption.] I am prepared to submit the telegrams to the right hon. Gentleman's inspection.

Sir A. Douglas-Home: Apparently we must accept that he has done everything in this field and that all the disarmament achievements are his.

The Prime Minister: No—I am just querying the right hon. Gentleman's spurious claim to a monopoly in these matters.
I come now to the main argument on which we shall be voting tonight. I hope that I have dismissed this tomfoolery about the right to a ticket to the top table. I come to the point of the whole argument of the right hon. Gentleman today—the argument that we heard so often in the election and before the election; this tedious repetition every time he made a speech. His argument is—and he said it again today—that we have and always will have an independent deterrent, and that we must not give it up. That was the basis of the


right hon. Gentleman's speech just now. Let us look at it.
The V-bombers? Yes, certainly, but they are getting a bit long in the tooth for an independent rôle in the kind of war that hon. Members opposite have been talking about, with the Soviet Union. I do not think they will disagree with that. I mentioned yesterday that the Americans no longer regard their equivalent of the V-bomber even the most sophisticated American bomber—as having an independent strategic rôle. Their bombers are intended to go in after the missiles have done their deadly work. The position of the bombers was stated quite clearly by Mr. McNamara in his testimony to Congress last year. That has never been queried.
All our bombers are due to be phased out by 1968. My authority for that? The right hon. Gentleman himself, speaking from this Box, on 17th March. On that occasion my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker) raised the question of President Johnson's proposal for a missile freeze and asked about Polaris. The right hon. Gentleman said that he had had assurances that President Johnson's proposed freeze did not cover the Polaris submarines. He said that it did not apply anyway, because there would be no addition to our nuclear striking power because, he said—and I quote—
before the missiles and the Polaris submarines come in. the bombers will have fallen out."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th March, 1964; Vol. 691, c. 1180.]
That was his phrase, and since the Polaris submarines are due to come in in 1968, the right hon. Gentleman, by that statement, was setting a final date for the end of our only British strategic weapon. It is the only genuinely British strategic weapon we have, or are likely to have, and he had set the date for the end of it. It is too late for him to get out of that now. He said it, and he did not contradict it.
He has always argued that after 1968 we shall have Polaris supplied on terms which require us to contribute it to N.A.T.O., or to a multilateral force under N.A.T.O., but with the right, under Clause 9, of withdrawing it at a time of supreme national emergency. It is on this withdrawal right that the whole Con-

servative election argument and all the right hon. Gentleman's speeches, were based. It is on this that they have said, time and again, that any other policy would mean surrendering our foreign policy and the defences of this country to the Americans. The right hon. Gentleman said that in all his election broadcasts.
The argument that I could never follow is why, if we assume that the Americans may default on their most solemn obligations to N.A.T.O., they would in all circumstances carry out their obligations to supply Polaris. My view is that the Americans will honour all their obligations, both to N.A.T.O. and to us, in respect of Polaris. I am surprised that the right hon. Gentleman is so selective about what the Americans will do. I suppose that right hon. Gentlemen would agree that from now to 1968 there is a certain risk about this; that we are not completely independent, and that we do not have an independent deterrent until the missiles arrive in 1968. Then, to judge from the mood of some of the right hon. Gentleman's election speeches—I believe that there was one in Dover—from then on, the grateful Tories, having accepted Polaris submarine missiles, could thumb their noses at America and proclaim our final declaration of independence. That was the sort of argument we had from him. But I wonder whether we are really sure about it. The right hon. Gentleman's argument about surrendering our freedom means, presumably, that we shall have to depend on the American nuclear umbrella. There may come a time when we lose our independence because the Americans are pressing us to do something which we do not want to do, but we have to accept because we depend on their nuclear umbrella. This is the argument which we have always heard from him.
Suppose that we have to depend on the Americans for assistance and supplies which go outside the contracts signed in respect of the Polaris, and suppose that we are dependent on them for our deterrent, and there comes this state of disagreement with the Americans which the right hon. Gentleman imagines. Suppose, further, that the Americans were to say—I am taking this on the same somewhat unlikely hypothesis which the right hon. Gentleman assumes about the Americans—"We will fully honour the


contracts signed. We will supply everything that we undertook to supply for Polaris", but we find, in this hypothetical row with the Americans when our independence is in question, that, because of some technical deficiencies, we need something beyond the contracts, some important component or material. Will there not be a danger, on the Opposition's argument, that, even though the Americans fulfilled and stuck to the letter of the contracts which they had signed, they might feel free to withhold some essential component or material not covered in the contracts? Is there not a danger there?
The question is not hypothetical. I should like the Leader of the Opposition to tell the House whether he is now satisfied that Britain can, from its own resources, without long delays wrecking the whole programme, supply every essential component for the Polaris programme without dependence on the Americans.

Hon. Members: Answer.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer our question?

The Prime Minister: I shall answer the question about Polaris and whether it is as independent as the right hon. Gentleman suggests. I can tell him now—I am surprised that he does not know; perhaps he was too busy making speeches instead of getting the facts—what the answer is to the question which I have just put to him. I can give chapter and verse to both the right hon. Gentleman and his right hon. Friend about fundamental components which it was intended that we should manufacture but which were not covered in the contracts and for which we now have had to turn to the Americans for help.
What about the position after 1968? Why did not the right hon. Gentleman come clean about the warhead when he was at the Box? Is it a British warhead? Yes, it is. It has been possible to redesign the warhead to fit the missile. But has it been tested? It cannot be under the Test Ban Agreement. So the whole of the independent deterrent, the whole security and future of Britain, of which right hon. and hon. Members opposite have talked so much, is depen-

dent on tests carried out by the Americans or dependent on an untested missile.

Mr. Thorneycroft: The Prime Minister has called in aid the argument of secrecy, purporting to describe a series of alleged deficiencies in this missile and our components. From my knowledge, his information to the House is false.

The Prime Minister: I now tell the right hon. Gentleman, as to the secrecy on the other point and on this, that he is free to come and to examine the information which we have. In respect of the warheads, I will ask the Leader of the Opposition—he is the one who makes all the speeches—one or two questions. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] The House needs to have this information. I know that it does not want to hear it, but it is going to get it. If hon. Members stop me saying it tonight we shall say it next week. They are going to get it sooner or later.
The question which I am asking is—

Mr. Hirst: Answer the questions.

The Prime Minister: This is what hon Members are all about to vote on. I want them to know what they are voting about.
The question is whether after 1968 we shall be in a position to supply all the fissile materials required to maintain the effectiveness of our warheads having regard to the half-life of these materials and so on. The Leader of the Opposition knows what I am talking about. I will not specify these materials. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I am prepared to give them to the right hon. Gentleman. I will give him their numbers in the atomic table. I will tell him anything that he wants to know.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Is not the Prime Minister going to buy these "rotten" submarines and put them into his force as a credible deterrent?

The Prime Minister: What I am saying to the Leader of the Opposition is that this programme would work only on an inter-dependent basis and not on an independent basis. He is not going to wriggle out of this one. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] The fact is that there is no independent deterrent because we are dependent on the Americans for the


fissile material for the British warheads. That is what I am telling him. This is true and he knows it.
Finally, we want to know what sort of war they were going to have the deterrent for. Obviously not some nuclear Suez. We acquit them of that. Obviously not as a contribution to a trigger mechanism to bring the American bomb into action when the American Government did not want to do it. The argument which we have had is that one day we may get some lunatic American President who, when the crunch came was prepared to retire to Fortress America and to leave Europe to its fate. We have now answered that point, because we have made it clear that this is committed to N.A.T.O. as long as the alliance lasts. So I put to the Leader of the Opposition—what are they voting about tonight? It is not a nuclear Suez. It is not the trigger for the American strategic deterrent.

We are left with one possibility—that the Leader of the Opposition is talking about embarking on a go-it-alone war with the Soviet Union when the rest of the alliance does not wish to do so. Is that it? Our credibility depends on this—it depends on the credibility of the Government. I want the Leader of the Opposition to tell us, as a former Prime Minister, as the head of the alternative Government, knowing that a go-it-alone war would mean a certain amount of posthumous revenge against the Soviet Union and total annihilation of all human life in Britain, whether he would be prepared to press that button in that kind of war. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer the question."] If he is not prepared to answer that question—[HON. MEMBERS: "Answer, answer."]— Hon. Members cannot take it—this has proved that their argument is a charade.

Question put, That this House do now adjourn:—

The House divided: Ayes, 291, Noes 311.

Division No. 43.]
AYES
[10.0 p.m.


Agnew, Commander Sir Peter
Campbell, Gordon
Farr, John


Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)
Carlisle, Mark
Fell, Anthony


Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)
Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert
Fisher, Nigel


Allason, James
Cary, Sir Robert
Fletcher-Cooke, Charles (Darwen)


Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian
Channon, H. P. G.
Fletcher-Cooke, Sir John (S'pton)


Anstruther-Gray, Rt. Hn. Sir W.
Chataway, Christopher
Forrest, George


Astor, John
Chichester-Clark, R.
Foster, Sir John


Atkins, Humphrey
Clark, Henry (Antrim, N.)
Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford &amp; Stone)


Awdry, Daniel
Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)
Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)


Baker, W. H. K.
Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)
Galbraith, Hn. T. G. D.


Balniel, Lord
Cole, Norman
Gammans, Lady


Barlow, Sir John
Cooke, Robert
Gardner, Edward


Batsford, Brian
Cooper, A. E.
Gibson-Watt, David


Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton
Cooper-Key, Sir Neill
Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, Central)


Bell, Ronald
Cordle, John
Gilmour, Sir John (East Fife)


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)
Corfield, F. V.
Glover, Sir Douglas


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos &amp; Fhm)
Costain, A. P.
Glyn, Sir Richard


Berkeley, Humphry
Courtney, Cdr. Anthony
Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.


Berry, Hn. Anthony
Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)
Goodhart, Philip


Biffen, John
Crawley, Aidan
Goodhew, Victor


Biggs-Davison, John
Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. Sir Oliver
Gower, Raymond


Bingham, R. M.
Crowder, F. P.
Grant, Anthony


Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel
Cunningham, Sir Knox
Grant-Ferris, R.


Black, Sir Cyril
Curran, Charles
Gresham -Cooke, R.


Blaker, Peter
Currie, G. B. H.
Gr[...]eve, Percy


Bossom, Hn. Clive
Dalkeith, Earl of
Griffiths Eldon (Bury St. Edmund.)


Box, Donald
Dance, James
Griffiths, Peter (Smethwick)


Boyle Rt. Hn. Sir Edward
Davies, Dr. Wyndham (Perry Barr)
Gurden, Harold


Braine, Bernard
d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Hall, John (Wycombe)


Brewis, John
Dean, Paul
Hall-Davis, A. G. F.


Brinton, Sir Tatton
Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.
Hamilton, Marquess of (Fermanagh)


Bromley-Davenport, Lt. -Col. Sir Walter
Digby, Simon Wingfield
Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)


Brooke, Rt. Hn. Henry
Dodds-Parker, Douglas
Harris, Reader (Heston)


Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Doughty, Charles
Harrison, Brian (Maldon)


Bruce-Gardyne, J.
Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)


Bryan, Paul
Drayson, G. B.
Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Maccles'd)


Buchanan-Smith, Alick
du Cann Rt. Hn. Edward
Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)


Buck, Antony
Eden, Sir John
Harvie Anderson, Miss


Bullus, Sir Eric
Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Hastings, Stephen


Burden, F. A.
Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Hawkins, Paul


Butcher, Sir Herbert
Emery, Peter
Hay, John


Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden)
Errington, Sir Eric
Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel




Heath, Rt. Hn. Edward
Mathew, Robert
Sandys, Rt. Hn. D.


Hendry, Forbes
Maude, Angus
Scott-Hopkins, James


Higgins, Terence L.
Maudling, Rt. Hn. Reginald
Sharples, Richard


Hiley, Joseph
Mawby, Ray
Shepherd, William


Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)
Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.
Sinclair, Sir George


Hirst, Geoffrey
Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.
Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd &amp; Chiswick)


Hobson, Rt. Hn. Sir John
Meyer, Sir Anthony
Smyth, Rt. Hn. Brig. Sir John


Hogg, Rt. Hn. Quintin
Mills, Peter (Torrington)
Soames, Rt. Hn. Christopher


Hopkins, Alan
Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)
Spearman, Sir Alexander


Hordern, Peter
Miscampbell, Norman
Speir, Sir Rupert


Hornby, Richard
Mitchell, David
Stainton, Keith


Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame P.
Monro, Hector
Stanley, Hn. Richard


Howard, Hn. G. R. (St. Ives)
More Jasper
Stodart, J. A.


Howe, Geoffrey (Bebington)
Morgan, W. G.
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm


Hunt, John (Bromley)
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Summers Sir Spencer


Hutchison, Michael Clark
Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles
Talbot, John E.


Iremonger, T. L.
Murton, Oscar
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)


Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Neave, Airey
Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)


Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)
Nicholls, Sir Harmar
Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)


Jennings, J. C.
Nicholson, Sir Godfrey
Temple, John M.


Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)
Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret


Jopling, Michael
Nugent, Rt. Hn. Sir Richard
Thomas, Sir Leslie (Canterbury)


Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith
Onslow, Cranley
Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Conway)


Kaberry, Sir Donald
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Thorneycroft, Rt. Hn. Peter


Kerby, Capt. Henry
Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian
Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)


Kerr, Sir Hamilton (Cambridge)
Osborn, John (Hallam)
Tilney, John (Wavertree)


Kershaw, Anthony
Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)
Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.


Kilfedder, James A.
Page, John (Harrow, W.)
Tweedsmuir, Lady


Kimball, Marcus
Page, R. Graham (Crosby)
van Straubenzee, W. R.


King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)
Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John


Kitson, Timothy
Peel, John
Vickers, Dame Joan


Lagden, Godfrey
Percival, Ian
Walder, David (High Peak)


Lambton, Viscount
Peyton, John
Walker, Peter (Worcester)


Lancaster, Col. C. G.
Pickthorn, Rt. Hn. Sir Kenneth
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek


Langford-Holt, Sir John
Pike, Miss Mervyn
Wall, Patrick


Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Pitt, Dame Edith
Walters, Dennis


Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Pounder, Rafton
Ward, Dame Irene


Litchfield, Capt. John
Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch
Weatherill, Bernard


Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'nC'dfield)
Price, David (Eastleigh)
Webster, David


Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)
Prior, J. M. L.
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Selwyn (Wirral)
Pym, Francis
Whitelaw, William


Longbottom, Charles
Quennell, Miss J. M.
Williams, Sir Rolf Dudley (Exeter)


Longden, Gilbert
Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James
Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)


Loveys, Walter H.
Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Lucas, Sir Jocelyn
Redmayne, Rt. Hn. Sir Martin
Wise, A. R.


Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Rees-Davies, W. R.
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick


McAdden, Sir Stephen
Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David
Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard


Maclean, Sir Fitzroy
Ridley Hn. Nicholas
Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher


Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain
Ridsdale, Julian
Woodnutt, Mark


McMaster, Stanley
Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)
Wylie, N. R.


McNair-Wilson, Patrick
Robson Brown, Sir William
Yates, William (The Wrekin)


Maginnis, John E.
Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)
Younger, Hn. George


Maitland, Sir John
Roots, William



Marlowe, Anthony
Royle, Anthony
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Marples, Rt. Hn. Ernest
Russell, Sir Ronald
Mr. MacArthur and Mr. McLaren.


Marten, Neil
St. John-Stevas, Norman





NOES


Abse, Leo
Bowden, Rt. Hn. H. W. (Leics S. W.)
Cullen, Mrs. Alice


Albu, Austen
Boyden, James
Dalyell, Tam


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Braddock, Mrs. E. M.
Darling, George


Alldritt, W. H.
Bradley, Tom
Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)


Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)
Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Davies, Harold (Leek)


Armstrong, Ernest
Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Davies, Ifor (Gower)


Atkinson, Norman
Brown, Hugh D. (Glasgow, Provan)
Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)


Bacon, Miss Alice
Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch &amp; Fbury)
de Freitas, Sir Geoffrey


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Buchan, Norman (Renfrewshire, W.)
Delargy, Hugh


Barnett, Joel
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)
Dell, Edmund


Baxter, William
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Dempsey, James


Beaney, Alan
Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Diamond, John


Bellenger, Rt. Hn. F. J.
Carmichael, Neil
Dodds, Norman


Bence, Cyril
Carter-Jones, Lewis
Doig, Peter


Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood
Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara
Donnelly, Desmond


Bennett, J. (Glasgow, Bridgeton)
Chapman, Donald
Driberg, Tom


Bessell, Peter
Coleman, Donald
Duffy, Dr. A. E. P.


Binns, John
Conlan, Bernard
Dunnett, Jack


Bishop, E. S.
Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Edelman, Maurice


Blackburn, F.
Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Edward, Rt. Hn. Ness (Caerphilly)


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Crawshaw, Richard
Edwards, Robert (Bilston)


Boardman, H.
Cronin, John
English, Michael


Boston, T. G.
Crosland, Anthony
Ennals, David


Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur
Crossman, Rt. Hn. R. H. S.
Ensor, David







Evans, Albert (Islington, S. W.)
Leadbitter, Ted
Reynolds, G. W.


Evans, Ioan (Birmingham, Yardley)
Ledger, Ron
Rhodes, Geoffrey


Fernyhough, E.
Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)
Richard, Ivor


Finch, Harold (Bedwellty)
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Fitch, Alan (Wigan)
Lever, Harold (Cheetham)
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)


Fletcher, Sir Eric (Islington, E.)
Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)
Robertson, John (Paisley)


Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)
Robinson, Rt. Hn. K. (St. Pancras, N.)


Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Rodgers, William (Stockton)


Floud, Bernard
Lipton, Marcus
Rose, Paul B.


Foley, Maurice
Lomas, Kenneth
Ross, Rt. Hn. William


Foot, Sir Dingle (Ipswich)
Loughlin, Charles
Rowland, Christopher


Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)
Lubbock, Eric
Sheldon, Robert


Ford, Ben
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Shinwell, Rt. Hn. E.


Fraser, Rt. Hn. Tom (Hamilton)
McBride, Neil
Shore, Peter (Stepney)


Freeson, Reginald
McCann, J.
Short, Rt. Hn. E. (N' c' tle-on-Tyne, C.)


Galpern, Sir Myer
MacColl, James
Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)


Garrett, W. E.
MacDermot, Niall
Silkin, John (Deptford)


Carrow, A.
McCuire, Michael
Silkin, S. C. (Camberwell, Dulwich)


George, Lady Megan Lloyd
McInnes, James
Silverman, Julius (Aston)


Ginsburg, David
McKay, Mrs. Margaret
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)


Gourlay, Harry
Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross &amp; Crom'ty)
Skeffington, Arthur


Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony
MacKenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)
Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke N.)


Gregory, Arnold
Mackie, John (Enfield, E.)
Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield)


Grey, Charles
McLeavy, Frank
Small, William


Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
MacMillan, Malcolm
Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)


Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)
MacPherson, Malcolm
Snow Julian


Griffiths, Will (M'chester Exchange)
Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)
Solomons, Henry


Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.
Mahon, Simon (Bootle)
Soskice, Rt. Hn. Sir Frank


Gunter, Rt. Hn. R. J.
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Spriggs, Leslie


Hale, Leslie
Manuel, Archie
Steele, Thomas


Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Mapp, Charles
Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael


Hamilton, William (West Fife)
Marsh, Richard
Stonehouse, John


Hamling, William (Woolwich, W.)
Mason, Roy
Stones, William


Hannan, William
Maxwell, Robert
Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Vauxhall)


Harper, Joseph
Mayhew, Christopher
Stross, Sir Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)


Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Mellish, Robert
Summerskill, Dr. Shirley


Hart, Mrs. Judith
Mendelson, J. J.
Swain, Thomas


Hattersley, Ray
Mikardo,Ian
Swingler, Stephen


Hayman, F. H.
Millan, Bruce
Symonds, J. B.


Hazell, Bert
Miller, Dr. M. S.
Taverne, Dick


Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis
Milne, Edward (Blyth)
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)


Heffer, Eric S.
Molloy, William
Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)


Henderson, Rt. Hn. Arthur
Monslow, Walter
Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)


Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret
Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)
Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)


Hill, J. (Midlothian)
Morris, Charles (Openshaw)
Thornton, Ernest


Hobden, Dennis (Brighton, K'town)
Morris, John (Aberavon)
Thorpe, Jeremy


Holman, Percy
Murray, Albert
Tinn, James


Hooson, H. E.
Neal, Harold
Tomney, Frank


Horner, John
Newens, Stan
Tuck, Raphael


Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)
Urwin, T. W.


Howarth, Harry (Wellingborough)
Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)
Varley, Eric G.


Howarth, Robert L. (Bolton, E.)
Norwood, Christopher
Wainwright, Edwin


Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Oakes, Gordon
Walden, Brian (All Saints)


Howie, W.
Ogden, Eric
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Hoy, James
O'Malley, Brian
Wallace, George


Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)
Oram, Albert E. (E. Ham S.)
Warbey, William


Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Orbach, Maurice
Watkins, Tudor


Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Orme, Stanley
Weitzman, David


Hunter, Adam (Dunfermline)
Oswald, Thomas
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Hunter, A. E. (Feltham)
Owen, Will
White, Mrs. Eirene


Hynd, H. (Accrington)
Padley, Walter
Whitlock, William


Hynd, John (Attercliffe)
Page, Derek (King's Lynn)
Wigg, Rt. Hn. George


Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)
Paget, R. T.
Wilkins, W. A.


Jackson, Colin
Palmer, Arthur
Willey Rt. Hn. Frederick


Janner, Sir Barnett
Pannell Rt. Hn. Charles
Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)


Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Pargiter, G. A.
Williams, LI. (Abertillery)


Jeger, George (Goole)
Park, Trevor (Derbyshire, S. E.)
Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)


Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n &amp; St. P'cras, S.)
Parkin, B. T.
Williams, W. T. (Warrington)


Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Pavitt, Laurence
Willis, George (Edinburgh, E.)


Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)
Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)
Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)


Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)
Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


Johnston, Russell (Inverness)
Pentland, Norman
Winterbottom, R. E.


Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Perry, Ernest G.
Woodburn, Rt. Hn. A.


Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)
Popplewell, Ernest
Woof, Robert


Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)
Prentice, R. E.
Wyatt, Woodrow


Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)
Probert, Arthur
Yates, Victor (Ladywood)


Kelley, Richard
Pursey, Cmdr. Harry
Zilliacus, K.


Kenyon, Clifford
Randall, Harry



Kerr, Mrs. Anne (R'ter &amp; Chatham)
Rankin, John
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central)
Redhead, Edward
Mr. Sydney Irving and


Lawson, George
Rees, Merlyn
Mr. George Rogers.

DOUBLE TAXATION RELIEF (SOUTHERN RHODESIA)

Resolved,
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that the Double Taxation Relief (Taxes on Income) (Southern Rhodesia) Order 1964 be made in the form of the draft laid before this House on 27th November.—[Mr. MacDermot.]

To be presented by Privy Councillors or Members of Her Majesty's Household.

DOUBLE TAXATION RELIEF (SWEDEN)

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that, on the ratification by the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden of the Conventions set out in the Schedule to the Order entitled the Double Taxation Relief (Estate Duty) (Sweden) Order 1964, a draft of which was laid before this House on 27th November, an Order may be made in the form of that draft.—[Mr. MacDermot.]

10.14 p.m.

Mr. William Clark: I do not think we should let this Order pass without asking the Government for an explanation of it. I am sure the Financial Secretary regrets as much as we do that the Rhodesian Order went through without debate, but, in courtesy to the House, the hon. And learned Gentleman should say something about this Order.
The previous Order, dealing with Rhodesia, was prepared by the last Government, and in that sense, of course, it appeals to us on this side. But this Order has been prepared under the present Government. Why have the Government thought it right to introduce an Order which only affects Sweden? Is it because of their feeling that Sweden is the sort of Socialist paradise which they continually tell us about?
I remind the House that our Estate Duty is very much higher than similar duty in Sweden. Our taxation is very much higher. In Sweden, the maximum in Income Tax is 65 per cent. compared with over 90 per cent. here. In the Chancellor of the Exchequer's statement on 8th December, in a reference to a capital gains tax—which has some connection, I am sure the House will agree, with Estate Duty—the right hon. Gentleman stated:
For the purpose of the tax, realisation will include disposal, long lease, exchange, for-

feiture and the transfer of ownership by gift or on death.
Presumably that statement must be read in conjunction with this Order. What I cannot understand is why there is a certain amount of discrimination in the Order, since the White Paper also said:
…any capital gains tax paid will be deductible from the amount of the estate for estate duty purposes…gains realised by non-residents from portfolio investments in the United Kingdom will be exempt."[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th December, 1964; Vol. 703, c. 166–7.]
Why is there this discrimination in favour of non-residents? I understand that this is the first measure of this type to be brought forward by the Government. Why, therefore, is this discrimination made in favour of Swedish nationals or people resident in Sweden? Does Sweden give us some preferential treatment?
I understand that, in Sweden, there is also a wealth or gift tax, whatever one likes to call it. Do we get the same facilities and the same alleviation of duty which we are to give the Swedes, according to the Chancellor's statement?
I would probably be out of order in speaking about the order relating to Rhodesia, which we have just approved, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, but I regret the speed with which Mr. Speaker put the Question on that Order. We are apparently to have a new form of taxation—a corporation tax—and it will particularly apply to Rhodesia because, if one gets a double taxation relief, then such relief is only of advantage to people living here provided the rate of overseas tax is 7s. or less. If the corporation tax is to be 35 per cent., presumably anyone with investments overseas who pays a rate in excess of 7s. in the £ will lose the difference between what he pays and the 7s.
When the next Budget comes along, shall we have to renegotiate these various double taxation agreements? If so, then it is a little precipitate of the Government to introduce both the Swedish and the Rhodesian Orders in such a hurry. Article 11(3) of the Swedish Order says that the Order will come into operation as soon as the Convention is signed by both parties, presumably the Swedish and British Governments. Can the Financial Secretary say when it is expected that the agreement will be ratified by both parties? Both Orders, but in particular the Swedish—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Dr. Horace King): The hon. Gentleman has several times referred to the Order which the House has already passed. It is not in order for him to discuss it now and it was not in order for him to criticise my predecessor in the Chair for having put the Order to the House too speedily. If the hon. Gentleman neglected to take the opportunity afforded to him by Mr. Speaker to discuss that Order, that is his own misfortune

Mr. Clark: You know, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, as we all know, how extremely difficult it is to get up a corridor which is very crowded. I endeavoured to get here in time, but I was not successful. It was not a matter of being slow but of being frustrated, as we on this side of the House and the rest of the country have been frustrated by the Government ever since they came to office

Sir Harmer Nicholls: On a point of order. Could not the previous Order be used for the purposes of comparison? It has now been accepted by the House, but could it not be used as a basis of comparison with the Order which we are now discussing?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I do not think that the hon. Member for Nottingham, South (Mr. William Clark) is attempting to do that

Mr. Clark: Perhaps I shall be able to do so later.
Speaking purely on the Swedish Order, it is fair to say that the whole of our tax system at the moment, Income Tax, corporation tax, Estate Duty, capital gains tax—and I think that the Financial Secretary will agree that Estate Duty and capital gains tax are fairly well bound up together, in view of the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 8th December—is in such a state of flux that nobody knows what the eventual result will be. It is all very well for the Financial Secretary to smile but I can assure him from my personal knowledge and from that of several of my hon. Friends that his hilarity is not shared by those who pay attention to these matters.
I am sure, and, if he were frank, the Financial Secretary would agree, that many people are extremely uncertain about the future tax position in this country. This Order, presumably like

the Rhodesian one with which I am comparing it, is only provisional. The Rhodesian Order was drawn up by the last Administration and in that sense appeals to us. The Swedish Order is new. What the Government must realise is that their next Budget must bring into question all our agreements of this kind, whether with Sweden, Rhodesia, Canada, or any other country.
The reason is simply that many of our double taxation agreements—it would be out of order to go into them—give preferential treatment in one country in respect of the tax which a resident has to bear compared with that which a foreigner can enjoy—if one can enjoy a tax. For instance, the Chief Secretary will agree that the Withholding Tax in the United States of America at the moment is at the rate of 30 per cent. for—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I must again ask the hon. Gentleman to restrain himself and confine himself to the Statutory Instrument before the House.

Mr. Clark: What I was trying to do was to prove that the Swedish Order, and any other double taxation Order which comes before the House between now and the next Budget—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: We are not concerned with any other Order which may come before the House. We are concerned only with this one.

Mr. Clark: Speaking on the Swedish Order—

The Chief Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. John Diamond): Hear, hear.

Mr. Clark: I am delighted that the Chief Secretary is paying attention to this. I think he will agree with me that the Swedish Order must be renegotiated if the tax structure of this country changes as a result of the next Budget. All our agreements, including the Swedish Order, must be renegotiated because, whether it be for Income Tax or Estate Duty—the Swedish Order deals only with Estate Duty—the imposition of a projected capital gains tax, tied up with our Estate Duty, is not mentioned in the Swedish Order. One of the articles in the Swedish Order says that there would be an exchange of information between the two contracting parties, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Another question which I should like to ask the Financial Secretary is: was there any discussion with Sweden in view of the fact that this Statutory Instrument was in abeyance? Was there an exchange of information between the two countries as to the eventual result and the effect of the proposed capital gains tax which the Chancellor of the Exchequer intends to introduce next April?
If the Financial Secretary answers those questions to our satisfaction, I am sure that, without going into any other double taxation relief, we on this side will be very happy

Sir Harmar Nicholls: We should like to be assured, if possible, that we are getting from Sweden as good as we are giving under this Order. If the Financial Secretary could give attention to that matter, I should be happy.

10.27 p.m.

The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Niall MacDermot): The hon. Member for Nottingham, South (Mr. William Clark) is labouring under a misapprehension, namely, that it was we who negotiated this agreement with the Swedish Government. It was in fact done by the Conservative Government and the Convention was signed the day before polling day—on 14th October. He should look there for any information which he wants as to the foreknowledge that was given by those negotiating on behalf of Her Majesty with the Swedes about the forthcoming capital gains tax, which was a prominent plank of the Labour Party in the election campaign. It may well be that those conducting the negotiations, realising that there would be a change of Government, warned the Swedish Government of the shape of things to come, just as some people in the City advised investors before polling day of what the consequences of a capital gains tax would be. The hon. Member said that people are terribly worried about this uncertainty. I sometimes wonder whether it is the uncertainty of what faces them which worries them or the certainty.
Let me turn to the Order and answer the hon. Gentleman's questions. He asked me to explain what the Order did, and I will seek shortly to do that. The Motion seeks approval for this

Convention, and it arises in this way. As the hon. Gentleman said, this agreement is to replace the Convention which was contained in the 1961 Order. That was limited in scope because at that time agreements with countries such as Sweden whose death duties are different in character from ours had to be made under Section 77 of the Finance Act, 1948. That could provide only for the adoption of a situs code for determining the situation of the property for death duty purposes. The use of such a code reduces but does not entirely eliminate double taxation.
By Section 29 of the Finance Act, 1962, we are authorised to make a comprehensive agreement of a credit type with any country which has a death duty, whatever form it takes. The major difference between the proposed new Swedish agreement and the old one, therefore, is that the new agreement includes provision for each country to grant a credit against its own duty for duty charged by the other country on the same property in cases where double taxation is not otherwise eliminated under the terms of the agreement.
The hon. Member asked why this is confined to Sweden. The reason is that when the 1962 legislation became effective, the Swedes asked us for a comprehensive death duty agreement to replace the limited 1961 agreement. The Order is the result of those negotiations

Mr. Stratton Mills: The Financial Secretary will appreciate that it is extremely difficult to follow this closely-reasoned argument. Can he give an example of the position under the situs situation as against what will now be the current situation?

Mr. MacDermot: I can give the hon. Member a great deal of technical detail if he wants it. I do not know how much the House wishes me to go into details of that kind. An example which would meet the point raised by the hon. Member is that a liability for death duty in both countries normally arises because property is regarded by British law as situated in Great Britain and by Swedish law as situated in Sweden and both countries, therefore, charge duty regardless of the domicile of the deceased person. Article IV of the Order provides an agreed code of rules for determining the situation of the various types of property.
Again, if a person domiciled in Great Britain had property situated in Sweden, or vice versa, where double taxation still arises, for that reason Article VI provides for the country of domicile to allow a credit against duty for the duty charged in the other country

Mr. Stratton Mills: I understand that to be the position following the Order. In the example given by the hon. and learned Gentleman, what would have been the position before the Order?

Mr. MacDermot: The position before the Order was that we were limited to the situs code.
The hon. Member for Peterborough (Sir Harmar Nicholls) asked whether there was full reciprocity under the agreement. I assure him that there is. The hon. Member for Nottingham, South, asked what would be the position when the capital gains tax is introduced in the next Budget. I cannot give a firm answer to that until the full details of those provisions are known. I am advised that it may well be that no further agreement will be required. If, however, any further agreement is required, it probably would merely take the form of a fairly short supplementary agreement.
There is, I believe, a form of capital gains tax in Sweden, although it is different in character from the one the nature of which my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced recently. I think that in Sweden death is not treated as a realisation. Obviously, therefore, for this purpose there will be differences. Sweden is, however, one of the many countries which have had a capital gains tax of one form or another for some time.
The hon. Member for Nottingham, South, also asked me to comment on the fact that our Estate Duty is much higher than the Swedish. I am sure that it will not have escaped his attention that there has bean a Socialist Government in Sweden for over 30 years; and no doubt, when the present Government have been in power for a like period, he will find that the Estate Duty will have been suitably lowered.

Mr. William Clark: Would not the Financial Secretary agree that if to our Estate Duty is to be added a capital gains tax, although our Estate Duty at present

runs at 80 per cent., the duty may be deducted but it is deducted from the total estate and not from duty? Will he comment on this?

Sir Harmar Nicholls: In answering that question, can the hon. and learned Gentleman give an assurance that as in Sweden, if the Socialist Government continue here, it will be a private enterprise Socialist Government, as Sweden's is?

Mr. MacDermot: The hon. Member knows that we are committed to a mixed economy in which we want to see a thriving private sector and a thriving public sector. The answer to the hon. Member's question is as contained in the statement made by my right hon. Friend the other day—any capital gains tax paid will be deductible from the amount of the estate for Estate Duty purposes.

Mr. William Clark: Surely, this is a little different from deducting capital gains tax from the actual Estate Duty. To deduct it just from the estate does not give the taxpayer the same relief as deducting capital gains tax from the Estate Duty.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that, on the ratification by the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden of the Conventions set out in the Schedule to the Order entitled the Double Taxation Relief (Estate Duty) (Sweden) Order 1964, a draft of which was laid before this House on 27th November, an Order may be made in the form of that draft.

To he presented by Privy Councillors or Members of Her Majesty's Household.

TEACHING COUNCIL (SCOTLAND) BILL

Order for Second Reading read.

Bill referred to the Scottish Grand Committee.—[Mrs. Hart.]

TRANSPORT SERVICES (RUISLIP-NORTHWOOD)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Whitlock.]

10.36 p.m.

Mr. F. P. Crowder: I am glad to have the opportunity to discuss the question of the London Transport No. 232 bus service and the train service on the Metropolitan Line. I wish to start with the bus service. It is the only form of public transport now available to my constituents travelling from north to south of the constituency.
The service, in fact, begins at Southall Garage, which is, I believe, a garage that has experienced more labour trouble than almost any other garage in the area. The buses go from there to Greenford, then to Eastcote, and then to Northwood. Before April, 1963, there was a single service which operated between the Eastcote Arms and Northwood. That was the No. 225 service. It ran during the peak periods at, roughly, seven-minute intervals.
That service was fairly satisfactory. Compared with the present No. 232 service it was eminently satisfactory. Unfortunately, the London Transport Board intervened. It altered that service. It did so to suit its own arrangements, its own organisation, and, as it has done before, it did so without any form of consideration for the people who travel on it, and it did so—which is almost incredible—without any consultation at all with the local authorities which, after all, know about these matters.
As I said earlier, it is the only bus route from north to south by public transport. It serves three large secondary schools en route and also three luncheon clubs which provide cheap lunches for old people at reasonable prices.
We have had two deputations from the council to the Board. One was on 23rd October, 1963, and the other was led by me personally on 30th July this year. On 30th July we pointed out—and I summarise a schedule—that on the 28th and the 29th, taking a morning and an afternoon, only 59 buses ran, against the

schedule of 74. Seven of those buses, curiously enough, ran early. There was a six-and-a-half minute service schedule. One of them was 13 minutes late, another was 20 minutes late, another was 22 minutes late, another was 30 minutes late, another was 48 minutes late and another was 49 minutes late. There was no question of argument about that at all.
To give the House an example of how old people are affected, there is a luncheon club at the Cavendish Pavilion and people have had to wait for one hour and over in order to get a bus from the Cavendish or to it. I was down there this morning and I spoke to a charming old lady, Mrs. Jones, at the bus stop at Eastcote. She told me that she had had to wait for as long as one-and-a-half hours in order to get away from that club.
I know that figures and statistics do not always mean a great deal but in two months, September and October, 1,009 lunches were served to old people compared with 1,383 in the year before. I have not the figures for the last two months, but those which I have given are an indication of how old people are unable to take advantage of the facilities open to them at the Cavendish dining club because at this time of year—and winter is to come—they cannot be expected to wait in cold and hard weather conditions, possibly at a bus stop in pouring rain, sleet or snow, for 45 minutes to one-and-a-half hours in order to get a cheap luncheon and to enjoy it as they wish.
There is also the question of Mount Vernon Hospital, which is somewhat isolated. The service is supposed to connect with the No. 347 bus. The fact is that owing to these shortages of drivers from the Southall garage, the connections are never valid. The result is that people sometimes have to hire taxis. My council has before it a case, among many, in which an old lady whose husband was seriously ill in Mount Vernon was forced to take taxis, costing her no less than £10, which she could ill afford, in order to visit her husband while he was in hospital. We are not dealing here with the Highlands but with a constituency situated in the suburbs only 16, 17 or 18 miles from London.
I will tell hon. Members what has happened in the Mount Vernon service.


Some people walk one-and-a-half miles from Northwood. Some people are fortunate enough to have a car which they use, or to have a friend with a car who gives them a lift. On occasions some people can afford a taxi.
It was rather putting out to those who are concerned in these matters to read a letter signed by a person called Robbins from the London Transport Board, dated 16th October, in which he said that a survey had been made and the Board was satisfied, having seen the number of passengers concerned, that there was no reason for doing what we have been asking it to do—to put on a service to meet the requirements of the hospital staff and those who wished to visit relatives during visiting hours in the evening.
Of course, what Mr. Robbins says is exactly right. Of course, there is no demand. It is rather like British Railways saying, "There is going to be a fast train to London at 9.0 o'clock" and putting it on the timetable, and leaving it there for a year and a half—but the train never runs. Then some official is sent down from the Ministry to see if there is a demand for it. Surely it is no surprise, people having learned that the train never runs, that there is not a great number of people waiting for it. It is that sort of ostrich type of attitude of the London Transport Board which my constituents really do find more than irksome.
I suppose the kindest thing I can say about the Board is that it means well, but I think that psychologically it is the whole time looking for reasons why it should not have to overcome difficulties which, after all, are there to be overcome. The whole time it is looking how it can avoid particular difficulties, rather than facing them, and attempting to meet the universal—I think I can almost use the word—outrage and demand which, having regard to the number of letters, and the attitude of my council, there is in Ruislip and Northwood at the moment.
The fact is that people know that this service does not operate, and they have simply given up using it. They have tried to find other ways and means, be they their own cars, be they taxis, be they their friends, of circumventing it. The Board, I am sure through no fault of its own, but because of staff shortage,

in a sense having created that situation, cannot now simply hide behind it and say there is no demand; because in effect the Board, because of its own difficulties, has made a situation which it is not able to meet and accordingly has dodged round it.
The other problem is the one of the school children. I have here a letter typical of hundreds I have received, and it says:
My younger daughter who is 10 years old and therefore not permitted to take a bicycle to school depends on the local bus service to take her to school at the other end of Eastcote. Recently she has waited anything from 35 to 40 minutes at Meadway bus stop in the mornings on many occasions, and several times has had to walk the considerable distance to Field End School, arriving anxious or late"—
one knows only too well what being late to school means to a child—
either because no bus came at all, or because, when it did eventually arrive, it was of course full up.
That is one of many letters which one could quote, and which one has received time and again on this subject.
Of course the council is a highly competent body in Ruislip-Northwood, and proud of running the district extremely efficiently, and naturally, when things got so bad, it could afford the suggestion, "For goodness sake, while we fully understand that the London Transport Board is not capable of dealing with this problem, why on earth cannot we run our own bus service? What would be the attitude if we were to go to the Traffic Commissioners and apply for a private licence? Then everybody could be happy." It was intimated to the council that if any such application were to be made it would be blocked and opposed by the Transport Board, which holds the monopoly.
I can see its difficulties there, because quite obviously, if the council were to run its own bus service, which I know, having regard to its efforts in different directions, would be extremely efficient, that would promote even further the labour trouble. But at the same time we were almost pressed to this point, and, although on the friendliest possible terms with the Board, things got so bad in the district that the council felt bound to mention it, and I think it should be of interest to the House that that is the reply that was received.
I am not going to say any more about this bus route. I know that staff shortages are the problem, and I shall have a word to say on that in a moment or two.
I now want to say something about the Metropolitan Line. I do not expect you will remember, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, but I initiated a debate on this line many years ago. I am glad to say that since then about £9 million has been spent on modernisation. It is only fair to say that after that money had been spent there was some slight improvement to begin with, but now the situation is not as good as it was before the money was spent.
The situation, in short, is that in the peak period—I am speaking of trains which go to the City of London—700 people have to stand every morning in what is called the Pinner Group, and in effect that is the area between Northwood and the Harrow area. That number has been agreed between Mr. Sturch, the Chairman of the Joint Transport Committee, and the Transport Users' Consultative Committee, which negotiates with the London Transport Board organisation. When complaint is made, it is said that it is due to staff shortage.
I have here a short schedule which will show in a nutshell what is happening, and I am dealing with trains from Northwood, and first trains. For instance, the 5.43 from Rickmansworth now runs at 5.52, in the early hours. The 5.59 from Watford now runs at 6.8. The 6.50 has been cancelled. The 7.5 to Liverpool Street has been cancelled. The 7.19 to Baker Street has been cancelled. The 7.26 to Aldgate has been cut back to Baker Street, and ends there. The 7.45 semi-fast to Aldgate has been cancelled. The 8.10 semi-fast has been reverted to slow because the 8.24 from Harrow has been cancelled. The 8.45 semi-fast, now the 8.44, stops additionally at Harrow because the 8.48 has been cancelled. The 9.4 has been cancelled. The 9.19 to Moorgate has been cancelled. That leaves a 20-minute gap, and the normal off-peak service should be 15 minutes. I merely point out that all those trains are on the fringe of the peak.
From the point of view of the comfort of passengers, there is this question of the sliding doors. Of necessity, and there is no avoiding it, these trains have to stop, and when they stop the doors have

to open, and they remain open for a considerable time. Mr. Deputy-Speaker, if the countryside where you woke up was as white as it was where I did, you can imagine what it is like for a business man travelling to London having to sit near one of those open doors for quite long periods time after time.
I think that it was I who in this House ventured to suggest that the new stock should remain the compartment-type stock of the type used by Southern Railways, and my suggestion to the Minister tonight is that the present stock, which has been provided under the £9 million expenditure to which I referred earlier. should, when convenient, and when economically possible, be handed over to the District Line, and that the Metropolitan Line should return to the traditional compartment-type stock.
I deal, finally, with public relations. Public relations have been, in one sense, extremely happy. The committees have worked together. But the fact is that the Transport Users' Consultative Committee, which is the London Transport Committee, is in practice nothing more or less than a thick wrapping of cotton wool between the operative staff of London Transport and their public relations. If we are to get things really done and moving, as I know London Transport would wish, surely the Joint Transport Committee does not need to go through all that business before it can approach the operational staff.
There is nobody more efficient than Mr. Sturch or Mr. Thompson, who is the Secretary of the Joint Transport Committee, which represents a large number of bodies, and I hope that in future something more direct can be arranged in that respect.
Finally, we were told at the meeting on 30th January that central buses are several thousand busmen short. I know that shortage of staff is a difficulty with which London Transport Board is faced, but the feeling is growing that it is not a particularly attractive employer. I am wondering whether the Minister cannot see fit at some stage to intervene and see what is wrong with it, and why it is so many thousand staff short. What is wrong with its arrangements? That is the whole basis of the matter which is affecting my constituents so acutely at present.

10.56 p.m.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Mr. Stephen Swingler): If hon. Members want a reply to an Adjournment debate they must learn to discipline themselves a little better. The hon. and learned Member has taken well over 20 minutes out of the 30 minutes available. I would have been willing for other hon. Members to join in the debate, but I have not been allowed much time to comment on a great deal of detailed stuff which the hon. Member has produced. Perhaps he thought that I was going to follow the example of one of his hon. Friends, when Parliamentary Secretary in the last Administration, who, having listened to the Adjournment debate—I believe it was raised by the hon. and learned Member himself—got up and said, "This subject is the managerial responsibility of London Transport, and it has nothing to do with me. I will see that it is all reported to the Board", and shut up after two minutes. I know that these sort of matters cannot be raised under the rules of the House at Question Time, but so long as the rules of the House permit such detailed matters to be raised in an Adjournment debate, hon. Members are entitled to a proper reply.
I start by making it clear that it would be folly on the part of my right hon. Friend or myself to attempt to intervene in such detailed matters as the hon. and learned Member has raised tonight—matters of train times and bus schedules—which are clearly the managerial responsibility of London Transport. In the first part of what I have to say, I will be briefly reporting information supplied by the London Transport Board on the situation. Afterwards, if there is time, I shall make one or two comments on the general situation.
I am in full sympathy with the hon. and learned Member's constituents. I agree with him entirely that this is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. I know that the London Transport Board is very conscious of the defects that have been revealed here. I will comment first on the Metropolitan Line. I understand that following meetings early in 1964 the Board made several improvements in the scheduled services which had been suggested by the Joint Transport Committee formed by the residents' associations in the area between Harrow and Northwood.

Unfortunately, staff shortages have since forced the Board to take off trains.
I am informed that London Transport intends to reintroduce some of these trains early in 1965. The Board is trying to produce a regular pattern of train services based on a realistic view of available staff, in preference to what one might regard as an "ideal" timetable, from which trains have to be cut out at very short notice when members of staff are absent. The Board is endeavouring to see that the train times which are advertised are realistic, and to ensure that if cancellations have to be made, proper notice is given.
We know, of course, that the No. 232 bus service has been the subject of complaint for quite a long time, and, on the information which I have, the Board agrees that as much as one-sixth of the scheduled mileage on this route has at times not bean operated, owing entirely to a shortage of drivers. When the scheduled service is operating fully, the London Transport Board takes the view that it is capable of meeting the passenger demand. Clearly, from some of the things said by the hon. and learned Gentleman. there is a good deal of conflict of evidence, between traffic censuses which the Board has undertaken as recently as 6th October and some of the figures which he produced about times during which passengers have to wait for buses and so on.
Basically, the difficulty is in the recruitment of drivers. This is particularly difficult in west and north-west London, because of the alternative opportunities for industrial employment which exist throughout this area. All that I have said emphasises that these are managerial responsibilities of the London Transport Board. It would be foolish and improper of my right hon. Friend or myself to intervene in these matters, which are duties imposed on the Board itself.
In spite of what the hon. and learned Member has said, I must emphasise that, under Section 56 of the Transport Act, it is the duty of the Transport Users' Consultative Committee to consider the sort of complaints which he has put forward tonight, or which are put forward by any large body of citizens, and which affect the services and facilities which are provided by any of the Transport Boards. That is the place where the consumers'


voice can be heard, and we advise that that facility of the Consultative Committee should be fully used.
We are very concerned about the transport conditions in London, and conditions for travellers in general. We recognise that the problems confronting the London Transport Board are immense, and are part of the colossal problems in transport which we, as a Government, have inherited. The hon. and learned Gentleman himself referred to the Phelps Brown Committee's Report. I should have liked to have read several extracts from that, if I had had the time. This Report showed what an immense problem the recruitment of busmen in the London area is. The Report explained that the busmen's job had become unattractive in comparison with many other jobs, especially because of the amount of evening and weekend work.
Since the report was made and because of negotiations that followed it, steps have been taken to improve the conditions of busmen by increases in take-home pay, better sick pay and the promise of the introduction next year of a 40-hour week and extra holidays for long-service staff. This seems, at the moment at any rate, to have halted the decline in staff in London Transport, but, nevertheless, as the local situation which the hon. and learned Gentleman spoke of reveals, there are still many places where short staffing is causing very great difficulty.
The London Transport Board has a statutory duty to pay its way. It has a statutory duty to provide adequate services and it is confronted with the increasing congestion on London's roads brought about by the general increase in traffic, resulting from the increase in employment in Central London and the increasing number of people driving to work in

motor cars at peak hours. This is illustrated in the most recent Annual Report of the London Transport Board. If I have time I will quote parts of that document. It stated:
During the period 1952–63, when street capacity has been substantially increased by road improvements and traffic engineering schemes, the number of vehicles coming into the area has gone up by 34,600 (58 per cent.) yet the number of passengers carried has gone down by 20,500 (6 per cent.) and traffic congestion is worse.
The Report showed that in central London we reached the position where there were 2,000 fewer buses and 9,000 fewer pedal cycles coming into the area, but their place had been more than filled by an extra 36,000 cars and 9,000 extra motor cycles coming into the area during peak hours.
We have inherited this position partly because of the policies, or lack of them, of the previous Administration in permitting more and more office building in central London by failing to put a brake on office building in the area; and this congestion and disruption of public transport has become—

Mr. John Page: rose—

Mr. Swingler: Only seconds remain. I cannot give way. As I was saying—

Mr. Crowder: On a point of order. This business of office building is purely political and—

The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at six minutes past Eleven o'clock.